test

Per capita beer consumption in the country had been stable for many years. In order to find new opportunities

A price estimate of a 6-pack of bottle Coors beer today is $5.59, and using the Consumer Price Index for 1990 it was determined that a 6-pack of bottle Coors cost approximately $3.43 (see Appendix A-2). Using Study F Cost of Goods Sold is 77.1% of sales. The contribution margin was then calculated as 22.9%. Fixed costs summed up to be about $250,000 including salaries, equipment & land depreciation, utilities, insurance, taxes, maintenance and janitorial services, and other miscellaneous expenses. Break-even Sales computed from the aforementioned figures turns out to be $1,211,790.39 (see Appendix A-4). Variable Costs per unit were determined using the contribution margin and price variables, and the result came to $2.65 (see Appendix A-4). Break-even quantity then was calculated at around 320,513 units, or gallons in 1990 (see Appendix A-5). A 6-pack of bottle beers holds approximately 72 fluid ounces, this makes up about 0.5625 gallons resulting in a price of roughly $5.35 per gallon (see Appendix A-6). Projected demand of beer in 1990 in South Delaware is about 5,400,397 (see Appendix A-1) and the Coors estimated market share of this demand according to Study C is 8.9% which computes to 480,635 gallons, therefore projected sales of Coors in the 2 county South Delaware distribution area is around $2,573,404.10 in 1990 (see Appendix A-7). The break-even market share of Coors in the 2 county distribution area of

The next project was bottling Gordon Biersch signature beer and retailing it. This had three biggest challenges: this project was entirely Gordon’s baby and demanded time and attention; secondly the freshness of the bottled beer versus the freshly brewed was an issue for which they decided the beer would have a shelf life no longer than three months. Thirdly and the most exciting challenge was the head-to-head competition with other microbreweries and premium beers. Despite the tough competitive environment, Gordon Biersch aimed to achieve 11% of the market in three years (by 1996). This retail venture required huge investment, thus they decided to start small to prove to the investors that they could pull it off.

New Belgium is, however, the third-largest craft brewery in the nation, with estimated sales of over $100 million, equaling approximately 700,000 barrels of beer per year. An analysis of the craft beer industry as a whole suggests that there is continued growth potential for New Belgium. Exhibit 5.1 of the New Belgium Brewing (B) case shows that craft beer is the fastest growing segment of the U.S. alcoholic beverage market, with an increase in market share of over 100 percent from 1999-2011. It is also an industry whose customers tend to be extremely loyal, making them less likely to view craft beer as a commodity. Consequently, craft beer has a higher probability of being immune to competition from inferior goods and substitutes. This is particularly applicable to New Belgium’s target market of “beer connoisseurs” that appreciate the high quality and taste of craft beer and who include “executives, lawyers, and accountants” with the continued ability to pay higher prices for craft beer, enabling the craft beer industry to achieve gross margins of up to 30 percent (Clark & Rogler, 2013).

The company was forced to buy empty kegs at a premium price. It also had to brew some of the

This had an adverse affect on the Amsterdam Brewery and other stakeholders too because it had failed to translate into increased sales of the product offsite. The owner got confused to make decision that whether he should continue to focus on building the original products or should keep releasing and promoting new products.

Secondly, After a fire destroyed the manufacturing plant in 1994, the more efficient equipment was purchased. It was capable of increasing the brewery’s potential output. Once Deutsche Brauerei expanded into the Ukraine, the additional capacity became necessary to handle the expansion in Ukrainnian market.Therefore, Deutsche Brauerei can effectively utilize the unused capacity.

INDUSTRY NINE: BEVERAGE/FOOD \5.5 gallon kegs. First year production totaled \,000 barrels and was sold to local taverns and restaurants for on-premises consumption. Sales and production grew gradually through the mid 1980s. Redhook sold through its own distribution group and independent beer distributors. The first major increase in production occurred in 1989 when Redhook replaced its first brewery with a larger capacity, stateof-the-art brewery located in a converted electric trolley barn in Seattle. In 1993, the company acquired land east of Seattle in the town of Woodinville where it constructed a much larger brewery. The Woodinville brewery came on line in September 1994, with an initial capacity of 60,000

Volume decreased for the first time in over twenty years in 1975 by four percent, during that same time Coors started to push out further in an attempt to become a national brand. 1985 marked a major year for the company as it set records in volume sold and revenues from the brewing division. Between 1975 and 1985 there were major changes in the company that eventually led to the company possibly opening its second brewing facility in history in Virginia. Through these years there were many new strategies implemented to foster this growth. In this paper I will diagnose key decisions, analyze potential solutions and show the actions needed to achieve the suggested changes.

Finally, the large brewers were increasingly successful by creating another point of differentiation. They attracted more consumers as the big brewers had the capacity to package beers in different sizes and therefore also appeal to consumers who drank beer in small amounts or slowly as well as packaged in different numbers to cater to the growing population of drinkers who consumed at home.

Boston Beer Company (BBC) has enjoyed much success with their craft beers with Samuel Adams as their main focus. Being the leader of this segment, overtopping five of their competitors combined (Exhibit 1), the company now must decide how to take advantage of the light beer market. Boston Lightship, their current light beer, had been a small contributor in BBC’s product line. Currently, it is facing dwindling sales with product volumes down from 12 000 cases per month to 3000 cases per month.

In addition to selling beer in bottles and cans, the distributorship will also sell kegs (contribution margin of 1/3 of beer in bottles and cans). The case states (p. 280) that keg beer prices at the wholesale level were about 45% of prices for beer in bottles and cans. These two facts can be combined with wholesale costs and prices for beer in bottles and cans to produce an overall weighted average contribution.

In a world where large, corporate breweries rule the market, craft beer is created to please an audience that applauds the styles, techniques and flavors. Though craft beer can be purchased through several different outlets, the best place to thoroughly enjoy the entire experience of the specially made beer is in the brewery where it was made. The article titled, “In Lean Times, a Stout Dream” in The Wall Street Journal1 states that, despite the hard economic times and consequent consumer cutbacks, sales of craft beer, the industry 's fastest-growing segment, rose

Even though their shipping costs were twice the industry’s, average shipping costs would have been much more had they attempted to enter other states. Besides, Coors made up for the inefficiency with the scale of their plant, the largest in the nation. The location lent itself well to Coors’ ability to differentiate its product. For example Coors was brewed using “pure Rocky Mountain spring water.” Coors had a great opportunity to serve an underserved geographical market. Seven of 24 million barrels sold in the region had to be imported from production facilities outside of the region, and Coors’ Colorado facility was more central to the area than the three other closest facilities in Missouri, Texas, and Wisconsin. Coors had the second lowest production cost per barrel in the industry, in spite of their claim of the most expensive raw material costs. Their cost advantage stemmed from the industry’s highest capacity utilization, economies of scale through the country’s largest brewery, single product focus, and the industry’s fastest packaging lines. Matching their low production cost was the lowest advertising cost relative to the industry. The mystique that had been built up about Coors and their differentiating, all-natural appeal allowed them to get away with lower advertising costs than average for the industry. Coors differentiated their product, both in the

The Website is targeted at retail trade: “(to) maximize the specialty beer sales opportunity through learning more about the dynamics of the category and qualities of the brand”. This has resulted in a 50% increase in sales revenue.