Effort costs a worker e > 0 and shirking costs them nothing. If two workers do action E a lot output is produced and the workers earn £3 each. If only one worker chooses action E less outp s produced and they both earn £1. The workers earn nothing if they both shirk. (i) Describe this situation as a strategic form game (assuming the workers do not observe ead other's effort choice when making their own decision). (ii) For what values of c does this game have strictly dominant strategies? (iii) Describe the Nash equilibria of this game for e = 0, 1, 2, 3. (iv) The workers now are re-arranged into a production line. First worker 1 moves and then work 2 moves. Worker 2 can now see worker l's effort level before they choose their effort. Dra

Principles of Economics 2e
2nd Edition
ISBN:9781947172364
Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro
Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro
Chapter7: Production, Costs, And Industry Structure
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 25RQ: In choosing a production technology, how will firms react if one input becomes relatively more...
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Two workers are on a production line. They each have two actions: exert effort, E, or shirk, S.
Effort costs a worker e > 0 and shirking costs them nothing. If two workers do action E a lot of
output is produced and the workers earn £3 each. If only one worker chooses action E less output
is produced and they both earn £1. The workers earn nothing if they both shirk.
(i) Describe this situation as a strategic form game (assuming the workers do not observe each
other's effort choice when making their own decision).
(ii) For what values of e does this game have strictly dominant strategies?
(iii) Describe the Nash equilibria of this game for e = 0,1, 2, 3.
(iv) The workers now are re-arranged into a production line. First worker 1 moves and then worker
2 moves. Worker 2 can now see worker l's effort level before they choose their effort. Draw
this extensive form game.
(v) Find the subgame perfect equilibria of the production-line game for c =
1/2 and c = 3/2.
Transcribed Image Text:Two workers are on a production line. They each have two actions: exert effort, E, or shirk, S. Effort costs a worker e > 0 and shirking costs them nothing. If two workers do action E a lot of output is produced and the workers earn £3 each. If only one worker chooses action E less output is produced and they both earn £1. The workers earn nothing if they both shirk. (i) Describe this situation as a strategic form game (assuming the workers do not observe each other's effort choice when making their own decision). (ii) For what values of e does this game have strictly dominant strategies? (iii) Describe the Nash equilibria of this game for e = 0,1, 2, 3. (iv) The workers now are re-arranged into a production line. First worker 1 moves and then worker 2 moves. Worker 2 can now see worker l's effort level before they choose their effort. Draw this extensive form game. (v) Find the subgame perfect equilibria of the production-line game for c = 1/2 and c = 3/2.
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