Figure: Prisoners' Dilemma for Thelma and Louise Louise Don't confess Confess Louise gets 5 years Louise gets 2 years Don't confess Theima gets 5 years Theima gets 20 years Louise gets 15 years Louise gets 20 years Confess Theima gets 2 years Theima gets 15 years (Figure: Prisoners' Dilemma for Thelma and Louise) Use Figure: Prisoners' Dilemma for Thelma and Louise. Thelma and Louise are arrested and jailed for murder. Given the payoff matrix in the figure, the optimal (collusive) behavior for Thelma and Louise to minimize their joint sentence is for Thelma and for Louise O to confess; to confess. O not to confess; not to confess O to confess; not to confess. O not to confess; to confess Thelma

Figure: Prisoners' Dilemma for Thelma and Louise Louise Don't confess Confess Louise gets 5 years Louise gets 2 years Don't confess Theima gets 5 years Theima gets 20 years Louise gets 15 years Louise gets 20 years Confess Theima gets 2 years Theima gets 15 years (Figure: Prisoners' Dilemma for Thelma and Louise) Use Figure: Prisoners' Dilemma for Thelma and Louise. Thelma and Louise are arrested and jailed for murder. Given the payoff matrix in the figure, the optimal (collusive) behavior for Thelma and Louise to minimize their joint sentence is for Thelma and for Louise O to confess; to confess. O not to confess; not to confess O to confess; not to confess. O not to confess; to confess Thelma

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Table 1.3: Erica and Fred's game. Fred Testify Remain silent Testify (-14, –14) (0, – 15) Erica Remain silent (-15,0) (-1, –1) What is the best global outcome, and how many years total prison time does it lead to? Both confess, 14 years in prison Both confess, 28 years in prison Both silent, 15 years in prison Both silent, 2 years in prison
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1) Define Cartel and give an example. 2) Thelma and Louise are being charged for a murder/robbery. They are separated by police and interrogated. They are given the choice to confess or not to confess. The payoff matrix below identifies the years that they will each spend in jail, for the various outcomes. Louise Confess Don't Confess Confess (2 10,10 15.2 Thelma Don't Confess 2,15 3,3 a. Identify the Dominant Strategy for either player, or state that there isn't one. Remember, a "Strategy" is the players move. In this example, state "Confess" or "Don't Confess" for each player, not the payoff. b. Identify the Nash Equilibrium.
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2. Consider the following two-player game with two players: Adam and Eve. Adam A1 A2 A3 A4 E1 6,3 5, 3 5, 0 2,0 E2 4,4 5, 4 3, 2 2, 3 Eve E3 4, 1 0,2 6, 1 3, 4 E4 3,0 5, 1 4,0 6₂ 1 a. Find the Iterated Elimination of Dominant Strategies Equilibrium for this game. Explain.
An old lady is looking for help crossing the street. Only one person is needed to help her; if more people help her, this is no better. You and I are the two people in the vicinity who can help; we have to choose simultaneously whether to do so. Each of us will get pleasure worth a 3 from her success (no matter who helps her), But each one who goes to help will bear a cost of 1, this being the value of our time taken up in helping. If neither player helps, the payoff for each player is zero. Set up this game in strategic form.
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Suppose there are two criminals who are thinking about robbing either an insurance company or a liquor store. The take from the insurance company robbery would be Gh50,000 each, but the job requires two people (one to do the robbing and one to drive the getaway car). The take from robing a liquor store is only $1000 but can be done with one person acting alone or both. What are the strategies of these players (the two criminals)? b. Write this situation in a normal game form assuming they are acting simultaneously. What are the equilibria for this game? (Note: Both Pure strategy and Mixed strategy) а. с.
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