Bertrand duopolists face MWTP = 8 - Q and can produce any quantity without marginal cost. If firm 1 will choose the price maximizing market profits this period, what price does firm 2 choose to maximize its profits this period? (Assume prices must be in whole cents. Remember, do not enter the $ sign.)

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= Suppose the inverse demand for a particular good is given by P 1200 12Q. Furthermore, there are only two firms, A and B. Firm A's marginal cost is a constant $25, and Firm B's marginal cost is a constant $20. Assume these two firms engage in Stackelberg competition, where Firm A moves first. If we assume that the firm with the lowest costs could supply the entire market, then the deadweight loss due to the market power these two firms exert through Stackelberg competition equals $_____. [Round your answer to two decimals.]

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The market demand function for birthday cards in Greenwich Village is: P = 100 − 10Q. The total cost function for producing birthday cards is:  C= 60 + 20q. Suppose that a firm can perfectly price discriminate (i.e. conduct first-degree price discrimination). How much will its profits be?   - How would I start this question?

2.- Each of two firms, firms 1 and 2, has a cost function C(q) = 1 2 q; the demand function for the firms' output is Q = 1.5-p, where Q is the total output. Firms compete in prices. That is, firms choose simultaneously what price they charge. Consumers will buy from the firm offering the lowest price. In case of tying, firms split equally the demand at the (common) price. The firm that charges the higher price sells nothing. (Bertrand model.) (a) Formally argue that there could be no equilibrium in prices other than p1 = p2 = 1 2. (b) Solve the same problem, but this time assuming that firms compete in quantities.Now, suppose that firm 1 has a capacity constraint of 1/3. That is, no matter what demand it gets, it can serve at most 1/3 units. Suppose that these units are served to the consumers who are willing to pay the most. Thus, even if it sets a price above that of firm 1, firm 2 may be able to sell some output. (c) Obtain the (residual) demand of firm 2 (as a function of its own…

Suppose the inverse demand function for two Cournot duopolists is given byP = 10 − ( Q 1 + Q 2 )and their costs are zero.1. What is each firm’s marginal revenue?