Question 19 Two firms both produce leather boots. The inverse demand equation is given by P = 320 - 2Q, where Pis the price of boots in USD/pair and Q is quantity of boots in million pair. The cost function is given by: C(Q) = 80Q. If the two firms are collusive oligopolists (a cartel), the profit level for the entire cartel is equal to: O 6,400 4,800 O 6,200 O 7,200

Question 19 Two firms both produce leather boots. The inverse demand equation is given by P = 320 - 2Q, where Pis the price of boots in USD/pair and Q is quantity of boots in million pair. The cost function is given by: C(Q) = 80Q. If the two firms are collusive oligopolists (a cartel), the profit level for the entire cartel is equal to: O 6,400 4,800 O 6,200 O 7,200

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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