1) Cournot Model with Asymmetric Information - Suppose the inverse demand function is P(Q) = 30−0.2 × (Qjoe +Qsarah) - Joe has a constant marginal cost of $10, known to both - Joe's expectation about Sarah's constant marginal cost is: 12 with probability 0.6 8 with probability 0.4 C2={- Question 1(a): Solve for the above Cournot-Nash equilibrium with asymmetric information with Sarah as a high cost supplier (C2 = 12 ... unknown to Joe) Question 1(b): Solve for the above Cournot-Nash equilibrium with asymmetric information with Sarah as a low cost supplier (C2 = 8 ... unknown to Joe) Question 1(c): Solve for the above Cournot-Nash equilibrium with complete information with Sarah as a high cost supplier (C2 = 12 ... known to Joe) Question 1(d): Solve for the above Cournot-Nash equilibrium with complete information with Sarah as a low cost supplier (C2 = 8) ... known to Joe) Question 1(e): If Sarah is a low cost supplier, what is the maximum she would

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Nash Equilibrium shows a work profile for all players in a game and is utilized to predict the outcome of their decision-making interaction. It models a steady state (i.e., a combination of strategies of total players) in which no player can profit by unilaterally changing its strategy.