2. Consider a society consisting with three individuals whose demand curves for a pure public good are Pa = 100-X, P = 110-X, P = 150-X for individual A, B, and C respectively. Marginal costs are constant and equal to $150 for each unit provided. (a) Determine the pareto optimal output rate and calculate the Lindahl prices for each individual.

Consider a market with two polluting firms with linear marginal abatement cost curves.  Firm B has increasing marginal abatement costs that are everywhere half as high as Firm A’s marginal abatement costs.  The maximum amount of pollution that can be tolerated is less than the total these two firms would emit if their pollution was unrestricted. Thus some aggregate amount of abatement is necessary.  The pollutant in question is uniformly mixing, so it doesn’t matter which firm cuts back how much, only that between them, they cut back by the required total amount. The environmental agency decides to solve the abatement allocation problem by giving out pollution permits in amounts such that each firm would be obliged to cut back their emissions by an equal amount. Would this be “fair”?  Would it be “efficient”?

Consider the following table, describing each person's willingness to pay for different levels (units) mosquito control. Mosquito control is a public good for this society. Demand for Mosquito Control Person A Level WTP($) Person B Person C WTP($) WTP($) 10 25 16 15 20 20 14 12 30 15 12 8. 40 10 10 6. 50 5 8 3 The marginal cost of producing one unit of mosquito control is $35 and constant. Assuming there is no Free-Rider issue, the private level of mosquito control supplied would be units. The optimal level of mosquito control however, would be units.

A Consider agent A with (inverse) demand curve for the public good P₁ = 60 - 2QA and agent B with inverse demand PB = 90 - 5QB, where prices are measured in £ per unit. The marginal cost of producing the public good is £10 per unit. What is the Pareto efficient level of the public good? Explain. Illustrate in a graph. [Hint: Compute the marginal social benefit of the public good by adding up the demand curves vertically, over the p's]

Suppose that engineers have discovered a new production process for this product which results in a significant positive externality.  As a result of the positive externality, for every given output level Marginal Social Value (MSV1) is now higher than consumer’s marginal willingness to pay (also known as the Demand Curve shown as D0 below). Keep in mind that the setting is still that of a monopoly. 1) Please indicate on the graph above, assuming an absence of any government intervention to correct the positive externality and adding any necessary curve(s): The monopoly price P1 and the monopoly quantity Q1 under the condition of the (uncorrected) positive externality. (Also indicate, for comparison purposes, the original monopoly price P0 and monopoly quantity Q0.) The Socially Optimal output, QSO1. The resulting Consumer Surplus CS1, the resulting Producer Surplus PS1, and the size of Dead-Weight Loss DWL1 if there is such a loss. (No need to show the economic profits earned by the…

If a) the government uses a tradable permits program for pollution emissions, b) polluting firms are heterogeneous in terms of their marginal abatement costs (MACs), and c) each firm is initially allocated an equal amount of permits, it must be the case that: Select one: a. Firms with higher marginal abatement costs will pay firms with lower marginal abatement costs to abate more. b. Firms with lower marginal abatement costs will end up with more permits than firms with higher marginal abatement costs after trading. c. All firms will end up abating the same amount of emissions. d. All of the above are true. e. All of the above are false.