Social Psychology (10th Edition)
Social Psychology (10th Edition)
10th Edition
ISBN: 9780134641287
Author: Elliot Aronson, Timothy D. Wilson, Robin M. Akert, Samuel R. Sommers
Publisher: Pearson College Div
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Related questions

Question

How does Cone’s black theology interpret human beings as created in the
image of God?

for oppressed persons, whose identity is made known in and
through their liberation. Therefore our definition of the human
being must be limited to what it means to be liberated from human
oppression. Any other approach fails to recognize the reality of
suffering in an inhuman society.
Black theology cannot affirm a higher harmony of the universe
which sidesteps the suffering of blacks. We are reminded of Dos-
toevski's Ivan Karamazov and his rejection of God because of the
suffering of children:
I renounce the higher harmony altogether. It's not worth the
tears of that one tortured child who beat itself on the breast
with its little fist and prayed in its stinking outhouse, with its
unexpiated tears to "dear kind God!"
To experience the sufferings of little children is to reject the
universal human being in favor of particular human beings. It
forces you to say something that takes seriously the meaning of
human suffering. Whites can move beyond particular human be-
ings to the universal human being because they have not experi-
enced the reality of color. This is the meaning of Maulana Ron
Karenga's comment:
Man is only man in a philosophy class or a biology lab. In the
world he is African, Asian or South American. He is a
Chinese making a cultural revolution, or an Afro-American
with soul. He lives by bread and butter, enjoys red beans and
rice, or watermelon and ice cream.*
The inability of American theology to define human nature in
the light of the Oppressed One and of particular oppressed peoples
stems from its identity with the structures of white power. The
human person in American theology is George Washington, Tho-
mas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln rolled into one and polished
up a bit. It is a colorless person, capable of "accepting" blacks as
sisters and brothers, which means that it does not mind the blacks
living next door if they behave themselves.
It is at this very point that American theology ceases to speak of
the human person in any real sense. Actually, only the oppressed
know what human personhood is because they have encountered
both the depravity of human behavior from oppressors and the
healing powers revealed in the Oppressed One. Having experienced
the brutality of human pride, they will speak less of human good-
ness; but also having encountered the meaning of liberation, they
can and must speak of human worth as revealed in the black
community itself affirming its blackness.
I have defined my point of departure as the manifestation of the
Oppressed One as he is involved in the liberation of an oppressed
community. It is now appropriate to ask, "What is the human
person?" That is, what is it that makes human beings what they are,
thereby distinguishing them essentially from everything else that
exists?'
The question about the human person is not answered by enu-
merating a list of properties; a person is not a collection of proper-
ties that can be scientifically analyzed. Rather to speak of the
human being is to speak about its being-in-the-world-of-human-
oppression. With the reality of human suffering as our starting
point, what can black theology say about human nature?
The Human Being as Endowed with Freedom
1. Freedom as Liberation. If the content of the gospel is libera-
tion, human existence must be explained as "being in freedom,"
which means rebellion against every form of slavery, the suppres-
sion of everything creative. "A slave," writes LeRoi Jones, "can-
not be a man." To be human is to be free, and to be free is to be
human. The liberated, the free, are the ones who define the mean-
ing of their being in terms of the oppressed of the land by partici-
pating in their liberation, fighting against everything that opposes
integral humanity. Only the oppressed are truly free!
This is the paradox of human existence. Freedom is the opposite
of oppression, but only the oppressed are truly free. How can this
be? On the one hand, the concreteness of human existence reveals
that human beings are not (fully) human when their creativity is
enslaved by alien powers. To be (fully) human is to be separated
from everything that is evil, everything that is against the "exten-
sion of the limits of humanity." But on the other hand, human
existence also discloses that the reality of evil is an ever-present
00
The Human Being in Black Theology
possibility in our finite world, and to be (fully) human means to be
identified with those who are enslaved as they fight against human
evil. Being human means being against evil by joining sides with
those who are the victims of evil. Quite literally, it means becoming
oppressed with the oppressed, making their cause one's own cause
by involving oneself in the liberation struggle. No one is free until
all are free.
