The second game (shown below) is a repeated game. It represents their behavior in two successive periods. Within each period they act simultaneously, but recall what has happened previously. In the second period, In the second period, the players acquire the same payoffs they did in the first, while retaining the payoffs received in the first. The figure below shows only two of the four possible subgames for the second period. Nash Equilibrium (NE) A: Period 1 B: A Period 2 Nash Equilibrium (NE) A: B: X X X A: 4 B: 1 X X X A: 6 A: 4 A: 7 A: 5 A: 4 A: 2 A:5 A: 3 B: 6 B: 7 B: 4 B: 5 B: 7 B: 8 B:5 B: 6 a. Solve the game by the Rollback method. Identify the dominant strategies and circle the Nash Equilibrium for each subgame and write it above its starting node. A: 2 B: 2 Nash Equilibrium (NE) A: B: X t

Instructions: Show all your work (including bi-matrix and/or game tree when relevant). 1. Two investors have each deposited 4 (all amounts are in $10,000s) with a bank. The bank has invested these deposits in a long-term project. If both investors make withdrawals at date 1 then each receives 2 and the game ends. If only one investor makes a withdrawal at date 1 then that investor receives 4, the other receives 0, and the game ends. Finally, if neither investor makes a withdrawal at date 1 then the project matures and the investors make withdrawal decisions at date 2. If both investors make withdrawals at date 2 then each receives 8 and the game ends. If only one investor makes a withdrawal at date 2 then that investor receives 10, the other receives 6, and the game ends. Finally, if neither investor makes a withdrawal at date 2 then the bank returns 8 to each investor and the game ends. Find the subgame-perfect outcomes.

please do not provide solution in image format thank you!

Solve the game with the given payoff matrix.   P = -6 0 1 -9 0 0 0 -1 -2 a) Find the optimal row player strategy  b) Find the optimal column player strategy  c) Find the expected value of the game