Gamma and Zeta are the only two widget manufacturers in the world. Each firm has a cost function given by: C(q) = 10+10q+q², where q is number of widgets produced. The market demand for widgets is represented by the inverse demand equation: P = 100 - Q where Q=q1 + q2 is total output. Suppose that each firm maximizes its profits taking its rival's output as given (i.e. the firms behave as Cournot oligopolists). a) What will be the equilibrium quantity selected by each firm? What is the market price? What is the profit level for each firm? Equilibrium quantity for each firm b) It occurs to the managers of Gamma and Zeta that they could do a lot better by colluding. If the two firms were to collude in a symmetric equilibrium, what would be the profit-maximizing choice of output for each firm? What is the industry price? What is the profit for each firm in this case? Equilibrium quantity for each firm .price profit Cheating quantity price c) What minimum discount factor is required for firms to find it worthwhile to collude? (You can assume that widgets are perishable, i.e. one period's output must be sold in the same period). Find also the optimal quantity that cheating firm want to produce, price and profit associated with this quantity. Round the discount factor to the first figure after the decimal sign (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, etc.) Do not round the other responses. discount factor .profit , cheating price cheating profit

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
icon
Related questions
Question
M11
Gamma and Zeta are the only two widget manufacturers in the world. Each firm has a cost function
given by: C(q) = 10+10q+q2, where q is number of widgets produced. The market demand for
widgets is represented by the inverse demand equation: P = 100 - Q where Q=q1 + q2 is total
output. Suppose that each firm maximizes its profits taking its rival's output as given (i.e. the firms
behave as Cournot oligopolists).
a) What will be the equilibrium quantity selected by each firm? What is the market price? What is
the profit level for each firm?
Equilibrium quantity for each firm
price
profit
b) It occurs to the managers of Gamma and Zeta that they could do a lot better by colluding. If the
two firms were to collude in a symmetric equilibrium, what would be the profit-maximizing choice of
output for each firm? What is the industry price? What is the profit for each firm in this case?
Equilibrium quantity for each firm
price
profit
c) What minimum discount factor is required for firms to find it worthwhile to collude? (You can
assume that widgets are perishable, i.e. one period's output must be sold in the same period). Find
also the optimal quantity that cheating firm want to produce, price and profit associated with this
quantity. Round the discount factor to the first figure after the decimal sign (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, etc.) Do not
round the other responses.
Cheating quantity
cheating price
cheating profit
, discount factor
Transcribed Image Text:Gamma and Zeta are the only two widget manufacturers in the world. Each firm has a cost function given by: C(q) = 10+10q+q2, where q is number of widgets produced. The market demand for widgets is represented by the inverse demand equation: P = 100 - Q where Q=q1 + q2 is total output. Suppose that each firm maximizes its profits taking its rival's output as given (i.e. the firms behave as Cournot oligopolists). a) What will be the equilibrium quantity selected by each firm? What is the market price? What is the profit level for each firm? Equilibrium quantity for each firm price profit b) It occurs to the managers of Gamma and Zeta that they could do a lot better by colluding. If the two firms were to collude in a symmetric equilibrium, what would be the profit-maximizing choice of output for each firm? What is the industry price? What is the profit for each firm in this case? Equilibrium quantity for each firm price profit c) What minimum discount factor is required for firms to find it worthwhile to collude? (You can assume that widgets are perishable, i.e. one period's output must be sold in the same period). Find also the optimal quantity that cheating firm want to produce, price and profit associated with this quantity. Round the discount factor to the first figure after the decimal sign (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, etc.) Do not round the other responses. Cheating quantity cheating price cheating profit , discount factor
Expert Solution
steps

Step by step

Solved in 5 steps with 33 images

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Fundraising
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
Recommended textbooks for you
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Economics
ISBN:
9780190931919
Author:
NEWNAN
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305585126
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Economics
ISBN:
9781259290619
Author:
Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education