Is Jon risk loving, risk neutral, or risk averse? Explain b. Suppose that Jon is currently earning an income of $1000 and can earn that income next year with certainty. He is offered a chance to take a new night watch job that offers a 0.25 probability of earning $2000 and a 0.75 probability of earning $500. Should he take the new night watch job? а.

Is Jon risk loving, risk neutral, or risk averse? Explain b. Suppose that Jon is currently earning an income of $1000 and can earn that income next year with certainty. He is offered a chance to take a new night watch job that offers a 0.25 probability of earning $2000 and a 0.75 probability of earning $500. Should he take the new night watch job? а.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Joey has utility function 1+√x where x is the amount of money he has. He is... A) Cannot tell from the information provided B) Risk averse C) Risk Netutral D) Risk Loving
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The value of a successful project is $420,000; the probabilities of success are 1/2 with good supervision and 1/4 without. The manager is risk neutral, not risk averse as in the text, so his expected utility equals his expected income minus his disutility of effort. He can get other jobs paying $90,000, and his disutility for exerting the extra effort for good supervision on your project is $100,000. (a) Show that inducing high effort would require the firm to offer a compensation scheme with a negative base salary; that is, if the project fails, the manager pays the firm an amount stipulated in the scheme. (b) How might a negative base salary be implemented in reality? (c) Show that if a negative base salary is not feasible, then the firm does better to settle for the low-pay, low-effort situation.
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