Consider five people (named 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) with the preference rankings over four projects A, B, C, and D. rank 1 2 3 4 I В A C A D II с D B св III D C D B C

Question 2 is only for background informaiton

From a certain place K, 2000 people set off for work in the distant place S in the morning by car. Each of the drivers must decide whether to come to place S via point G or via point D (see the directed graph below). The travel time on segments G-S and K-D is not dependent on the number of drivers: each driver traverses the G-S segment in 60 minutes, and the K-D segment in 45 minutes, regardless of the number of drivers. However, the travel time on segments K-G and D-S depends on the number of drivers: if x drivers travel on the K-G segment, each driver on this segment consumes 0.005x minutes; if x drivers travel on the D-S segment, each driver on this segment consumes 0.01x minutes (see the directed graph below). Assume that all people start simultaneously and do not know the decisions of other people. Find all pure Nash equilibria of the game.

asumming Two firms produce a homogeneous good and compete in prices. Consumers buy the good from the firm that charges the lower price. In case the price charged by the two firms is the same, the firms split the demand. The linear demand curve for the product is given by Q=100A−P. Bothfirmshavethe same constant marginal cost of 40. (a) [10] Plot the best response functions on the axes, recording p1 on the horizontal axis and p2 on the vertical axis. Label the two best response functions. Make sure that you explain what the prices in equilibrium (and profits) for the two firms are when they choose prices simultaneously and interact only once. Assume now that both firms choose simultaneously but interact an infinite number of times. Each firm discounts the future based on the discount factor 0 < δ < 1. (b) Show under which range of δ collusion is an equilibrium in this market. Explain the various steps. (c)  Repeat the analysis in (b), but assuming now that the two firms compete in…