As a manager of a chain of movie theaters that are monopolies in their respective markets, you have noticed much higher demand on weekends than during the week. You therefore conducted a study that has revealed two different demand curves at your movie theaters. On weekends, the inverse demand function is P=30-0.002Q, on weekdays, it is P= 22 -0.002 Q. You acquire legal rights from movie producers to show their films at a cost of $30,000 per movie, plus a $3.50 "royalty" for each moviegoer entering your theaters (the average moviegoer in your market watches a movie only once). What type of pricing strategy should you consider in this case? Block pricing O First degree price discrimination O Second degree price discrimination Third degree price discrimination What price should you charge on weekends? Instructions: Enter your response rounded to two decimal places. $ What price should you charge on weekdays? Instructions: Enter your response rounded to two decimal places. $

As a manager of a chain of movie theaters that are monopolies in their respective markets, you have noticed much higher demand on weekends than during the week. You therefore conducted a study that has revealed two different demand curves at your movie theaters. On weekends, the inverse demand function is P=30-0.002Q, on weekdays, it is P= 22 -0.002 Q. You acquire legal rights from movie producers to show their films at a cost of $30,000 per movie, plus a $3.50 "royalty" for each moviegoer entering your theaters (the average moviegoer in your market watches a movie only once). What type of pricing strategy should you consider in this case? Block pricing O First degree price discrimination O Second degree price discrimination Third degree price discrimination What price should you charge on weekends? Instructions: Enter your response rounded to two decimal places. $ What price should you charge on weekdays? Instructions: Enter your response rounded to two decimal places. $

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter13: best-practice Tactics: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1E

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As a manager of a chain of movie theaters that are monopolies in their respective markets, you have noticed much higher demand on weekends than during the week. You therefore conducted a study that has revealed two different demand curves at your movie theaters. On weekends, the inverse demand function is P = 20 - 0.001Q; on weekdays, it is P = 15 - 0.002Q. You acquire legal rights from movie producers to show their films at a cost of $25,000 per movie, plus a $2.50 "royalty" for each moviegoer entering your theaters (the average moviegoer in your market watches a movie only once). What price should you charge on weekends? What price should you charge on weekdays?
As a manager of a chain of movie theaters that are monopolies in their respective markets, you have noticed much higher demand on weekends than during the week. You therefore conducted a study that has revealed two different demand curves at your movie theaters. On weekends, the inverse demand function is P = 20 − 0.001Q; on weekdays, it is P = 15 − 0.002Q. You acquire legal rights from movie producers to show their films at a cost of $25,000 per movie, plus a $2.50 “royalty” for each moviegoer entering your theaters (the average moviegoer in your market watches a movie only once). Devise a pricing strategy to maximize your firm’s profits.
As a manager of a chain of movie theaters that are monopolies in their respective markets, you have noticed much higher demand on weekends than during the week. You therefore conducted a study that has revealed two different demand curves at your movie theaters. On weekends, the inverse demand function is P = 20 – 0.001Q; on weekdays, it is P = 15 – 0.002Q. You acquire legal rights from movie producers to show their films at a cost of $25,000 per movie, plus a $2.50 “royalty” for each moviegoer entering your theaters (the average moviegoer in your market watches a movie only once).
The manager of a convenience store competes in a monopolistically competitive market and buys cola from a supplier at a price of $1.25 per liter. The manager thinks that because there are several supermarkets nearby, the demand for cola sold at her store is slightly more elastic than the elasticity for the representative food store reported in Table (which is −3.8). Based on this information, she perceives that the elasticity of demand for cola sold by her store is −4. What price should the manager charge for a liter of cola to maximize profits?
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A manager of a nightclub realizes that demand for drinks is more elastic among students and is trying to determine the optimal pricing schedule. Specifically, he estimates the following average demand for his customer types: Under 25: q^r=18-5pOver 25: q=10-2p The two age groups visit the nightclub in equal numbers on average. Assume that drinks cost the club $2 to make. A) suppose that once again it is impossible to identify which group the customers belong. Suppose the manager lowers the price of drinks to equal to marginal cost and still wanted to attract both customers, what entry fee would the manager set?
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A golf club’s owner has commissioned a market study that estimates the average customer’s monthly demand curve for playing 18-hole golf game to be Q=50 – 0.5P, where Q stands for the number of 18-hole golf game, and P is the green fee. The marginal cost is given by MC=20. (1) Under two-part pricing strategy, what is the optimal amount of green fee to charge for one round of 18-hole golf game? (2) Under two-part pricing strategy, what is the optimal amount of membership due? (3) Under two-part pricing strategy, what is the size of the profit obtained from the average customer?
A manager of a nightclub realizes that demand for drinks is more elastic among students and is trying to determine the optimal pricing schedule. Specifically, he estimates the following average demand for his customer types: Under 25: qr =18-5p Over 25: q=10-2p The two age groups visit the nightclub in equal numbers on average. Assume that drinks cost the club $2 to make. If the manager can charge a separate entry fee and a price per drink for each group, what two-part price will the manager set for reach group. Now suppose that once again it is impossible to identify which group the customers belong. Suppose the manager lowers the price of drinks to equal to marginal cost and still wanted to attract both customers, what entry fee would the manager set? Compare the profits earned in parts a) to d). Which scheme would you choose if you could not identify customer type and which would you choose if you could identify customer type.
Assume you are the Director of Marketing for Majjus Enterprise, a firm that produces a new product called African Solar. Your company sells to two distinct geographical markets-East Legon and Nima. Majjus Enterprise is described as a monopolist and has the possibility of discriminating between its East Legon and Nima Markets. In order to derive the maximum profit from the production process, you engaged the services of an Econometrician, who estimated the demand functions for both East Legon and Nima markets to be: Q1 = 24 – 0.2P1 East Legon Market Q2 = 10 – 0.05P2 Nima Market Where Q1 and Q2 are the respective quantities of African Solar demanded in the East Legon and Nima markets and P1 and P2 are their respective prices (in GH¢). If the Total Cost (TC) of Majjus Enterprise for producing African Solar for these two markets is given as TC = 35 + 40Q, where Q = Q1 + Q2. What profit will Majjus Enterprise make with and without price discrimination? What…
Suppose the European Union (EU) is investigating a proposed merger between two of the largest distillers of premium Scotch liquor. Based on some economists’ definition of the relevant market, the two firms proposing to merge enjoyed a combined market share of about two-thirds, while another firm essentially controlled the remaining share of the market. Additionally, suppose that the (wholesale) market elasticity of demand for Scotch liquor is –1.3 and that it costs $16.20 to produce and distribute each liter of Scotch. Based only on these data, provide quantitative estimates of the likely pre- and postmerger prices in the wholesale market for premium Scotch liquor. In light of your estimates, are you surprised that the EU might raise concerns about potential anticompetitive effects of the proposed merger? Explain carefully.
Each year a new group of high school seniors chooses where they want to attend college. The college faces two identifiably different categories of customers, in-state and out-of-state students. The (inverse) demand equation for in-state students is given by PI=$9000- QI, while demand by out-of-state students is given by PO= $21,000 -9QO. P represents the annual tuition charged by the college and Q represents the number of students who enter as freshmen. The marginal cost of educating an additional student is constant and equal to $3000. Suppose that the Board of Trustees wants to act as a profit-maximizing monopolist in setting price and output. What tuition should they charge for in-state and out-of-state students, and how many of each would enroll each year?