Paul Tillich expresses this paradox in his analysis of the relation-
ship between being and nonbeing. On the one hand, being is the
opposite of nonbeing. To be is to participate in Being, which is the
source of everything that is. To exist is to exist in freedom-that is,
stand out from nonbeing and be." But, on the other hand, finite
being "does not stand completely out of non-being." Always
present is the threat of nothingness, the possibility of ceasing to be.
The human person, therefore, is a creature who seeks to be in
spite of nonbeing. The power to be in spite of nonbeing is what
Tillich calls courage:
The courage to be is the ethical act in which man affirms his
being in spite of those elements of his existence which conflict
with essential self-affirmation."
Inherent in freedom is the recognition that there is something
wrong with society, and those who are free will not be content until
all members of society are treated as persons.
ns. There comes a time in
life when persons realize that the world is not as they dreamt, and
they have to make a choice: submit or risk all." Being free means
that the only real choice is risking all. Those who are prepared to
risk all when they perceive the true nature of society and what it
means to the oppressed. Those who come to this recognition also
realize, as does Ignazio Silone's Pietro Spina in Bread and Wine,
that freedom must be taken:
Freedom is not something you get as a present. . . . You can
live in a dictatorship and be free on one condition: that you
fight the dictatorship. The man who thinks with his own
mind and keeps it uncorrupted is free. The man who fights
for what he thinks is right is free. But you can live in the most
democratic country on earth, and if you're lazy, obtuse or
servile within yourself, you're not free. Even without any
violent coercion, you're a slave. You can't beg your freedom
from someone. You have to seize it-everyone as much as he
can.12
It is not difficult for the oppressed to understand the meaning of
freedom. They are forced by the very nature of their condition to
interpret their existence in the world contrary to the value-
structures of an oppressive society. For the oppressed, to be is to be
in revolt against the forces that impede the creation of the new
person.
This is what Karl Marx had in mind in his definition of the
human being as praxis, which means "directed activity."" Praxis
expresses human freedom. "Freedom," writes Marx, "is the es-
sence of man." It "is not something outside one who freely is, it is
the specific mode or structure of being," and inherent in it is
action. Marx says: "The coincidence of the changing circumstances
and of human activity can be conceived and rationally understood
only as revolutionizing practice [praxis]." He elaborates on the
inseparable relationship of freedom and liberative activity. To be
(fully) human is to be involved, participating in societal structures
for human liberation.
As Petrović puts it:
The question of the essence of freedom, like the question of
the essence of man, is not only a question. It is at once
participation in production of freedom. It is an activity.
through which freedom frees itself."
