Scenario 2. Two firms, A and B, each currently dump 50 tons of chemicals into the local river. The government has decided to reduce the pollution and from now on will require a pollution permit for each ton of pollution dumped into the river. It costs Firm A $100 for each ton of pollution that it eliminates before it reaches the river, and it costs Firm B $50 for each ton of pollution that it eliminates before it reaches the river. The government gives each firm 20 pollution permits. Government officials are not sure whether to allow the firms to buy or sell the pollution permits to each other.
Refer to Scenario 2. What is the total cost of reducing pollution if the firms are allowed to buy and sell permits from each other? if firms are not allowed to buy and sell pollution permits from each other?
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- Table 2 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Lisa and Mark, own wells that produce sa drinking water. Each week Lisa and Mark work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the Time left 1:5 bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Lisa and Mark can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: Quantity (in gallons) 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000 1,100 1,200 Select one: Price O a. $60 O b. $20 O c. $40 O d. $70 $120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Refer to Table 2. If Lisa and Mark operate as a profit-maximizing monopoly in the market for water, what price will they charge? Total Revenue (and Total Profit) $0 11,000 20,000 27,000 32,000 35,000 36,000 35,000 32,000 27,000 20,000 11,000 0arrow_forwardMany economists would consider an efficient level of pollution control to occur where the marginal benefit of reducing pollution is ____________ the marginal cost of reducing pollution. a. greater than b. equal to c. less thanarrow_forward12.4 The Fireyear and Goodstone Rubber Companies are two firms located in the rubber capital of the world. These factories produce finished rubber and sell that rubber into a highly competitive world market at the fixed price of $60 per ton. The process of producing a ton of rubber also results in a ton of air pollution that affects the rubber capital of the world. This 1:1 relationship between rubber output and pollution is fixed and immutable at both factories. Consider the following information regarding the costs (in $) of producing rubber at the two factories (QF and QG): Fireyear Costs 300+2Q Marginal costs 4QF Goodstone 500+ Q 2QG Total pollution emissions generated are EF + EG = QF +QG. Marginal damage from pol- lution is equal to $12 per ton of pollution. a. In the absence of regulation, how much rubber would be produced by each firm? What is the profit for each firm? b. The local government decides to impose a Pigovian tax on pollution in the community. What is the proper…arrow_forward
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