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QD1 = 12-4P1 + P2, QS1 = 3+2P1-5P2. solve for P equilibrium and Q equilibrium

Exercise 1.12. Consider the following game. There is a club with three members: Ann, Bob and Carla. They have to choose which of the three is going to be president next year. Currently Ann is the president. Each member is both a candidate and a voter. Voting is as follows: each member votes for one candidate (voting for oneself is allowed); if two or more people vote for the same candidate then that person is chosen as the next president; if there is complete disagreement, in the sense that there is exactly one vote for each candidate, then the person from whom Ann voted is selected as the next president. (a) Represent this voting procedure as a game frame, indicating inside each cell of each table which candidate is elected. (b) Assume that the players' preferences are as follows: AnnAm Carla Ann Bob, Carla Bob Ann, Bob Carla Ann Caria Carla. Using utility values 0, 1 and 2, convert the game frame into a game. (c) Apply the IDWDS to the game of part (b). Is there a weak iterated…

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Hello, please help me to solve part (d) and (e):Charlie finds two fifty-pence pieces on the floor. His friend Dylan is standing next to him when he finds them. Chris can offer Dylan nothing at all, one of the fifty-pence pieces, or both. Dylan observes the offer made by Charlie, and can either accept the offer (in which case they each receive the split specified by Charlie) or reject the offer.If he rejects the offer, each player gets nothing at all (because Charlie is embarassed and throws the moneyaway).(a) Formulate this interaction as an extensive-form game. To keep things simple, players’ payoff is equal to their monetary gain.(b) List all histories of the game. Split these into terminal and non-terminal histories.(c) What are the strategies available to Charlie? What are the strategies available to Dylan? Draw the strategic-form game.(d) Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game.(e) What do you think will happen?

Each stock listed on the New York Stock Exchange is allocated to a specialist, who is responsible for maintaining an orderly market. This person has a specific location on the floor of the exchange known as

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No1 ) Rob works as a loan officer for a major U.S. commercial bank, specializing in international loans. When considering loans to governments and businesses in other nations, Rob Multiple Choice must be aware of federal limits on the total amount of U.S. funds his bank can lend to foreign borrowers.   can only make loans if his bank has funds in excess of those sought by American firms.   is likely to approve loans to foreign borrowers if the return is high enough to justify the risk. must increase the dollar volume of loans they make to customers.   must pay more to borrow from the Fed.   have fewer funds available for lending.   will find their balance sheets temporarily out of balance.   must be careful to get approval from the International Monetary Fund.   No. 2) When the Fed increases the reserve requirement, banks   Multiple Choice must increase the dollar volume of loans they make to customers.   must pay more to borrow from the Fed.…

Economics Explain in detail how you would extend the Cox- Ross{Rubinstein binomial tree model for pricing options if instead of considering two states of nature in each period you consider three states of nature (e.g. a good state, a middle state and a bad state). Focus on a tree with two periods (periods 0, 1 and 2) and draw the corresponging trinomial tree.

An individual has a vNM utility function over money of u(x)= x, where x is final wealth. She currently has $8 and can choose among the following three lotteries. Which lottery will she choose? • Lottery 1: Give up her $8 and face the gamble (0.1, 0.5, 0.4) over final wealth levels ($1, $8, $27). • Lottery 2: Keep her $8. • Lottery 3: Give up her $8 and face the gamble (0.2, 0.8,0.0) over final wealth levels ($1, $8, $27) O Lottery 1 O Lottery 2 Lottery 3 O They are indifferent between lotteries 1 and 2 O They are indifferent between lotteries 2 and 3 O They are indifferent between lotteries 1 and 3 O They are indifferent between all three lotteris