ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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ISBN: 9780190931919
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need help on question 7-13
![Use the following to answer questions (1) - (14): Suppose the local market for flat glass, considered a
homogeneous product, consists of two firms, A and B. The market demand is given as:
Q = 40 - 2P, where Q is the market quantity and P is the price.
A's total cost (TC) is: TC, = 6°q4, where q, is the quantity produced and sold by A
B's total cost (TC3) is: TC, = 8q2, where qg is the quantity produced and sold by B
[1]
The market structure these two firms operate in is definitely not monopolistic competition.
A.
True
В.
False
[2]
Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium A produces a quantity closest in value to:
A.
9
В.
11
C.
13
D.
15
[3]
Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium the market quantity is closest in value to:
A.
10
В.
13
С.
17
D.
20
[4]
Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium the market price is closest in value to:
A.
9
В.
11
C.
15
D.
19
[5]
Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium B's profit is closest in value to:
A.
8.
В.
16
C.
20
D.
26
[6]
Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium A's profit is closest in value to:
A.
8.
В.
16
C.
20
D.
26](https://content.bartleby.com/qna-images/question/b17dca31-9e9b-409c-a2ff-191d71fb3cfd/bb7cfed0-c79b-40bc-9beb-dfaa6138380a/mcek68j_processed.png)
Transcribed Image Text:Use the following to answer questions (1) - (14): Suppose the local market for flat glass, considered a
homogeneous product, consists of two firms, A and B. The market demand is given as:
Q = 40 - 2P, where Q is the market quantity and P is the price.
A's total cost (TC) is: TC, = 6°q4, where q, is the quantity produced and sold by A
B's total cost (TC3) is: TC, = 8q2, where qg is the quantity produced and sold by B
[1]
The market structure these two firms operate in is definitely not monopolistic competition.
A.
True
В.
False
[2]
Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium A produces a quantity closest in value to:
A.
9
В.
11
C.
13
D.
15
[3]
Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium the market quantity is closest in value to:
A.
10
В.
13
С.
17
D.
20
[4]
Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium the market price is closest in value to:
A.
9
В.
11
C.
15
D.
19
[5]
Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium B's profit is closest in value to:
A.
8.
В.
16
C.
20
D.
26
[6]
Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium A's profit is closest in value to:
A.
8.
В.
16
C.
20
D.
26
![Page <
2
>
of 6
+
ZOOM
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Accordingly,
[7]
this is represented as a dynamic game.
A.
True
В.
False
[8]
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Accordingly,
A moves first while B moves second.
A.
True
В.
False
[9]
backwards induction, B will produce a quantity closest in value to:
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using
A.
5
В.
7
С.
D.
15
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using
[10]
backwards induction, the market quantity is closest in value to:
A.
12
В.
15
С.
18
D.
21
[11]
backwards induction, the market price is closest in value to:
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using
A.
15
В.
10
C.
D.
[12]
backwards induction, A's profit is closest in value to:
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using
A.
68
В.
52
C.
44
D.
32
[13]
backwards induction, B's profit is closest in value to:
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using
A.
8
В.
16
C.
20
D.
26](https://content.bartleby.com/qna-images/question/b17dca31-9e9b-409c-a2ff-191d71fb3cfd/bb7cfed0-c79b-40bc-9beb-dfaa6138380a/cz27m9g_processed.png)
Transcribed Image Text:Page <
2
>
of 6
+
ZOOM
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Accordingly,
[7]
this is represented as a dynamic game.
A.
True
В.
False
[8]
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Accordingly,
A moves first while B moves second.
A.
True
В.
False
[9]
backwards induction, B will produce a quantity closest in value to:
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using
A.
5
В.
7
С.
D.
15
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using
[10]
backwards induction, the market quantity is closest in value to:
A.
12
В.
15
С.
18
D.
21
[11]
backwards induction, the market price is closest in value to:
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using
A.
15
В.
10
C.
D.
[12]
backwards induction, A's profit is closest in value to:
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using
A.
68
В.
52
C.
44
D.
32
[13]
backwards induction, B's profit is closest in value to:
Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using
A.
8
В.
16
C.
20
D.
26
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- Typed plz and Asap Please give me a quality solution thanksarrow_forwardFigure A Q Figure B Figure C Price (dollars per unit) 15- Price (dollars per unit) 15 Price (dollars per unit) 15- 14- 13- 12- 11- 10- MC MC 14- 14- 13- 12- 11- 10- „MC ATC 13- 12- 11- 10- ATC ATC MR MR MR 9- 9- 9- 8- 8- 8- 7- 7- 6- 90 100 100 100 1i0 Quantity (units) 90 110 90 110 15 Qua Quantity (units) Quantity (units) Consider a perfectly competitive firm in a short-run equilibrium. Figure shows a firm in bad times because the firm produces units and makes a(n) O A. A; 100; economic loss O B. B; 90; economic profit O C. A; 110; economic loss O D. C; 100; economic loss O E. C; 100; normal profitarrow_forwardWhats a problem customers face with LCD Panels Battery issues?arrow_forward
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