Freedom, then, is not an abstract question. It deals with human
existence in a world of societal enslavement. We cannot solve the
question of freedom in a college classroom, theoretically debating
the idea of "freedom versus determinism." Freedom is an existen-
tial reality. It is not a matter of rational thought but of human
confrontation. It is not solved by academic discussion but by risky
human encounter. As Silone's Spina says, "Man doesn't really exist
unless he's fighting against his own limits."18
To be free means that human beings are not an object, and they
will not let others treat them as an "it." They refuse to let limits be
expand button
Transcribed Image Text:for oppressed persons, whose identity is made known in and through their liberation. Therefore our definition of the human being must be limited to what it means to be liberated from human oppression. Any other approach fails to recognize the reality of suffering in an inhuman society. Black theology cannot affirm a higher harmony of the universe which sidesteps the suffering of blacks. We are reminded of Dos- toevski's Ivan Karamazov and his rejection of God because of the suffering of children: I renounce the higher harmony altogether. It's not worth the tears of that one tortured child who beat itself on the breast with its little fist and prayed in its stinking outhouse, with its unexpiated tears to "dear kind God!" To experience the sufferings of little children is to reject the universal human being in favor of particular human beings. It forces you to say something that takes seriously the meaning of human suffering. Whites can move beyond particular human be- ings to the universal human being because they have not experi- enced the reality of color. This is the meaning of Maulana Ron Karenga's comment: Man is only man in a philosophy class or a biology lab. In the world he is African, Asian or South American. He is a Chinese making a cultural revolution, or an Afro-American with soul. He lives by bread and butter, enjoys red beans and rice, or watermelon and ice cream.* The inability of American theology to define human nature in the light of the Oppressed One and of particular oppressed peoples stems from its identity with the structures of white power. The human person in American theology is George Washington, Tho- mas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln rolled into one and polished up a bit. It is a colorless person, capable of "accepting" blacks as sisters and brothers, which means that it does not mind the blacks living next door if they behave themselves. It is at this very point that American theology ceases to speak of the human person in any real sense. Actually, only the oppressed know what human personhood is because they have encountered both the depravity of human behavior from oppressors and the healing powers revealed in the Oppressed One. Having experienced the brutality of human pride, they will speak less of human good- ness; but also having encountered the meaning of liberation, they can and must speak of human worth as revealed in the black community itself affirming its blackness. I have defined my point of departure as the manifestation of the Oppressed One as he is involved in the liberation of an oppressed community. It is now appropriate to ask, "What is the human person?" That is, what is it that makes human beings what they are, thereby distinguishing them essentially from everything else that exists?' The question about the human person is not answered by enu- merating a list of properties; a person is not a collection of proper- ties that can be scientifically analyzed. Rather to speak of the human being is to speak about its being-in-the-world-of-human- oppression. With the reality of human suffering as our starting point, what can black theology say about human nature? The Human Being as Endowed with Freedom 1. Freedom as Liberation. If the content of the gospel is libera- tion, human existence must be explained as "being in freedom," which means rebellion against every form of slavery, the suppres- sion of everything creative. "A slave," writes LeRoi Jones, "can- not be a man." To be human is to be free, and to be free is to be human. The liberated, the free, are the ones who define the mean- ing of their being in terms of the oppressed of the land by partici- pating in their liberation, fighting against everything that opposes integral humanity. Only the oppressed are truly free! This is the paradox of human existence. Freedom is the opposite of oppression, but only the oppressed are truly free. How can this be? On the one hand, the concreteness of human existence reveals that human beings are not (fully) human when their creativity is enslaved by alien powers. To be (fully) human is to be separated from everything that is evil, everything that is against the "exten- sion of the limits of humanity." But on the other hand, human existence also discloses that the reality of evil is an ever-present 00 The Human Being in Black Theology possibility in our finite world, and to be (fully) human means to be identified with those who are enslaved as they fight against human evil. Being human means being against evil by joining sides with those who are the victims of evil. Quite literally, it means becoming oppressed with the oppressed, making their cause one's own cause by involving oneself in the liberation struggle. No one is free until all are free. Paul Tillich expresses this paradox in his analysis of the relation- ship between being and nonbeing. On the one hand, being is the opposite of nonbeing. To be is to participate in Being, which is the source of everything that is. To exist is to exist in freedom-that is, stand out from nonbeing and be." But, on the other hand, finite being "does not stand completely out of non-being." Always present is the threat of nothingness, the possibility of ceasing to be. The human person, therefore, is a creature who seeks to be in spite of nonbeing. The