If there were many suppliers of diamonds, the price would be s per diamond and the quantity sold would be diamonds. If there were only one supplier of diamonds, the price would be s per diamond and the quantity sold would be diamonds. Suppose Russia and South Africa form a cartel. In this case, the price would be s per diamond and the total quantity sold would be diamonds. If the countries split the market evenly, South Africa would produce diamonds and earn a profit of $ If South Africa increased its production by 1,000 diamonds while Russia stuck to the cartel agreement, South Africa's profit would to Why are cartel agreements often not successful? O All parties would make more money if everyone increased production. O Different firms experience different costs. O One party has an incentive to cheat to make more profit.

Refer to the accompanying table, which represents the costs and production for a monopolist. Price Quantity Fixed Cost Variable Cost $20 0 $10   $0 $18 1 $10   $5 $16 2 $10   $8  $14 3 $10 $18   $12 4 $10 $30   $10 5 $10 $44         1) At Q=2, the marginal cost of this firm is $ ____ 2)The profit made by this profit-maximizing firm is $ __

Economics: Industrial Economics Question: A duopoly exists in the market for lumber in a town. It costs the first company, Big Cutters, $16 per cord of wood while it costs the second company, Pine Stackers, $10 per cord of wood. The local market demand curve for wood is Q-31,000-100P. Assume each has the capacity to serve the entire market and that they can only price in whole dollar amounts (i.e.$30, not $29.99).   Assume initially that Cutters and Stackers decide to collude and split the market. How many cords of wood will they sell? Choices: A. 12,000 B. 9,000 C. 15,000 D. 20,000   2. What will be the price they charge? Choices: A. 190 B. 210 C. 110 D. 160   3. How much will Big Cutters produce? Choices: A. 9,000 B. 4,500 C. 0 D. 15,000   Now assume that collusion is not possible. 4. What is the Nash Equilibrium quantity that Pine Stackers Choices: A. 0 B. 15,300 C. 14,700 D. 29,500   5. What is the Nash Equilibrium price? Choices: A. 15 B. 112 C. 11 D. 157 Thank you for your…

Given Cost and Revenue functions C(q)=q3−10q2+52q+5000 and R(q)=−3q2+2400q​, what cost is incurred when marginal profit is​ $0?

Assume an oligopolist confronts two possible demand curves for its own output, as illustrated below. The first (A) prevails if other oligopolists don't match price changes. The second (B) prevails if rivals do match price changes. Price (dollars per unit) 19- 17 Demand B 15- Demand A 13- 11. 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Quantity (units per period) (a) By how much does quantity demanded increase if price is reduced from $11 to $9 and Instructions: Enter your responses rounded to the nearest whole number. (i) Rivals match the price cut? (ii) Rivals don't match the price cut? (b) By how much does quantity demanded decrease when price is raised from $11 to $15 and Instructions: Enter your responses rounded to the nearest whole number (do not include negative signs). (i) Rivals match the price hike? (ii) Rivals don't match the price hike?

Describe the difference in economic profit between a competitive firm and a monopolist in both the short and long run. Which should take longer to reach the long-run equilibrium? In the short run, both monopolists and competitive firms run, economic profit. True or False: The adjustment to long-run equilibrium takes the same amount of time for monopolies and competitive industries. (Can/Cannot) earn positive economic profits. In the long _(neither/monopolists, but not competitive/both/ competitive but not monopolists) can earn a positive

Suppose that Jana's Financial Consulting Company is a perfectly price discriminating monopolist with the following cost and revenue information: 0 1 2 Quantity Total Cost Marginal Cost Price Total Revenue Marginal Revenue $100 $170 $140 $160 $184 $150 $230 $140 $280 $130 $335 $120 $395 $110 $475 $100 $575 $95 min 00 6 7

Q16 Suppose we are referring to OPEC, the oil cartel. Which would make it easier to maintain an effective collusive agreement among OPEC members? Multiple Choice   the emergence of a number of potential entrant firms   a decrease in the elasticity of demand for the OPEC's oil    a new method of pricing that makes it more difficult for cartel members to determine the prices at which other cartel members are selling oil   an increase in the number of substitutes for the oil produced by the OPEC cartel   a pledge of allegiance to the cartel

6. The cartel Consider a town in which only two residents, Rajiv and Simone, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Rajiv and Simone can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) 6.00 Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 0 0 5.50 45 247.50 5.00 90 450.00 4.50 135 607.50 4.00 180 720.00 3.50 225 787.50 3.00 270 810.00 2.50 315 787.50 2.00 360 720.00 1.50 405 607.50 1.00 450 450.00 0.50 495 247.50 0 540 0 Suppose Rajiv and Simone form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ per gallon, and the total output is gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Rajiv and Simone agree to split production equally. Therefore, Rajiv's profit is $ and Simone's profit is $ Suppose that Rajiv and Simone have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of…

Only typed answer  The incentive to cheat within a cartel increases with an increase in the following factors, except: a) Economic performance and industry sales b) the differences in costs across firms c) The number of firms operating in the cartel d) The number of possible entrants into the indu stry