1. Write down the game tree 2. Find the players' payoff functions. 3. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium.

Microeconomic Theory
12th Edition
ISBN:9781337517942
Author:NICHOLSON
Publisher:NICHOLSON
Chapter2: Mathematics For Microeconomics
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 2.15P
icon
Related questions
Question
! solved all parts
Problem 3 Consider a firm that employs a worker on a project. If the project succeeds,
it generates a revenue of a > 0 for the firm. If it fails, the revenue is zero. The worker
0, the project succeeds with
1, the project succeeds with probability p1 > p0. The firm
does not observe the actual effort, only the whether the project succeeds or not. Hence, it
can choose an effort level e = 0 or e = 1. If he chooses e =
probability po;
if he chooses e =
sets a wage schedule such that it pays a wage of ws in case the project succeeds, and of wp
in case of failure. Both wages cannot be negative. The worker's utility is given by w – ce,
with a > c> 0. The firm maximizes expected profits. Both players are risk neutral. The
game proceeds as follows: Step 1: The firm sets the wage schedule Step 2: The worker
decides about his effort. Step 3: Nature decides whether the project fails or not (with
probabilities depending on the effort chosen in step 2), and the payoffs are realized.
1. Write down the game tree
2. Find the players' payoff functions.
3. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Transcribed Image Text:Problem 3 Consider a firm that employs a worker on a project. If the project succeeds, it generates a revenue of a > 0 for the firm. If it fails, the revenue is zero. The worker 0, the project succeeds with 1, the project succeeds with probability p1 > p0. The firm does not observe the actual effort, only the whether the project succeeds or not. Hence, it can choose an effort level e = 0 or e = 1. If he chooses e = probability po; if he chooses e = sets a wage schedule such that it pays a wage of ws in case the project succeeds, and of wp in case of failure. Both wages cannot be negative. The worker's utility is given by w – ce, with a > c> 0. The firm maximizes expected profits. Both players are risk neutral. The game proceeds as follows: Step 1: The firm sets the wage schedule Step 2: The worker decides about his effort. Step 3: Nature decides whether the project fails or not (with probabilities depending on the effort chosen in step 2), and the payoffs are realized. 1. Write down the game tree 2. Find the players' payoff functions. 3. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Expert Solution
steps

Step by step

Solved in 5 steps with 1 images

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Incomplete Information
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
  • SEE MORE QUESTIONS
Recommended textbooks for you
Microeconomic Theory
Microeconomic Theory
Economics
ISBN:
9781337517942
Author:
NICHOLSON
Publisher:
Cengage
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning