In the Lindahl model, if player 1 is honest and player 2 maximises his utility which of the following is true: O Player 2 has a higher utility than if both players had been honest. The level of public good provided is more than that implied by the Samuelson rule. Player 1 consumes more public goods than player 2.
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- Consider a setting in which player 1 moves first by choosing among threeactions: a, b, and c. After observing the choice of player 1, player 2 choosesamong two actions: x and y. Consider the following three variants as towhat player 3 can do and what she knows when she moves:a. If player 1 chose a, then player 3 selects among two actions: high andlow. Player 3 knows player 2’s choice when she moves. Write down theextensive form of this setting. (You can ignore payoffs.)b. If player 1 chose a, then player 3 selects among two actions: high andlow. Player 3 does not know player 2’s choice when she moves. Writedown the extensive form of this setting. (You can ignore payoffs.)c. If player 1 chose either a or b, then player 3 selects among two actions: high and low. Player 3 observes the choice of player 2, but not that of player 1. Write down the extensive form of this setting.(You can ignore payoffs.)The situation is the case of 'Partially Aligned Interests: Financial Adviser and Investor' in Chapter 9. You will complete a similar analysis for the case where the adviser's report has to be the coarser choice between B or "not B." In this case, the game is represented as the following tree: Nature ● O O O B (1/3) M (1/3) G (1/3) Bad Adviser ● Not Bad Adviser ● Not Bad Adviser O Not Bad (Always NB, Invest if NB) (NB only if M or G, Invest if NB) (Always NB, Not if NB) You (NB only if M or G, Not if NB) You I ● You Invest Not Invest Not 1 You ! !Not I Invest 'Invest Not 2,-52 0, 0 where L is the cost of lost reputation from exaggeration. The babbling Nash Equilibrium of this game is 2-L, -52 0, 0 2.2, -1.2 0, 0 13, 42 0, 0Kayla and Kevin are friends who go together to a used textbook seller who has two copies ofthe biology book that they both need for their class this semester. The cost to the seller ofacquiring the books was $25 each and no other students will need this book. Kayla states thatshe is willing to pay $40 for the book, while Kevin says he is willing to pay $80. Which ofthe following describes the most likely conclusion to this scenario? Group of answer choices The seller will sell the books to both Kayla and Kevin for $40 each because if they tried tocharge Kevin a higher price, Kayla would engage in arbitrage. The seller will sell one book to Kayla for $40 and one book to Kevin for $80 because thismarket meets all three requirements for price discrimination. The seller will sell the books to both Kayla and Kevin for $80 each because Kevin's highervalue exceeds Kayla's willingness to pay. The seller will sell the books to both Kayla and Kevin for $25 each because that is howmuch the…
- Question 29 Assume in the market with two consumers, Chloe and Oliver. Chloe's utility function is U(x, y) = 2x + 120y¹/2 Oliver's utility function is U(x, y) = 2x+10y. At a Pareto optimal allocation in which both individuals consume some of each good, how much y does Chloe consume? I O 60 05 O 225 O 36 Question 30 Consider the game below where the first payoff belongs to player 1 and the second payoff belongs to player 2: (1,3) (2,1) (1,0) (0,2) B D F H 2 П 2 (1,1) A C E G Use backward induction, a Nash equilibrium outcome of the game is: O (1,3) O (2, 1) O (1,0) O (1, 1)In the game below, there are two equilibriums: both players play conserve or both players play plunder. If the game is repeated multiple times, players can maintain equilibrium in which conserve is played if: Player 2 Player 1 Conserve Plunder Select one: a. Conserve 100, 100 50,-100 Plunder -100, 50 0,0 Game is repeated many times and discount rates are high O b. Game is repeated few times and discount rates are low O c. Game is repeated few times and discount rates are high O d. Game is repeated many times and discount rates are lowConsider a town with a single street of 1 km long with 3,000 people spread uniformly along it. Two stores, 1 and 2, are located at the opposite ends of the street and sell the same product (store 1 is locatedattheleftend).Thecostofwalkingist1 =$6perkmtostore1andt2 =$9perkmtostore2for each consumer. The net utility of a consumer located at point x from buying a product at store 1 is U1(x) = 100 – p1 – t1x, where pi is a price of the product at store i = 1,2. The net utility from buying at store 2 is U2(x) = 100 – p2 – t2(1 – x). The average cost of the product for each store is c = 4. (a) Assume that all consumers buy product from the sellers. Find the demand functions Di(p1,p2) and the profit functions πi(p1,p2) for each store i = 1,2 as functions of prices p1,p2.(b) Find the equilibrium prices.