power to be in spite of nonbeing is what Tillich calls courage: The courage to be is the ethical act in which man affirms his being in spite of those elements of his existence which conflict with essential self-affirmation." Inherent in freedom is the recognition that there is something wrong with society, and those who are free will not be content until all members of society are treated as persons. ns. There comes a time in life when persons realize that the world is not as they dreamt, and they have to make a choice: submit or risk all." Being free means that the only real choice is risking all. Those who are prepared to risk all when they perceive the true nature of society and what it means to the oppressed. Those who come to this recognition also realize, as does Ignazio Silone's Pietro Spina in Bread and Wine, that freedom must be taken: Freedom is not something you get as a present. . . . You can live in a dictatorship and be free on one condition: that you fight the dictatorship. The man who thinks with his own mind and keeps it uncorrupted is free. The man who fights for what he thinks is right is free. But you can live in the most democratic country on earth, and if you're lazy, obtuse or servile within yourself, you're not free. Even without any violent coercion, you're a slave. You can't beg your freedom from someone. You have to seize it-everyone as much as he can.12 It is not difficult for the oppressed to understand the meaning of freedom. They are forced by the very nature of their condition to interpret their existence in the world contrary to the value- structures of an oppressive society. For the oppressed, to be is to be in revolt against the forces that impede the creation of the new person. This is what Karl Marx had in mind in his definition of the human being as praxis, which means "directed activity."" Praxis expresses human freedom. "Freedom," writes Marx, "is the es- sence of man." It "is not something outside one who freely is, it is the specific mode or structure of being," and inherent in it is action. Marx says: "The coincidence of the changing circumstances and of human activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionizing practice [praxis]." He elaborates on the inseparable relationship of freedom and liberative activity. To be (fully) human is to be involved, participating in societal structures for human liberation. As Petrović puts it: The question of the essence of freedom, like the question of the essence of man, is not only a question. It is at once participation in production of freedom. It is an activity. through which freedom frees itself." Freedom, then, is not an abstract question. It deals with human existence in a world of societal enslavement. We cannot solve the question of freedom in a college classroom, theoretically debating the idea of "freedom versus determinism." Freedom is an existen- tial reality. It is not a matter of rational thought but of human confrontation. It is not solved by academic discussion but by risky human encounter. As Silone's Spina says, "Man doesn't really exist unless he's fighting against his own limits."18 To be free means that human beings are not an object, and they will not let others treat them as an "it." They refuse to let limits be
put on their being. They are at once a part of nature (subject to laws
of the universe) and are independent of nature. Dostoevski makes
this point in his Notes from the Underworld: "Great Heavens,
what are the laws of nature to me! . . . Obviously I cannot pierce
this wall with my forehead. . . but neither will I reconcile myself to
it just because it is a stone wall." Or again, he writes: "The whole
human enterprise consists exclusively in man proving to himself
every moment that he is man and not a cog." Those who insist on
treating human beings as cogs must be made to realize that the
human being is not a robot but is a free, living organism, capable of
making the most of human-creativity Liberation is nothing but
putting into practice the reality of human freedom.
2. Freedom and the Image of God. The being of the human
person as freedom is expressed in the Bible in terms of the image of
God. Even though there has been much talk about the imago Dei in
the history of theology, most religionists have not given proper
attention to the concept of existential freedom and its relationship
to the image of God. Theologians seem to have a way of making
simple ideas obscure by spending their energies debating fine
points. (It is little wonder that nonprofessionals think that theology
is unrelated to ordinary human involvement in the world.)
In the history of theology, the image of God is generally con-
ceived of in terms of rationality and freedom." Justin's statement is
representative of the patristic period:
In the beginning He made the human race with the power of
thought and of choosing the truth and doing right, so that all
men are without excuse before God; for they have been born
rational and contemplative.20
It is significant that freedom and rational reflection go hand in
hand, without any connection to the rebellion of the oppressed.
Medieval thought was similarly defective, as the image was inter-
preted in terms of an analogia entis, which means that the being of
the human persons as such is in the likeness of the being of God.
The Reformation reinterpreted the image to include the personal
encounter between God and the human person, and deemphasized
the capacity of reason to o know God. Luther even speaks of reason
as a "whore" that deceives persons by causing a creature to think
that it is God. To say that humankind was created in the image of
God meant, for Luther, that "man was in a relation to God that was
wholly based on and governed by God's grace, to which man
responded with faith." It was a relationship analogous to a child's
relationship to its father. Just as the child responds to its father in
obedience and trust, the image of God responds to God with
trustful obedience.
