f there are two firms Atlas and Bowden in this market with the total cost function TC = 500 + 10Q^2 and they engage in Cournot competition, what is each firm's equilibrium quantity, price, and profit? [NB: round quantities to nearest integer to find equilibrium quantity, price, and profit]

Q1: Firms A and B are two firms supplying products in two separate differentiated goods markets. Equations (1) and (2) give the total cost functions of the two firms:  - Firm A: TC = 2Q -----------------------------(1) - Firm B TC = 10 + 2Q -------------------------(2) Each firm has the ability to produce a maximum quantity of 80,000 units in ten batches of 8,000. Question: Explain and draw the relationship between the zero-profit curve and the marginal cost curve for the two firms using the quantity schedule of the two firms and the relevant plots of equations (1) and (2) ? *Please draw diagram and answer asap*

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Q1: Firms A and B are two firms supplying products in two separate differentiated goods markets. Equations (1) and (2) give the total cost functions of the two firms:  - Firm A: TC = 2Q -----------------------------(1) - Firm B TC = 10 + 2Q -------------------------(2) Each firm has the ability to produce a maximum quantity of 80,000 units in ten batches of 8,000. Question :  Use the information given about firm A above and use appropriate diagrams/figures to explain how the equilibrium will change if it’s cost of production rises to $5?

1 Cournot Suppose that the inverse market demand function is given by P 100 - Q. where Q is the total output. There are two firms in the industry. Each firm has a total cost function given by C; = 10g,, where i = 1,2. They are competing in quantities. Calculate the profit maximizing price and quantity for both firms.

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2.- Each of two firms, firms 1 and 2, has a cost function C(q) = 1 2 q; the demand function for the firms' output is Q = 1.5-p, where Q is the total output. Firms compete in prices. That is, firms choose simultaneously what price they charge. Consumers will buy from the firm offering the lowest price. In case of tying, firms split equally the demand at the (common) price. The firm that charges the higher price sells nothing. (Bertrand model.) (a) Formally argue that there could be no equilibrium in prices other than p1 = p2 = 1 2. (b) Solve the same problem, but this time assuming that firms compete in quantities.Now, suppose that firm 1 has a capacity constraint of 1/3. That is, no matter what demand it gets, it can serve at most 1/3 units. Suppose that these units are served to the consumers who are willing to pay the most. Thus, even if it sets a price above that of firm 1, firm 2 may be able to sell some output. (c) Obtain the (residual) demand of firm 2 (as a function of its own…