If the Los Angeles Lakers had a 42-30 record in the shortened 2020-21 NBA season and then go 50-32 in the 2021-22 season, we would expect the intercept of the demand curve for Lakers tickets to lie A/ up the y-axis in P/Q space in 2021-22 than it did in 2020-21. This means the Lakers could sell A tickets at any price they set in 2021-22. However, the Lakers might not actually sell more tickets to home games even though their demand is higher because they are A by the size of the Staples Center.

If the Los Angeles Lakers had a 42-30 record in the shortened 2020-21 NBA season and then go 50-32 in the 2021-22 season, we would expect the intercept of the demand curve for Lakers tickets to lie A/ up the y-axis in P/Q space in 2021-22 than it did in 2020-21. This means the Lakers could sell A tickets at any price they set in 2021-22. However, the Lakers might not actually sell more tickets to home games even though their demand is higher because they are A by the size of the Staples Center.

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 6PA

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