Oculus and Maxygen are small drug companies. Oculus has obtained a patent on a new antibiotic that is effective against an emerging superbug—a bacteria that is resistant to traditional antibiotics. Unfortunately, the Oculus drug has severe side​ effects, making the drug unsuitable except for patients who are desperate.     Ownership of this drug is worth ​$20 million to Oculus under the current situation. Maxygen has a patent on another drug that is of no therapeutic value in itself so the drug generates no current income for Maxygen. ​ However, when combined in a particular way with the Oculus​ drug, it dramatically reduces the negative side effects. The value of the two drugs together is estimated at ​$55 million. Maxygen is negotiating to sell its patent to Oculus. Situations of this type are fairly common in the drug business and sales of patent rights are common. ​ However, sometimes negotiations over such sales take a long time and sometimes negotiations are unsuccessful. Why would such wasteful outcomes​ occur? Nash bargaining sometimes fails because   A. the parties have incomplete information.   B. the parties are not concerned about payoffs.   C. the parties move simultaneously.   D. the parties are too honest.   E. the parties are overly rational

Esperanza Aquile is planning to create a driving school. She has two main options: First option: To locate the school in Madrid where the demand function is Q = 50+ 100P+30P2 Second option: to launch the school in Barceola with a demand function: Q = 15000-90P2. Variable costs: 15 euros Fixed costs: 10000 euros Fixed costs and Variable costs are the same for every city. Using this information please calculate profits and recommend where Esperanza should locate her school. There's a need to use a profit equation: Profit= Price*Quantity + Variable Cost* Quantity - Fixed Costs. Here we should have a profit funcion. Then there's need to derivate the function with respect to P and then check it if the price is minimum or maximum.

The following are the demand and supply functions for three competing mobile phone models ofdifferent manufacturers. ??? = ?? − ???? + ??? + ?????? = ???? − ????? = ?? + ??? − ??? + ?????? = ??? − ????? = ?? + ??? + ??? − ?????? = ??? − ??Using Gaussian Elimination Method determine whether there are prices which would bring thesupply and demand levels into equilibrium for each of the three mobile phone models. If so, what are the equilibrium demand and supply quantities?You may get the three equations of market equilibrium condition by equating ???with ??? , ??? ???? ??? and ??????? ???.

Toyota Pregame Show First Quarter Chevrolet Pregame Show $5million $5 million $3 million $3 million First Quarter $6 million $6 million Based on these answers, Toyota has a dominant strategy to: $4 million always purchase a pregame ad, regardless of what Chevrolet does. always purchase a first quarter ad, regardless of what Chevrolet does. only purchase a pregame ad if they know Chevrolet will do the same. $4 million

"Let Q =S[n-2(PAP)] be the demand for a firm product in a monopolistic competition market, where P is the firm s price, AP is average price in the industry and n is the number of firms in the industry. Suppose S = 1440 is Home market size; S = 2560 is Foreign market size. Suppose firms are symmetric in each country. Home s firms have a total cost C = 20 + 4Q and Foreign s firms have a total cost C = 20 + 5Q. The equilibrium number of firms at Home under autarchy is: " 6 8 10 10 12

Suppose that two corporations, Analytica and Bobmetrics, are negotiating the share of profit from a time sensitive joint project. The total profit generated by the project is £10 million. However, every day that the deal is delayed reduces the value of the total profit by £1 million. The way the negotiation is set up is the following: in the first day, Analytica’s lawyers propose a split of the profits, and Bobmetrics’ lawyers can agree, or they can discuss it some more and make their own offer on the second day. After that the two teams alternate. Analytica gets to make proposals on days 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, while Bobmetrics makes proposals on days 2, 4, 6, 8 an 10. On day 11, the profit from the joint project becomes 0. The negotiations stop when either company accepts the proposal of the other, or on day 11. Find the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this dynamic negotiation game. What happens when the loss of value is slower or faster? What conclusions can you draw? Briefly explain…

You are a manager in a market composed of eight firms, each of which has a 12.5% market share. The premerger Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for this market equals If any two of these firms merge, the post-merger HHI equals Based on this information and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines described in this course, which of the following statements is true? A. A merger like this leads to an unconcentrated market and is typically permitted. B. A merger like this leads to a moderately concentrated market and potentially raises antitrust concerns. C. A merger like this leads to a highly concentrated market and potentially raises antitrust concerns. D. A merger like this leads to a highly concentrated market, is presumed to enhance market power, and will almost certainly be blocked. E. Other/None of the above/Not enough information provided. O

A telecom incumbent owns the upstream network and is currently a monopoly retail supplier. The incumbet has fixed cost of F=1.4 and marginal cost of co=0.3 per call for its upstream network. The incumbent's retail marginal cost of a call c₁.25 and its retail price is fixed p₁=0.75. Give the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) rate of access to the incumbent's network. If applicable, give up to two decimal places rounding up the second decimal place, eg use 87.65 instead of 87.647.

Seagate and Western Digital (WD) run a cartel producing identical 1 TB hard drives. The demand for hard drives is Q = 17 – P. They both have MC = 2 and no fixed cost so ATC = 2. This is a lot like the Coke-Pepsi game in the duopoly quantity_game video. You can verify that together the firms maximize their (combined) profit by each making 3.75 hard drives. What profit does Seagate make with this cartel agreement? $

Both Google and Amazon are major players in the smart home market, using their own internally developed smart home control system (Google Assistant and Alexa, respectively). Suppose each is considering a new round of investments into their smart home offerings, which could build on their in-house system or be tailored to a new open source standard system, called Connected Home. Google estimates that it will cost $1.2 billion to build on Google Assistant and $2.0 billion to move to Connected Home. Amazon's projected cost of building on Alexa is $1.1 billion, while the cost of moving to Connected Home is $2.7 billion. As shown in the accompanying table, each company's projected revenues depend not only on the technology it uses, but also on the technology used by its rival, Projected Revenues for Different Combinations of Smart Home Technologies (in billions) Technologies (Google-Amazon) Google's Revenues $12.1 $12.1 $9.8 Amazon's Revenues Google Assistant-Alexa $13.5 Google…