Commenting on Luther's view of the original righteousness of
human nature (image of God), P. S. Watson says:
It was a state in which his whole life was so centered in God,
that in thought, will and action he was governed solely by the
good and gracious will of God. It was as if he had "no will of
his own," no desire but to do the will of God, whose word of
command and promise he implicitly believed. That was what
constituted man's "original righteousness"-the right rela-
tionship to God, and therefore to all else, for which and in
which he was created. 22
It is to Luther's credit that he added the personal dimension in
contrast to the rationalistic approach of medieval theology. But it is
to his discredit that he failed to relate this concept to the social and
_political conditions of the oppressed. Luther's identification with
the structures of power weakened his view of the image of God.
The idea of freedom to challenge the state with force when it resorts
AuTLAVO20
to oppression is not present in his thinking.
Modern theology, following Schleiermacher's unhappy clue to
the relationship of theology and anthropology, forgot about
Luther's emphasis on human depravity and proceeded once again
to make appeals to human goodness. The nineteenth century is
known for its confidence in the rational person, who not only knew
what was right but was capable of responding to it. The image of
God in human nature was the guarantee that the world was moving
in a desirable direction. It never occurred to these "Christian"
thinkers that they had missed some contrary evidence: this was the
period of black enslavement and Amerindian extermination, as
well as European colonial conquests in Africa and Asia.
World War I did much to shatter this ungodly view of human
nature. Karl Barth with his Epistle to the Romans commentary,
Rudolf Bultmann with his existential, form-critical approach, Paul
Tillich with his ontology, Emil Brunner with his own brand of neo-
orthodoxy, and Reinhold Niebuhr with his ethical orientation made
such an impact on liberalism that we are likely never to see it again
the way it used to be. These thinkers did not share the liberalist
confidence in human nature; like the reformers, they emphasized
human depravity, the inability of the creature to transcend finite
existence. The image of God in human nature was not to be
identified with abstract rationality or freedom. Although all the so-
called neo-orthodox theologians had unique approaches to the idea
of the image, they all agreed that it involved the whole person in a
divine-human encounter.
Refuting the Thomistic concept of an analogia entis, Bonhoeffer
says:
There is no analogy between God and man, if only because
God the only One existing in and for himself in his unde-
rived being, yet at the same time existing for his creatures,
binding and giving his freedom to man-must not be thought
"of as being alone; in-as-much as he is the God who in Christ
bears witness to his "being for man."""
Bonhoeffer prefers to speak of an analogia relationis, which is
neither a part of human nature, nor a structure of its being, nor a
capacity. It is a given relationship in which human beings are free to
be for God because God is free for them in Christ.
The analogy, the likeness must be understood strictly as
follows: the likeness has its likeness only from the original. It
always refers us only to the original, and is "like" only in this
way. Analogia relationis is therefore the relation given by
God. . . . The relation of creature with creature is a God-
given relation because it exists in freedom and freedom origi-
nates from God.24
Black theology can appreciate the new emphasis, but it is not
enough to identify the image with analogia relationis, as Bonhoef-
fer himself apparently realized later when Hitler's pretensions to
deity became evident. If the image of God includes freedom, as is
definitely implied in the divine-human encounter, then it must also
include liberation.
Even though Karl Barth was opposed to them, the liberals were
right in their stress on freedom as an essential element of the imago
Dei, though they had the wrong idea of freedom. Freedom is not a
rational decision about possible alternatives; it is a participation of
the whole person in the liberation struggle. The Barthians were
correct on the personal aspect of freedom in the divine-human
encounter, but they failed to place due emphasis on the role of
liberation in an oppressive society.
