A monopolist faces a market demand Q(p)=1500-5p and has cost function C(q)-120q. Supposethat the government intervenes the market and splits the monopolist into two firms with costfunctions C₁(91)=120q1 and C₂(92)=120q2. If the newly created firms compete in Cournot model,then the total profit level of the two firms is?4050018000360002025010125TRG

Market demand function: After the government intervenes, there are two firms. The cost function of…

A monopolist faces a market demand Q(p)-1500-5p and has cost function C(q)-120q. Suppose that the government intervenes the market and splits the monopolist into two firms with cost functions C₂(q)-120q1 and C₂(92)-120q2. If the newly created firms compete in Cournot model, then the total profit level of the two firms is? 40500 18000 36000 20250 10125

A monopolist faces a market demand Q(p)-1500-5p and has cost function C(q)-120q. Suppose that the government intervenes the market and splits the monopolist into two firms with cost functions C₂(q)-120q1 and C₂(92)-120q2. If the newly created firms compete in Cournot model, then the total profit level of the two firms is? 40500 18000 36000 20250 10125

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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