Emily and Celeste both work at the same company and earn $10,000 per month. Assume all income is consumed (c). There is a 3% chance that Emily will lose her job and a 6% chance that Celeste will lose her job this month. If either loses her job, she earns $0. Celeste and Emily both have utility function C1/2   Suppose the government provides social insurance to both Celeste and Emily that will fully cover $10,000 of monthly income and charges each a premium $450. Assuming Celeste and Emily are the only participants, what is the expected cost of this program?

Hi! Can you help me with the question below?  Todd has a job that presents zero risk of death or injury, but has always craved something more exciting. His current annual salary is $50,000. He has been offered a job on an Alaskan fishing boat that will pay$55,000 annually. This new job offer, however, comes with a 10% risk of severe injury that will cause Todd to have no income. Which of the following is true? (Assume the severe injury has no relevant implications besides reducing Todd’s income) A) Todd will definitely take the new job if he’s risk averse.B) Todd will definitely take the new job if he’s risk neutral.C) Todd will definitely decline the new job if he’s risk averse or risk neutral.D) Todd will definitely accept the new job if he’s risk seeking.E) Not enough information to determine.

Suppose Lesley is deciding on career paths. She could choose career A, which earns $50,000 per year and has a 10% chance of layoff each year, or career B, which earns 80,000 per year and has a 30% chance of layoff each year. When laid off, she earns 0. Suppose her utility over annual earnings is equal to U(E) = VE (a) What would be her preferred job if she had to choose one or the other? If she could allocate her time to both jobs (e.g., could spend 90% of time in job A and 10% in job B) what would be her ideal allocation of time between jobs?

Fred wants to hire Barney to manage his retail store. Barney can apply a high level of effort (at a cost to him of $30), a medium level of effort (at a cost to him of $10),  or a low level of effort (at a cost to him of $0).  Fred's profits depend not only of the level of Barney's effort but also on the state of consumer demand. Fred believes that demand will be high with probability 50 percent (and therefore demand will be low with probability 50 percent). Fred has determined the following possible profit levels (before paying Barney)  will occur depending on Barney's effort and the state of consumer demand:     Demand     low high effort low 20 40 medium 40 80 high 80 100 Of the choices below, what is the largest percentage range of profit provided to Barney that would ensure Barney would supply high effort?    a. any percent greater than 75.00 percent (3/4).  b. any percent greater than 66.66 percent (2/3).  c. any percent greater than 50.00 percent (1/2).d. any…

Nicolaus I Bernoulli offers his friend Pierre Rémond de Montmort a game where they need to repeatedly toss a fair ducat until they get a head for the first time. The game stops then, and they count the number n of coin tosses it took to get the desired outcome, and Montmort gets 2^n ducats. Assume that Montmort's utility function is u(w)=w^0.14. How much should Montmort pay to play this game?

3. Let us consider a utility function: U(x) = (V2x -1. (200sxs800) We have LiL2 where L1=(1, Y) and L2=(0.3, 450, 0.7,648). a. Determine the value of Y. b. Determine RP (Risk Premium) of L2.

Suppose your preferences can characterized by the simple utility function U = √C, where C is consumption. You enjoy rock climbing, where you have a 10% chance of get- ting injured and losing $50,000. Your income (and therefore consumption) in the uninjured state is $90,000. What is the most you are willing to pay for an insurance policy?     What is the fee for a fair insurance?

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Persons A and B are roommates. Person A smokes and Person B does not. The index s measures how smoky the room is. It varies from s=0, where there is no smoke in the room, to s=1, when the room is filled with smoke. Thus, 1-s measures how "clean" the air in the room is. Person A's utility function is UA(XA,S)=XA+In(1+s), where xA is the amount of money Person A owns. Person B's utility function is uB(XB,1s)%3D3XB+2(1-s), where Xg is the amount of money Person B owns. Each person starts with an endowment of 5 units of money. Persch B has the legal right to a smoke-free room and there is a market for "emission right." At the Walrasian equilibrium, what will be the (per unit of smoke index) price p of the emission rights if the price of money is 1? O a. None of the other answers. O b. p=2/3 O c. p=1 O d. p=3/2 О е. р31/6

Suppose you manage a factory with ten workers. Each worker’s output is determined by the equation q = e. Output sells in the market for a price of 40. The firm has fixed cost equal to 800, and variable costs aside from labor are 8 per unit of output. Worker utility is U = w – e2. Suppose you are paying workers a wage equal to bq. What is the profit- maximizing value of b? Suppose that the probability of worker error increases as the worker increases effort, and that worker error results in unusable output. Suppose that the probability of worker error is Pr[Error] = e/10. Then for worker effort level e, expected (usable) output is now determined by the equation E[q] = (1-Pr[Error]) x e. However, the problem is that you cannot detect errors until after the product is shipped to customers, meaning you pay workers for output before you know whether it is usable or not, and you have to refund your customers for unusable output. Demonstrate why you should not pay your workers the same…