The inverse market demand curve is P(Y) = 365-2Y, where Y = YA+YB, and the total cost function for any firm in the industry is TC(y) = 5y + 10. Assume there are two firms, A and B, and they follow the Cournot model behavior. What would be the equlibrium output for firm A? Answer is an integer.

The inverse market demand curve is P(Y) = 365-2Y, where Y = YA+YB, and the total cost function for any firm in the industry is TC(y) = 5y + 10. Assume there are two firms, A and B, and they follow the Cournot model behavior. What would be the equlibrium output for firm A? Answer is an integer.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

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The inverse market demand curve is P(Y) = 365-2Y, where Y = YA + YB, and the total cost function for any firm in the industry is TC(y) = 5y + 10. Assume there are two firms, A and B,
and they follow the Cournot model behavior. What would be the equlibrium output for firm A? Answer is an integer.

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