- Barbara is trying to sell her Apple computer; however, none of the potential buyers is willing to pay the price Barbara desires. Barbara's friend Zeynep, an economist, thinks this might be due to a lack of information on the part of buyers. Zeynep uses the concept of to explain to Barbara why she cannot sell her computer at the price she is asking 1) supply and demand O2) adverse selection 3) moral hazard 4) None of the above answers are correct4. Consider the following variant of the Prisoner's Dilemma game: Player 1 is unsure whether Player 2 is "nice" or "selfish", while Player 2 knows Player 1's preferences. Further suppose that Player 1's preferences depend on whether Player 2 is nice or selfish. Specifically, suppose that there is a probability p that Player 2 is "selfish", in which case the game is given as follows. Game with Selfish Player 2 Player1/Player 2 Cooperate (C) Don't Cooperate (D) Cooperate (C) 4, 4 0, 6 Don't Cooperate (D) 6, 0 2, 2 And Player 2 is "nice" with probability 1-p, in which case the following game results. Game with Nice Player 2 Player1/Player 2 Cooperate (C) Don't Cooperate (D) 2, 4 Cooperate (C) 6, 6 Don't Cooperate (D) 4, 0 0, 2 [Note that C = cooperate (with each other) and D = don't cooperate or defect). a) Write the extensive form of this game. How many strategies does each player have in this game? b) For what values of p (if any) is it a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for Player 1 to play D in…Consider an extensive game. First, a firm from City 1 (Player2) makes Betty (Player 1) a job offer. The offer promises an income y1. ThenBetty decides whether to accept the offer. If the o§er is accepted, the payffsto Betty and the firm are (y1 - x1; 1- y1), where x1 is the house price inCity 1. While Betty is contemplating over this o§er, she receives another joboffer from a firm in City 2. This outside option promises an income of y2and a house price x2. If Betty rejects Player 2ís offer and accepts the outsideoption, the payoffs to the two players are (y2 - x2; 0). If Betty rejects bothoffers, then the payo§s are (0; 0). Assume y1 > x1, y2 > x2, 0 < y1 < 1and y2 - x2 + x1 <=1 .assume that Betty will accept an offer if she isindifferent from accepting and rejecting it. Do the following: (a) Draw thegame tree. (b) Find the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) by specifyingstrategies used. (c) What is Bettyís payoff in the SPE? How does this payoffchange respectively with…
- In the game below, there are two equilibriums: both players play conserve or both players play plunder. If the game is repeated multiple times, players can maintain equilibrium in which conserve is played if: Player 2 Player 1 Conserve Plunder Select one: Conserve Plunder (100,100) -100,50 50,-100 (0,0 Game is repeated few times and discount rates are low Ob Game is repeated many times and discount rates are high O c. Game is repeated many times and discount rates are low O d. Game is repeated few times and discount rates are highSuppose Tom, Mary and Jill have apartments in the same building, and installing a security system for their building costs $750. Tom is willing to pay $100 for the security system, Mary is willing to pay $300 and Jill is willing to pay $300. If the three of them hold a vote on whether to install the system and split the cost equally, how will the vote go? O Nobody would vote yes O Only one would vote yes Only two would vote yes All three would vote yes4. There is a project for which player 1 can exert effort e > 0 that costs her c(e) = 0.5e2. If player 1 and player 2 can come to an agreement, then a total value of v(e) = e is produced, which can be allocated between the two players. Effort also produces a value y(e) = ke, where k = [0, 1], that player 1 can obtain for herself if player 1 and 2 fail to agree. The game has three stages: (I stage) Player 1 chooses effort e > 0; (II Stage) Player 2 observes e and chooses and effort level a € [0, 1]; (III stage) Player 1 observes a and either agrees (a) or rejects (r) the offer. If player 1 accepts the offer, then her payoff is ae - 0.5e² and player 2's payoff (1-a)e. If she rejects the offer, then player 1's payoff is ke - 0.5e² and player 2's payoff is zero. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium effort choice? ●