A small community has 20 people, each of whom has a wealth of $12,000. Each individual must choose whether to contribute $300 or $0 to the support of public entertainment for their community. The money value of the benefit that a person gets from this public entertainment is b times the total amount of money contributed by individuals in the community.
Question 3 options:
If 20b > 1, everybody is better off if all contribute to the public entertainment fund than if nobody contributes, but if 20b < 1, everybody is better off if nobody contributes than if all contribute
Everybody is worse off if all contribute than if nobody contributes if b > 1, but if b < 1, everybody is better off if nobody contributes.
This game has a dominant strategy equilibrium in which nobody contributes anything for public entertainment.
If 20b > 1, there is a dominant strategy equilibrium in which everybody contributes.
In order for there to be a dominant strategy equilibrium in which all contribute, it must be that b > 20.
Trending nowThis is a popular solution!
Step by stepSolved in 3 steps
- 7arrow_forwardKyoko and Rina are considering contributing toward the creation of a public park. Each can choose whether to contribute $300 to the public park or to keep that $300 for a weekend getaway. Since a public park is a public good, both Kyoko and Rina will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.90 of benefit. For example, if both Kyoko and Rina choose to contribute, then a total of $600 would be contributed to the public park. So, Kyoko and Rina would each receive $540 of benefit from the public park, and their combined benefit would be $1,080. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table. Since a weekend getaway is a private good, if Kyoko chooses to spend $300 on a weekend getaway, Kyoko would get $300 of benefit from the weekend getaway and Rina wouldn't receive any benefit from Kyoko's choice. If Kyoko still spends $300 on a weekend getaway and Rina chooses to contribute…arrow_forwardAssume that the price per hamburger is $2.50. The incremental value to you of each hamburger is described in the table below. If you are seeking to maximize total net gains from hamburgers, how many hamburgers should you purchase? Pairs of jeans Marginal Benefit 1 $8.00 2 $6.00 3 $4.00 4 $2.00 5 $0.00 Group of answer choices 3 2 4 5 1arrow_forward
- Please answer everything in the photos.arrow_forwardConsider two groups of citizens, each group can either choose to drive x = d or to take public transport x = p. The first group, group 1, enjoys driving and has the following 3 benefit from using their car within the ULEZ area: B1(x1 = d) = 18. The second group, group 2, does not enjoy driving and has a benefit of B2(x2 = d) = 0 from driving their car. If they don’t drive, citizens can use public transport to get around. The benefit of doing so is the same for both groups: B1(x1 = p) = B2(x2 = p) = 10. Both groups drive cars that do not meet the ULEZ requirements and therefore create excessive pollution. For simplicity, we consider that pollution, and the health problems it induces, are the main cost of driving. This cost is imposed on both groups and is equal to Ci(x1 = d, x2 = d) = 10 if both groups drive, Ci(x1 = p, x2 = d) = Ci(x1 = d, x2 = p) = 5 if only one group drives and Ci(x1 = p, x2 = p) = 0 if neither group drives, where i represents either group 1 or group 2. The…arrow_forwardConsider two groups of citizens, each group can either choose to drive x = d or to take public transport x = p. The first group, group 1, enjoys driving and has the following 3 benefit from using their car within the ULEZ area: B1(x1 = d) = 18. The second group, group 2, does not enjoy driving and has a benefit of B2(x2 = d) = 0 from driving their car. If they don’t drive, citizens can use public transport to get around. The benefit of doing so is the same for both groups: B1(x1 = p) = B2(x2 = p) = 10. Both groups drive cars that do not meet the ULEZ requirements and therefore create excessive pollution. For simplicity, we consider that pollution, and the health problems it induces, are the main cost of driving. This cost is imposed on both groups and is equal to Ci(x1 = d, x2 = d) = 10 if both groups drive, Ci(x1 = p, x2 = d) = Ci(x1 = d, x2 = p) = 5 if only one group drives and Ci(x1 = p, x2 = p) = 0 if neither group drives, where i represents either group 1 or group 2. The…arrow_forward
- Your total benefits from spending time with your spouse are shown in the following table. Hours per Day Total Benefit 0 0 1 20 2 38 3 54 4 68 5 80 6 90 7 98 8 104 Alternatively, you have the option of working as many hours as you want, earning $11 per hour. Assume this is the next best use of your time. Use the marginal principle to find your optimal number of hours to spend with your spouse per day. The optimal amount of time for you to spend with your spouse is hours per day Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.arrow_forward2iiarrow_forwardRefer to Figure 11-1. Assuming that higher education spending means better quality, how many families will receive lower quality education because of the government providing public education?arrow_forward
- Consider two groups of citizens, each group can either choose to drive x = d or to take public transport x = p. The first group, group 1, enjoys driving and has the following benefit from using their car within the ULEZ area: B1(x1 = d) = 18. The second group, group 2, does not enjoy driving and has a benefit of B2(x2 = d) = 0 from driving their car. If they don’t drive, citizens can use public transport to get around. The benefit of doing so is the same for both groups: B1(x1 = p) = B2(x2 = p) = 10. Both groups drive cars that do not meet the ULEZ requirements and therefore create excessive pollution. For simplicity, we consider that pollution, and the health problems it induces, are the main cost of driving. This cost is imposed on both groups and is equal to Ci(x1 = d, x2 = d) = 10 if both groups drive, Ci(x1 = p, x2 = d) = Ci(x1 = d, x2 = p) = 5 if only one group drives and Ci(x1 = p, x2 = p) = 0 if neither group drives, where i represents either group 1 or group 2. The utility of…arrow_forward1. when consent is given, the individual is held to this concern even if here she did not fully understand what was being consented to. True or falsearrow_forwardBrian and Edison are considering contributing toward the creation of a public park. Each can choose whether to contribute $400 to the public park or to keep that $400 for a cell phone. Since a public park is a public good, both Brian and Edison will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.80 of benefit. For example, if both Brian and Edison choose to contribute, then a total of $800 would be contributed to the public park. So, Brian and Edison would each receive $640 of benefit from the public park, and their combined benefit would be $1,280. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table. Since a cell phone is a private good, if Brian chooses to spend $400 on a cell phone, Brian would get $400 of benefit from the cell phone and Edison wouldn't receive any benefit from Brian's choice. If Brian still spends $400 on a cell phone and Edison chooses to contribute $400 to the…arrow_forward
- Principles of Economics (12th Edition)EconomicsISBN:9780134078779Author:Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. OsterPublisher:PEARSONEngineering Economy (17th Edition)EconomicsISBN:9780134870069Author:William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick KoellingPublisher:PEARSON
- Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)EconomicsISBN:9781305585126Author:N. Gregory MankiwPublisher:Cengage LearningManagerial Economics: A Problem Solving ApproachEconomicsISBN:9781337106665Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike ShorPublisher:Cengage LearningManagerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-...EconomicsISBN:9781259290619Author:Michael Baye, Jeff PrincePublisher:McGraw-Hill Education