Janeek and Raj are the only two growers who provide organically grown com to a local grocery store. They know that if they cooperated and produced less com, they could raise the price of the corn. If they work independently, they will each earn $100. If they decide to work together and both lower their output, they can each earn $150. If one person lowers output and the other does not, the person who lowers output will earn $0 and the other person will capture the entire market and will earn $200. Reference the game illustrated below where the first payout in each cell is for Janeek and the second is for Raj (J.R) Independent Cooperate Independent ($100, $100) ($0, $200) What is the Nash Equilibrium for this game? (Cooperate, Cooperate) (Cooperate, Independent) (Independent, Cooperate) (Independent, Independent) Cooperate ($200, 50) ($150, $150)

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Mike and Sophie are splitting up and need to decide who will get the car they purchased together. Using the method of sealed bids, Mike bids $5,000 and Sophie bids $4,500 for the car. Since Mike's bid is higher, he gets the car, and has to compensate Sophie with cash. How much will he have to pay Sophie in order to keep the division fair?

Two countries decide to specialize in producing certain goods to export to other countries, and in return they import different goods from these other countries.  The advantage of these exports and imports is: Group of answer choices the country will be able to produce at a point outside your production possibilities frontier. the country will be able to consume at a point outside your production possibilities frontier. the countries will be able to produce and consume at a point outside your production possibilities frontier. the country's production possibilities frontier will shift outward.

= Two firms sell substitutable products; the market price is: P = 90-Q, where Q Q₁ + Q₂ is the total market quantity, which consists of Q₁ (the quantity produced by Firm 1) and Q₂ (the quantity produced by Firm 2). The firms choose their quantities simultaneously. Firm 1's costs are C₁ = 10- 6Q₁ +Q². Firm 2's costs are C₂ = Q². Which is the best response function for Firm 2? O O O O Q₂ = 15. 1 Q₂ = 30 - ²0₁₁ 3 Q₂ = 42 + ²³² Q₁₁ 2 = 1. 3 Q₂ = 45. What is the equilibrium market quantity Q? O Q = 15.25. O Q = 30. Q = 46.5. O Q = 50. What is the equilibrium market price P? O P = 90. O P = 60. O P = 43.5. O P = 10.

Suppose there are two manufacturers of Electronics, Samsung and LG. When producing electronics, both of these companies emit pollution into the air. Currently each company emits 50 tons of pollution into the atmosphere. The government has recently introduced a policy to limit the amount of pollution these companies can omit by only giving them 25 pollution permits each. Each permit can be used to emit 1 ton of pollution or it can be sold to another manufacturer. For Samsung to reduce pollution it would cost $120 per ton of pollution, while for LG it would cost $40 per ton of pollution. If two companies decide to exchange permits with each other, what would we expect to happen? Selected answer will be automatically saved. For keyboard navigation, press up/down arrow keys to select an answer. a b с d Samsung and LG will emit 25 tons of pollution each. LG will no longer pollute and Samsung will not lower the amount it pollutes. Samsung will no longer pollute and LG will not lower the…

Suppose that there are two firms in the market. The market demand is given by P=220 - 2Q, where Q is the total output (Q=Q1+Q2). Each firm has an identical cost function, TCi=8Qi, i=1, 2. Consider the collusion, in which they decide the output level together to maximize the joint profit. If they divide the production into half, then each firm should produce Qi=  _______  units in order to maximize the joint profit.

There are two adjacent coal fields A and B. Under the fields is a common pool of coal worth $12 million. Drilling to extract the coal costs $1 million. If each company drills, each will get half the coal and each will earn a $5 million profit. Either company could drill a second time. If one company has two of the three wells drilled, that company gets two-thirds of the coal, yielding a profit of $6 million, and the other company gets one-third of the coal, for a profit of $3 million. If both companies drill a second well, the companies again split the coal, and each earn a profit of $4 million. What is company A's dominant strategy? Should it drill one well, two wells, or is there no dominant strategy? What is company B's dominant strategy? Should it drill one well, two wells, or is there no dominant strategy? What is the Nash equilibrium?

Two firms simultaneously decide whether or not to enter a market, and if yes, when to enter a market. The market lasts for 5 periods: starting in period 1 and ending in period 5. A firm that chooses to enter can enter in any of the five periods. Once a firm enters the market in any period it has to stay in the market through period 5. In any period tt that the the firm is not in the market, it earns a zero profit. In any period tt, if a firm is a monopolist in the market, it makes the profit 10t−24. In any period tt if a firm is a duopolist in the market it makes a profit of 7t−24. A firm's payoff is the total profit it earns in all the periods it is in the market.   How many strategies does each firm have?   Firm 1's best response to Firm 2's choice Do not enter is to enter in period:   In a Nash equilibrium, Firm 1 enters in period _______ (if there is more than one answer, write any one)

Which of the following is most likely to be rivalrous in some situations but non-rivalrous in others? Group of answer choices A pile of mulch provided by the town from which everyone can take. A public playground swingset. An open-access ebook. A fireworks show.