Create a 3x3 payoff matrix for a two person zero sum game (cannot be scissors, paper, rock)

A company makes three types of candy and packages them in three assortments. Assortment I contains 4 cherry, 4 lemon, and 12 lime candies, and sells for a profit of $4.00. Assortment Il contains 12 cherry, 4 lemon, and 4 lime candies, and sells for a profit of $3.00. Assortment III contains 8 cherry, 8 lemon, and 8 lime candies, and sells for a profit of $5.00. They can make 4,800 cherry, 4,200 lemon, and 5,600 lime candies weekly. How many boxes of each type should the company produce each week in order to maximize its profit (assuming that all boxes produced can be sold)? What is the maximum profit? when OA. The maximum profit is $ assortment III are produced. . boxes of assortment I, boxes of assortment II and boxes of

A venture capitalist, willing to invest $1,000,000, has three investments to choose from. The first investment, a software company, has a 13% chance of returning $6,000,000 profit, a 20% chance of returning $3,000,000 profit, and a 67% chance of losing the million dollars. The second company, a hardware company, has a 14% chance of returning $6,000,000 profit, a 30% chance of returning $1,500,000 profit, and a 56% chance of losing the million dollars. The third company, a biotech firm, has a 10% chance of returning $7,000,000 profit, a 41% of no profit or loss, and a 49% chance of losing the million dollars.Order the expected values from smallest to largest.   first, third, second second, third, first third, second, first first, second, third second, first, third third, first, second

Four army divisions attack a town along two possible roads. The town has three divisions defending it. A defending division is dug in and hence equivalent to two attacking divisions. Even one division attacking an undefended road captures the town. Each commander must decide how many divisions to attack or defend each road. If the attacking commander captures a road to the town, the town falls. Score 1 to the attacker if the town falls and −1 if it doesn’t. (a) Find the payoff matrix with payoff the attacker’s probability of winning the town. (b) Find the value of the game and the optimal saddle point.