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4)The result with unspecified N firms can be applied to N approaching infinity.
Q2) Which of the following statements about the classic Cournot duopoly model is incorrect?
1)The products of the two firms are homogeneous.
2)It is a static game with complete information.
3)The two firms decide on their prices and let their quantities be dictated
4)There exist examples that have unique Nash equilibrium points
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- Consider a duopolistic market in which the two identical firms compete by selecting their quantities. The inverse market demand is P(Q) = 210−Q and each firm has a marginal cost of $15 per unit. Assume that fixed costs are negligible for both firms. Cournot Model Determine the Nash-Cournot equilibrium for this market.(Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places.) Firm 1's quantity: q1= ? units. Firm 2's quantity: q2 = ? units. Market price: P= ? Stackelberg Model Determine the Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium for this market, assuming that Firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader. (Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places.) Firm 1's quantity: q1 = ? units Firm 2s quantity: q2 = ? units. Market price: P = ?Which of the following statements about the classic Cournot duopoly model is incorrect? 1)The products of the two firms are homogeneous. 2) It is a static game with complete information. 3) The two firms decide on their prices and let their quantities be dictated demand conditions. 4) There exist examples that have unique Nash equilibrium points.Problem 5.1. The inverse market demand for printer paper is given by P = 400 – 2Q. There are two firms who compete to produce this paper, each with a marginal cost of production equal to c = 40 over a large range of output (ie, assume constant marginal cost). The two firms compete in quantities, in other words they each simultaneously choose a quantity to produce (Cournot competition). Derive the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of this game. Please write final answers in the boxes, showing work in blank areas. (a) The reaction function for each firm. 91 (92): 92 (91) (b) Optimal output q for each firm. 92 = р = = π1 = (c) Market price (from demand curve). (d) Firm profits. 92 = π2 =
- Consider two firms who compete with each other in terms of quantity. If the inverse market demand and total costs of the firms are given by P = 140 – Q TC, = 20q, + 10 TC2 = 20q1 + 10 a. Find the Response (Reaction) functions of each curve b. Find the Nash Equilibrium of this Cournot duopoly game c. Graphically represent this equilibrium using their Response (Reaction) curves d. Suppose these two firms collude and form a cartel, what will the equilibrium be under this situation e. Is the equilibrium under (d) sustainable or not and why? f. Suppose that both firms have agreed that firm 1 is a leader and firm 2 is a follower, find the Nash equilibrium of this sequential gameConsider a Cournot duopoly with the inverse demand P = 200−2Q. Firm 1 and 2 compete by simultaneously choosing their quantities. Both firms have constant marginal and average cost MC = AC = 20. A) Find each firm’s best response function. Plot the best response functions (label the x-axes as ?1 and y-axes as ?2 ). B) Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities, profits and market price. Illustrate the equilibrium point on your graph in part AAnswer the given question with a proper explanation and step-by-step solution. Three firms produce identical products and compete in a market where the inverse demand function is P(q1, q2, q3) = 78 − q1− q2− q3. Each has a per-unit cost of 14 and zero fixed cost. They simultaneously choose quantities. In scenario (a), find the Nash equilibrium of this game and let A = firm 2's profit in the Nash equilibrium. In scenario (b), assume that the firms form a cartel, i.e., they act as a monopoly and split the profit evenly. If the total quantity produced by the cartel is Q, then the inverse demand is P(Q) = 78 - Q. Let B = firm 2's profit in the cartel. Calculate the value of A - B and enter your answer in the box below. Please round your answer to 3 decimal places (e.g., write 4/3 as 1.333).
- Consider a Cournot duopoly. The inverse demand function of the market is given by p = 10-Q, where p is the market price, and Q = 91 +92 is the aggregate output. The marginal costs of the two firms are C₁ 1 and C₂ = 4. = (a) Solve for the Nash equilibrium of the game including firm out- puts, market price, aggregate output, and firm profits. (b) Now suppose these two firms play a 2-stage game. In stage 1, they produce capacities 9₁ and 92, which are equal to the Nash equilibrium quantities of the Cournot game characterised by part (a). In stage 2, they simultaneously decide on their prices p₁ and P2. The marginal cost for each firm to sell up to capacity is 0. It is impossible to sell more than capacity. The residual demand for 10 Piāj if Pi > Pj firm ij, is Di (Pi, Pj) = 10-Pi 2 = if pipi. (Note, if Pi < Pj 10 - Pi here we assume that the efficient/parallel rationing applies). Prove that it is a Nash equilibrium of the second stage subgame that each firm charges the market clearing…Consider a Cournot duopoly with the inverse demand P = 200 − 2Q. Firm 1 and 2 compete by simultaneously choosing their quantities. Both firms have constant marginal and average cost MC = AC = 20. A) Find each firm’s best response function. Plot the best response functions (label the x-axes as ?1 and y-axes as ?2 ). B) Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities, profits and market price. Illustrate the equilibrium point on your graph in part (A). C) Suppose instead that firm 1 had MC = AC = 20, but firm 2’s MC = 8. What is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs and profits now? How would this affect your answers to part (B)? ExplainA homogenous-good duopoly faces an inverse market demand function of p = 150 − Q. Assume that both firms face the same constant marginal cost, MC1 = MC2 = 30. Calculate the output of each firm, the market output, and the market price in a Nash-Cournot equilibrium Re-solve part (a) assuming that the marginal cost of firm 1 falls to MC1 =20 Explain what will happen to each firm’s output, the market output, and the market price if the two firms can collude (e.g., form a cartel)
- Consider a duopolistic market with two firms, A and B, facing a market demand curve of P=100-qA –qB for the same product. Assume that the cost of production is CA=2qA for firm A and CB=4qB for firm B. Suppose that both firms make output decision simultaneously. In Nash equilibrium, the firm A should produce unit, and its profit is In Nash equilibrium, the firm B should produce unit, and its profit is .The firms in a duopoly produce differentiated products. The inverse demand for Firm 1 is The inverse demand for Firm 2 is and P₁ = 52-9₁-0.592. Each firm has a marginal cost of m= $1 per unit. Solve for the Nash-Cournot equilibrium quantities. The Cournot equilibrium quantities are (Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places.) P₂ = 100-92-0.5q1₁. 91 = units 92 units. =Suppose that two firms produce mountain spring water and the market demand for mountain spring water is given as follows: P= 254 - 91 - 92 Firm 1 and Firm 2 have a MC = 50 a) Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium price and quantity of each firm. b) Assume now that firm 1 becomes the Stackelberg leader. What will be the market price, output by each firm? Compared to part a, who gains? c) If Firm 1 chooses a quantity, then Firm 2 chooses a quantity (having observed Firm 1's quantity), then Firm 1 has an opportunity to revise its quantity (having observed Firm 2's quantity), then payoffs are determined, does either firm stand to gain relative to the case of simultaneous quantity choice? Why or why not? (hint: there is no need to do any calculation here).
