The game features two players, namely Player A and Playes B, each expipped with thure strategies as cla Player B Player A AI A2 A3 131 50,60 60; 44 65,20 B2 15,69 20,55 40;60 B3 45,40 25,30 50,45 hat is the payoff received by Player B assuming he plays his secure strategy?

Consider the extensive form game shown here. The top payoff at a terminal node is for player 1. Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria for the game below.

Question 4. Zeynep and Mehmet will eventually play the following game. Mehmet L R U 3,1 0,0 Zeynep D 0,3 1,3 In a preliminary stage, Zeynep has already asked Mehmet to allow her to move first and proposed to pay him 1 unit of her own payoff in exchange. So Mehmet has to options: • If he accepts Zeynep's offer: they will play the sequential move version of the above game in which Zeynep moves first. Mehmet will receive 1 unit of utility more, and Zeynep will receive 1 unit of utility less (in any outcome of the game) compared to the payoffs given in the bimatrix. 2 • If he rejects Zeynep's offer: they will play the simultaneous move game. a. Represent this strategic interaction in a game tree. b. How many information sets does each player have? c. Characterize the set of pure strategies for both players. d. Present this game as a normal-form game, and characterize the set of pure strategy Nash equi- libria.

Consider the following coordination game: Player 2P1   Comedy Show Concert Comedy Show 11,5 0,0 Concert 0,0 2,2 a. Find the Nash equilibrium(s) for this game.b. Now assume Player 1 and Player 2 have distributional preferences.  Specifically, both people greatly care about the utility of the other person.  In fact, they place equal weight on their outcome and the other person’soutcome, ρ = σ = ½. Find the Nash equilibrium(s) with these utilitarianpreferences.c. Now consider the case where Player1 and Player2 do not like each other.  Specifically, any positive outcome for the other person is viewed as anegative outcome for the individual, ρ = σ = -1. Find the Nashequilibrium(s) with these envious preferences.

Consider the payoff matrix below, which describes a symmetric A B A 17,17 0,14 B 14,0 8,8 (a) Find all Nash equilibria of this game, including any mixed strategy equilibria. (b) Draw the expected payoff difference diagram for this game, including all the Nash equilibria you found in (a). is (c) What would you expect to occur most frequently when this game played as a lab experiment? Justify your answer using your answers from (a) and (b).

Paramter y = 0  If ⟨a, d⟩ is played in the first period and ⟨b, e⟩ is played in the second period, whatis the resulting (repeated game) payoff for the row player?

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Exercise 6.8. Consider the following extensive-form game with cardinal payoffs: 1 R O player pay 000 2 1 M 3 b 010 O player 3's payoff 1 2 221 2 000 0 0 (a) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Which ones are also subgame perfect? (b) [This is a more challenging question] Prove that there is no mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where Player 1 plays Mwith probability strictly between 0 and 1.

Please solve it complete with details and explanation

Find ALL pure-atrategy Subgame Nash Equilibria (you may ignore mixed strategies). Be sure to pay attention to which player is which! N Y 2,2 R R 4, 4 8,2 2,8 0,0 2)