Multiple choice question Which of the following is NOT an assumption of the median voter model? a. single-dimensional voting b. two candidates c. politicians have no ideology d. money impacts elections

Multiple choice question Which of the following is NOT an assumption of the median voter model? a. single-dimensional voting b. two candidates c. politicians have no ideology d. money impacts elections

Microeconomics

13th Edition

ISBN:9781337617406

Author:Roger A. Arnold

Publisher:Roger A. Arnold

Chapter18: Public Choice And Special Interet Group Politics

Section18.3: Voters And Rational Ignorance

Problem 1ST

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Answer to Part AAssume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jonesin an upcoming election.Assuming the following voter preferences:Voter ID Preference (1-9)A 4B 5C 6A. True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smithand Jones will either both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adopts preference 6.
Political Economy Assume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jones in an upcoming election. Voter Id Preference(1-9) A 4 B 5 C 6 True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smith and Jones will either both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adopts preference 6. Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 5. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference? Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences? If the tax in C induces 100%…
Political Economy Assume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jones in an upcoming election. Voter Id Preference(1-9) A 4 B 5 C 6 True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smith and Jones will either both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adopts preference 6. Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 5. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference? Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences? If the tax in C induces 100%…
Political Economy Assume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jones in an upcoming election. Voter Id Preference(1-9) A 4 B 5 C 6 True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smith and Jones will either both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adopts preference 6. B) Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 5. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference? C) Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences? D) If the tax in C induces…
Answers to all 4 partsAssume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-rightspectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the mostright leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jonesin an upcoming election.Assuming the following voter preferences:Voter ID Preference (1-9)A 4B 5C 6A. True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smith and Jones willeither both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adoptspreference 6.B. Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6to 9. B remains at 5. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Joneswill change their preference?C. Keeping the assumptions from…
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