b. Now suppose that Player B has a different utility function from what was described earlier. She has two components to her utility: money and comparison. Let d = TA – TB be the difference between the two players' payoffs in the game. Then assume Player B's utility function is U(m,d) = m – 0.5d. The game still functions exactly as it did before, with Player A proposing a split of the pot and Player B deciding to accept the proposal or reject it. Player B still gets 0 utility if she rejects Player A's proposal, and she still accepts a proposal if she is indifferent between accepting and rejecting. Draw a new game tree reflecting Player B's different utility function. What rule will Player B follow in deciding whether to accept an offer? Knowing this, how much will Player A offer Player B in Nash equilibrium? c. Now suppose that there are two types of people: Type I, those whose utility functions are U(m) = m, and Type II, those whose utility functions are U(m,d) = m- 0.5d. Suppose everyone knows that half of the population is the first type, and half is the second type. Suppose Player A knows that he is Type I, but he does not know Player B's type. What is Player A's expected utility (that is, the expected value of his utility) in this case from making his proposal as if Player B were Type I and didn't care about comparison? What is his expected utility from making his proposal as if Player B were Type II and did care about comparison?

You are part of a government task force evaluating whether new models of cars will meet fuel efficiency standards set out by the newly signed climate bill.  You have run an ANCOVA model that predicts fuel efficiency (in miles per gallon) as a function of vehicle weight (measured in thousands of lbs, where a value of 2.5 would correspond to 2,500 lbs), horsepower, and number of cylinders in the car (cylinders is a factor in this model with 3 levels: 4 cylinders, 6 cylinders, and 8 cylinders).  Your analysis tells you the following; The mean miles per gallon of all cars analyzed is 20.09 The mean weight of all cars analyzed is 3.217 thousand lbs The mean horsepower of all cars analyzed is 146.7 The regression coefficient for weight is -3.18 miles per gallon per additional thousand lbs  The regression coefficient for horsepower is -0.023 miles per gallon per additional unit of horsepower Cars with 4 cylinders get 2.13 more miles per gallon, on average, than the average car Toyota is…

30 QUESTION 14 Question 9. (CUSTOMERS ARE ASSESTS FOR A BUSINESS) A saleswoman buys the five products say, bag, sunglass, watch, makeup set, and fountain pen from a supplier. Let x = 78, x2 = 25, x3 = 22, x4 = 40 and x5 =10 be the costs respectively. A saleswoman sets a profit of $3 at the end of day from the five items. If she sold two items of each product, compute her total sale as: 5 2 Σx +3 i=1 QUESTION 15

A company manufactures two products. If it charges price pi for product i, it can sell qi units of product i, where q1 = 80 – 2p1 + p2 and q2 = 100 – 3p2 + p1. It costs $8 to produce a unit of product 1 and $15 to produce a unit of product 2. a.  How many units of each product should the company produce to maximize its profit? If needed, round your answers to one decimal digit.   Product 1 Product 2 Production quantities         b.  What prices should the company charge to maximize its profit? If needed, round your answers to the nearest cent.   Product 1 Product 2 Prices $   $