23
The biblical concept of image means that human beings are
created in such a way that they cannot obey oppressive laws and still
be human. To be human is to be in the image of God—that is, to be
creative: revolting against everything that is opposed to humanity.<
Therefore, whatever we say about sin and the human inability to
know God because of the fall, it must not in any way diminish the
human freedom to revolt against oppression. As Gerhard von Rad
says:
The Priestly account of man's creation. . . speaks less of the
nature of God's image than of its purpose. There is less said
about the gift itself than about the task. . . [that task is]
domination in the world, especially over the animals. 25
In view of the exodus we must also say that the task includes
participation in the freedom of God in the liberation of God's
people. Jürgen Moltmann puts it this way:
Jahweh is...the God who leads his people out of the house.
of bondage. Thus he is a God of freedom, the God ahead of
us. One acquires social, political, and world-surpassing free-
dom from God, not against him.26
It is the biblical concept of the image of God that makes black
rebellion in America human. When black persons affirm their
freedom in God, they must say no to white racists. By saying no,
they say yes to God and their blackness, affirming at the same time
the inhumanity of the white neighbor who insists on playing God.
Black theology emphasizes the right of blacks to be black and by so
doing to participate in the image of God.
expand button
Transcribed Image Text:put on their being. They are at once a part of nature (subject to laws of the universe) and are independent of nature. Dostoevski makes this point in his Notes from the Underworld: "Great Heavens, what are the laws of nature to me! . . . Obviously I cannot pierce this wall with my forehead. . . but neither will I reconcile myself to it just because it is a stone wall." Or again, he writes: "The whole human enterprise consists exclusively in man proving to himself every moment that he is man and not a cog." Those who insist on treating human beings as cogs must be made to realize that the human being is not a robot but is a free, living organism, capable of making the most of human-creativity Liberation is nothing but putting into practice the reality of human freedom. 2. Freedom and the Image of God. The being of the human person as freedom is expressed in the Bible in terms of the image of God. Even though there has been much talk about the imago Dei in the history of theology, most religionists have not given proper attention to the concept of existential freedom and its relationship to the image of God. Theologians seem to have a way of making simple ideas obscure by spending their energies debating fine points. (It is little wonder that nonprofessionals think that theology is unrelated to ordinary human involvement in the world.) In the history of theology, the image of God is generally con- ceived of in terms of rationality and freedom." Justin's statement is representative of the patristic period: In the beginning He made the human race with the power of thought and of choosing the truth and doing right, so that all men are without excuse before God; for they have been born rational and contemplative.20 It is significant that freedom and rational reflection go hand in hand, without any connection to the rebellion of the oppressed. Medieval thought was similarly defective, as the image was inter- preted in terms of an analogia entis, which means that the being of the human persons as such is in the likeness of the being of God. The Reformation reinterpreted the image to include the personal encounter between God and the human person, and deemphasized the capacity of reason to o know God. Luther even speaks of reason as a "whore" that deceives persons by causing a creature to think that it is God. To say that humankind was created in the image of God meant, for Luther, that "man was in a relation to God that was wholly based on and governed by God's grace, to which man responded with faith." It was a relationship analogous to a child's relationship to its father. Just as the child responds to its father in obedience and trust, the image of God responds to God with trustful obedience. Commenting on Luther's view of the original righteousness of human nature (image of God), P. S. Watson says: It was a state in which his whole life was so centered in God, that in thought, will and action he was governed solely by the good and gracious will of God. It was as if he had "no will of his own," no desire but to do the will of God, whose word of command and promise he implicitly believed. That was what constituted man's "original righteousness"-the right rela- tionship to God, and therefore to all else, for which and in which he was created. 