Consider the above extensive-form game. If player 1 chooses U, player 2 will choose____. If player 1 chooses D, player 2 will choose _____. Based on this, player 1 should choose to play ____.

Consider the above extensive-form game. If player 1 chooses U, player 2 will choose__. If player 1 chooses D, player 2 will choose _. Based on this, player 1 should choose to play __.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Question

Consider the above extensive-form game. If player 1 chooses U, player 2 will choose____. If player 1 chooses D, player 2 will choose _____. Based on this, player 1 should choose to play ____.

1
U
D
2
2
U'
D'
U'
D'
(0, 0)
(2,1)
(1,2)
(3,1)

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