Rich Uncle Pennybags is the only seller of board games in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The inverse demand curve for board games is given by: P= 40–0.5q where q is in hundreds of games per month. Rich Uncle Pennybags' marginal cost of producing board games is: MC =7+0.1q . Suppose Uncle Pennybags is a magnificent salesman, able to discern perfectly his customers' willingness to pay. If he leverages this information to begin perfectly price discriminating, how many board games will he sell?

Rich Uncle Pennybags is the only seller of board games in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The inverse demand curve for board games is given by: P= 40–0.5q where q is in hundreds of games per month. Rich Uncle Pennybags' marginal cost of producing board games is: MC =7+0.1q . Suppose Uncle Pennybags is a magnificent salesman, able to discern perfectly his customers' willingness to pay. If he leverages this information to begin perfectly price discriminating, how many board games will he sell?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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