22 It is to Luther's credit that he added the personal dimension in contrast to the rationalistic approach of medieval theology. But it is to his discredit that he failed to relate this concept to the social and _political conditions of the oppressed. Luther's identification with the structures of power weakened his view of the image of God. The idea of freedom to challenge the state with force when it resorts AuTLAVO20 to oppression is not present in his thinking. Modern theology, following Schleiermacher's unhappy clue to the relationship of theology and anthropology, forgot about Luther's emphasis on human depravity and proceeded once again to make appeals to human goodness. The nineteenth century is known for its confidence in the rational person, who not only knew what was right but was capable of responding to it. The image of God in human nature was the guarantee that the world was moving in a desirable direction. It never occurred to these "Christian" thinkers that they had missed some contrary evidence: this was the period of black enslavement and Amerindian extermination, as well as European colonial conquests in Africa and Asia. World War I did much to shatter this ungodly view of human nature. Karl Barth with his Epistle to the Romans commentary, Rudolf Bultmann with his existential, form-critical approach, Paul Tillich with his ontology, Emil Brunner with his own brand of neo- orthodoxy, and Reinhold Niebuhr with his ethical orientation made such an impact on liberalism that we are likely never to see it again the way it used to be. These thinkers did not share the liberalist confidence in human nature; like the reformers, they emphasized human depravity, the inability of the creature to transcend finite existence. The image of God in human nature was not to be identified with abstract rationality or freedom. Although all the so- called neo-orthodox theologians had unique approaches to the idea of the image, they all agreed that it involved the whole person in a divine-human encounter. Refuting the Thomistic concept of an analogia entis, Bonhoeffer says: There is no analogy between God and man, if only because God the only One existing in and for himself in his unde- rived being, yet at the same time existing for his creatures, binding and giving his freedom to man-must not be thought "of as being alone; in-as-much as he is the God who in Christ bears witness to his "being for man.""" Bonhoeffer prefers to speak of an analogia relationis, which is neither a part of human nature, nor a structure of its being, nor a capacity. It is a given relationship in which human beings are free to be for God because God is free for them in Christ. The analogy, the likeness must be understood strictly as follows: the likeness has its likeness only from the original. It always refers us only to the original, and is "like" only in this way. Analogia relationis is therefore the relation given by God. . . . The relation of creature with creature is a God- given relation because it exists in freedom and freedom origi- nates from God.24 Black theology can appreciate the new emphasis, but it is not enough to identify the image with analogia relationis, as Bonhoef- fer himself apparently realized later when Hitler's pretensions to deity became evident. If the image of God includes freedom, as is definitely implied in the divine-human encounter, then it must also include liberation. Even though Karl Barth was opposed to them, the liberals were right in their stress on freedom as an essential element of the imago Dei, though they had the wrong idea of freedom. Freedom is not a rational decision about possible alternatives; it is a participation of the whole person in the liberation struggle. The Barthians were correct on the personal aspect of freedom in the divine-human encounter, but they failed to place due emphasis on the role of liberation in an oppressive society. 23 The biblical concept of image means that human beings are created in such a way that they cannot obey oppressive laws and still be human. To be human is to be in the image of God—that is, to be creative: revolting against everything that is opposed to humanity.< Therefore, whatever we say about sin and the human inability to know God because of the fall, it must not in any way diminish the human freedom to revolt against oppression. As Gerhard von Rad says: The Priestly account of man's creation. . . speaks less of the nature of God's image than of its purpose. There is less said about the gift itself than about the task. . . [that task is] domination in the world, especially over the animals. 25 In view of the exodus we must also say that the task includes participation in the freedom of God in the liberation of God's people. Jürgen Moltmann puts it this way: Jahweh is...the God who leads his people out of the house. of bondage. Thus he is a God of freedom, the God ahead of us. One acquires social, political, and world-surpassing free- dom from God, not against him.26 It is the biblical concept of the image of God that makes black rebellion in America human. When black persons affirm their freedom in God, they must say no to white racists. By saying no, they say yes to God and their blackness, affirming at the same time the inhumanity of the white neighbor who insists on playing God. Black theology emphasizes the right of blacks to be black and by so doing to participate in the image of God.
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