There is a unit mass of individuals ("sellers") willing to sell their cars to a unit mass of buyers. A half of the sellers has low quality cars and the other half has high quality cars. The seller with a low quality car values it at $1000 and the one with high quality car values it at $2000. The buyers are willing to pay $2400 for a higher quality car and $1200 for a low quality car. Each seller first decides whether to bring his car to the market or not. Each car brought to the market is sold at the price equal to a buyer's willingness to pay given the information available to the buyer. (a)Suppose that the buyers observe the quality of each car. Analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibrium decisions of the sellers' market participation. (b)Suppose the buyers cannot tell the qualities of the cars. How does your equilibrium analysis change?

Principles of Microeconomics
7th Edition
ISBN:9781305156050
Author:N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw
Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics
Section: Chapter Questions
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3. There is a unit mass of individuals (“sellers") willing to sell their cars to a unit mass of
buyers. A half of the sellers has low quality cars and the other half has high quality cars.
The seller with a low quality car values it at $1000 and the one with high quality car values
it at $2000. The buyers are willing to pay $2400 for a higher quality car and $1200 for a
low quality car. Each seller first decides whether to bring his car to the market or not. Each
car brought to the market is sold at the price equal to a buyer's willingness to pay given the
information available to the buyer.
(a)Suppose that the buyers observe the quality of each car. Analyze the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium decisions of the sellers' market participation.
(b)Suppose the buyers cannot tell the qualities of the cars. How does your equilibrium
analysis change?
Transcribed Image Text:3. There is a unit mass of individuals (“sellers") willing to sell their cars to a unit mass of buyers. A half of the sellers has low quality cars and the other half has high quality cars. The seller with a low quality car values it at $1000 and the one with high quality car values it at $2000. The buyers are willing to pay $2400 for a higher quality car and $1200 for a low quality car. Each seller first decides whether to bring his car to the market or not. Each car brought to the market is sold at the price equal to a buyer's willingness to pay given the information available to the buyer. (a)Suppose that the buyers observe the quality of each car. Analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibrium decisions of the sellers' market participation. (b)Suppose the buyers cannot tell the qualities of the cars. How does your equilibrium analysis change?
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