Consider a variant of the Bertrand's competition given in class. Assume that each firm is restricted to choose a price that is an integral number of cents. Take the monetary unit to be cent and assume that c is an integer and a > c+1. Is (c, c) a Nash equilibrium? Is there any other Nash equilibrium? Plz do fast

From the bank of terms match the letter that corresponds to the appropriate concept/description. Bank of terms Letter A Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium Bayesian Nash equilibrium Nash equilibrium Competition à la Cournot Competition à la Bertrand В C E Herfindahl index F Perfect competition G Consumer urplus Lerner index H I Principal-agent model Natural monopoly Strategic complements Conjectural variations approach Strategic substitutes J K L M N Concept/description Competition in quantities Price taking behavior Index of maket power Write letter Measure of welfare Solution for a static game with incomplete information Competition in prices Measure of intensity of competition Manager and business owner work relationship Best response functions that slope upwards Estimation of market power

NASH EQUILIBRIUM Consider the following game in strategic form. bị b2 a1 16,12 4,20 a2 6,28 9,14 a3 8,6 12,4 1-T-0 1-T The Equilibrium Existence Theorem guarantees that this game possesses at least one Nash equilibrium of the form (7* , o*, 7*). Which values of T are part of such an equilibrium? (Mark all values for which an associated equilibrium exists.) Select one or more: 0.00 0.60 0.30 0.80 0.25 0.75 0.20 O 1.00

Hello, In a) I get qi=2, price=3 and profiti= 4.  I had a question on (b), I attached my answer in handwritten, is it correct to do it by showing Lemma 1 result? It is so confusing. So, based on this with q(bar) as capacity constrained, and they are not gigantic capacity, I assumed it is played under pure strategy equilibrium of pricing game. Hence, the "optimal price = market-clearing" price is a Nash Equilibria as in Lemma 1. Pls, can you help me with (b)? Thanks