Consider the following scenario: you are a UNICEF aid worker running a vaccination campaign in certain remote villages in the 3rd world. The new vaccine being used protects against the ultra-deadly Ebola virus, of which there is a major outbreak nearby. Children are especially vulnerable to this horrible virus. You and your team enter a small village and offer to provide the vaccine free of charge, explaining (truthfully) that the children of the village will very likely die terrible deaths soon if they don’t get the vaccine. But the village elders and most of the parents don’t believe you; they mistakenly think this “vaccination campaign” is an evil conspiracy and that UNICEF wants to jab their children with needles in order to make them ill. You try to persuade them of your good intentions, but fail. They refuse to let your team vaccinate the children. As it happens, UNICEF has permission from the national government to use threats of force in order to vaccinate the children, and your team includes armed soldiers who, upon your order, will threaten to shoot the parents unless they allow the children to be vaccinated. It has become clear that the parents won’t agree to the vaccinations unless they are threatened in this way. (You won’t actually order the killing, just the threat. You know [somehow] that the threat will be effective.) Do you give the order to the soldiers to make the threat? Or do you respect the parents’ wishes, and leave the children unvaccinated? Explain your answer in detail, along the way making reference to the ideas of Singer or O’Neill.
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- P P* Pw Pdump S In the graph above, Pw=29, Pdump-17, Q1=6, Q2-9, Q3=13, Q4=20, Q5=22. Germans are able to buy steel on the world market. The graph above shows the German market for Steel. According to the graph above, if US firms dump steel in Germany at a price of Pdump, how will German consumers of steel be affected? Enter the amount of their change in welfare. If they're better off, enter a positive number; if they're worse off, enter a negative number. Round to two decimal places. 120arrow_forwardThe mayor of Green City is considering whether to institute a Covid vaccine mandate for public employees. The fire chief opposes vaccination, and has threatened to resign if a mandate is instituted. The mayor believes that instituting a mandate is critical to getting Covid under control, and thus not instituting the mandate would costs the city -50 utility. However, the fire chief is critical to maintaining public safety. If the fire chief resigns, it would cost the city 75 utility. The fire chief believes a mandate would be an invasion of his personal freedom, costing him 20 utility. The mandate only impacts the fire chief if he does not resign. However, resigning his job as fire chief would cost him 40 utility. Draw this game. Identify how many subgames it contains. Then, solve the game to find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria.arrow_forwardPlease help with question 14. Thank you.arrow_forward
- A pandemic is gaining strength in the United Republic. Health experts advise the citizens to behave in a way that reduces the risk of conta- gion. For simplicity, suppose that each citizen chooses between heeding the advice (playing the p strategy) or ignoring the advice (playing the s strategy). The restrictions involved in heeding the advice and playing p come at a private cost to the citizen; all citizens benefit from curtailing the pandemic, that is, from having many people playing p). To be specific, the payoffs are given by p(x) 1+ 2x s(x) 2+ 2x where a is the fraction of citizens that heed the advice and play p (0 < x< 1). (a) Draw a diagram illustrating the payoffs from playing p (heeding the health advice) and s (ignoring the advice) as functions of x. (b) Describe all of the possible equilibria in this 'pandemic game' and calculate the payoffs at the equilibrium (equilibria). Which of these equilibria is (are) most likely to obtain in this game? Explain your answer. (c)…arrow_forwardKyoko and Rina are considering contributing toward the creation of a public park. Each can choose whether to contribute $300 to the public park or to keep that $300 for a weekend getaway. Since a public park is a public good, both Kyoko and Rina will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.90 of benefit. For example, if both Kyoko and Rina choose to contribute, then a total of $600 would be contributed to the public park. So, Kyoko and Rina would each receive $540 of benefit from the public park, and their combined benefit would be $1,080. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table. Since a weekend getaway is a private good, if Kyoko chooses to spend $300 on a weekend getaway, Kyoko would get $300 of benefit from the weekend getaway and Rina wouldn't receive any benefit from Kyoko's choice. If Kyoko still spends $300 on a weekend getaway and Rina chooses to contribute…arrow_forwardAs of May, 2021; 40% of the COVID-19 vaccines administered globally have gone to people in 27 wealth nations that represent only 11% of the global population. Amidst this vaccine inequality in the backdrop of the pandemic in the world, every country should have the right to make its own vaccine. That's the principle, underpinning the campaign to temporarily waive Intellectual Property (IP) protection on coronavirus vaccines. (a) Suppose the IP is waived (the know-how is available to everyone) and Bangladesh can make its own vaccine. Using the theories of demand-supply and market, discuss the impact of this scenario on the price, quantity, profit margins of the vaccine producing firms, consumers' surplus, producers' surplus in the COVID-19 vaccine market of Bangladesh. (b) Suppose the Government of Bangladesh imposes a per-unit tax on the vaccines sold by "B". Who will bear most of this tax burden and why? (c) If the IP is not waived and only one company "B" is approved for producing…arrow_forward
- Next Friday, you plan to sell cakes at a bake sale to raise money for your school. You plan to charge $30 per cake, and you anticipate that you will sell 10 cakes. You can either purchase cakes to sell or bake them yourself. If you purchase the cakes, they will cost $25 each. If you bake your own cakes, your cost depends upon the number of cakes you bake, as shown in the table below. Number of cakes you bake Total cost of baked cakes ($) 0 0 1 10 2 22 3 36 4 52 5 70 6 90 7 112 8 136 9 162 10 190 a) How many cakes should you bake? How many cakes should you purchase? Bake ___ cake(s) and purchase ___ cake(s). b) Given your answer to part a, how much in total will the 10 cakes cost you? $ c) How much would it have cost you to bake all 10 cakes? $ d) How much would it have cost you to purchase all 10 cakes? $arrow_forwardOne of the principles of economics is that people respond to incentives. Using this principle, discuss how a tax imposed on people who refuse to get vaccinated against COVID-19 virus affects the national level of vaccination coverage.arrow_forwardCould Question 13 be answered?arrow_forward
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