Within hours of the return of the Zhawar commanders the DRA had reconsolidated and made their way back to the Bori/Zhawar area. Upon arrival the DRA opted to focus their efforts on Zhawar as opposed to Bori and mounted an offensive composed of infantry advances and artilery that ultimately proved ineffective as the DRA was pushed back after each cycle of this methodology attempted by the DRA. This stalemate lasted approximately ten days, until the DRA called in Soviet Airstrikes upon Mujahideen firing positions covered and concealed by the caves in the Manay Kandow Pass. The Soviet bombardment of the Manay Kandow Pass dislodged the Mujahideen from their domanant firing position and ever so slightly changed the calculus in the battle for the …show more content…
The HUMINT and CI environment for the DRA however, was very good and could have been capitalized on with guidance from the Soviet Union, who had been perfecting their craft for years before said battle. Because the DRA was composed primarily of Afghan Nationals, they could have infiltrated elements within the Mujahideen to include Zhawar to simply collect intelligence or to subvert and/or sabotage Mujahideen efforts at that location. The DRA could have created a source and sub-source network that could have far reaching influence and collection. Better HUMINT and CI programs might have informed the DRA the Mujahideen were regularly refitting supplies and personnel through specific passes into Pakistan throughout the battle. Lastly, the DRA and Soviet Union would have known what they were coming up against, the Mujahideen order of battle, weapon system positioning, and the fact that they had two tanks, which ultimately lead to the unraveling of the DRA and Soviet Union at the First Battle of Zhawar. The entire calculus of the battle might have been changed had HUMINT and CI been utilized in an effective …show more content…
Afghanistan was not considered technologically advanced, which is one of the reasons the Soviet Union targeted them as a viable communist proxy in the first place. It was unclear as to why the Soviet Union did not bring to bear their full SIGINT capability against the Mujahideen. After all, the wireless technology used in Mujahideen communication systems was old and easily intercepted. Had the DRA or Soviet Union utilized SIGINT more effectively they may have been aware of the coming and going of personnel and supplies to and from Zhawar since it was one of the most important Mujahideen supply hubs in the region. The DRA may have known about the paths that allowed personnel and supplies to come and go from Pakistan throughout the First Battle of Zhawar and the fact that the DRA had heavy armor at Zhawar, which they could have planned for during the
Air support had planned to bombard enemy positions for 55 minutes; however, miscommunication between Texas 14 and higher led to a short bombardment and a total of six bombs being dropped. TF HAMMER was unsuccessful in entering the valley due to a heavy amount of small arms fire and mortar attacks. The lack of air support triggered by bad communication frustrated Afghan and Special Forces alike and led to Afghan trucks being hit heavily by pre-registered mortar fire on known choke points by Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. Unity of command is crucial in conducting a successful military operation: communication flows smoothly through a unified command, but unfortunately for a non-unified command, the reverse effect holds true.
I remember the day that it all happen. The day the battle for Yahya Khel started, the first major offensive operation for 3rd Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment (Black Knights), 172nd Infantry Brigade. I was in my rack on Forward Operating Base Super (FOB), in the early morning, I was awoken by a member the Operation Detachment Alpha (ODA) team that we shared the FOB with. He asked me “You the mortar guy?” I said I was. “Grab your gear. We have to go, we loaded your 120mm mortar and all the rounds into our vehicles. I’ll explain the situation on the way.” He said
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In February 2002, Special Forces intelligence agents along with Advanced Force Operations (AFO), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), were starting to make a connection between an increase presence of high-value targets (HVT), the Taliban, and Al-Qaeda fighters in an area called Shahi-Kot Valley (Neville, 2005). Shahi-Kot is located in Afghanistan, just southeast of a town called Zormat. A plan was devised to eliminate the enemy threat in that area. Major Franklin L. Hagenbeck was to command the mission called Operation Anaconda. This operation was the first large-scale battle in the United States War in Afghanistan since the Battle of Tora Bora (Call, 2007, p. 57-86). Operation Anaconda was also unique in the fact that it would involve a great number of Afghan militia, U.S. and coalition Special Operations, and conventional forces (U.S. Army, n.d.),
But opposition intensifies with various mujahideen groups fighting Soviet forces. US, Pakistan, China, Iran and Saudi Arabia supply money and arms to the mujahideen. 1985 - Mujahideen come together in Pakistan to form alliance against Soviet forces. Half of Afghan population now estimated to be displaced by war, with many fleeing to neighbouring Iran or Pakistan. 1986 - US begins supplying mujahideen with Stinger missiles, enabling them to shoot down Soviet helicopter gunships.
Many elite forces from around the world came together for operation Anaconda. The focal point of the operation was the Lower Shahikot Valley, which housed and protected a large number of foreign fighters – “Afghan Arabs” from al-Qaeda, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Chechens from the Islamic Movements of Uzbekistan (IMU) 5. Takur Ghar was the highest point overlooking the Shahikot Valley and was a key terrain to capture for the mission. A noted Afghanistan specialist, Lester Grau, believes there were initially 600 estimated enemy fighters in the valley, which tallied with other credible sources6. The valley was protected by multilayered defenses. At the entrances to the valley, the insurgents maintained checkpoints, which allowed an early warning system of attempted ground attack7. The valley was “classic guerilla terrain – easily defendable, controlled access, numerous routes of escape, and near a sympathetic border”8.
Afghanistan is a country with extreme climate, in the summer, temperatures rises at 50º c and there are also huge dust storms, this wasn’t an easy war to fight. The United States, Canada,
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Both happened in the same year of 1988. Al-Qaida was such a strong force that the Soviets got scared and left
To begin, Mujahidin was a rebel group during the 1980s that Ronald Reagan had funded. During the war the United States gave financial as well as military assistance to Mujahidin (Davis Moorhead). A reason why the U.S. helped Mujahidin was because of the relationship that they had with Great Britain. The Soviets had supported the Afghanistan government and Britain was also supporting the Mujahidin (Davis Moorhead). The main reason why the U.S. got involved was to support Mujahidin with military support. Mujahidin had then lead to the well know terrorist group
The plan was to have the mission function like a “hammer and anvil.” The very outer cordon area would consist of mainly US SOF and numerous other nations. Task Force Rakkasans (10th Mountain and 101st Airborne Divisions) would be air assaulted in by Chinooks helicopters on the eastern side of the valley to set up blocking positions. The valley floor
(Nyrop, 27) Soviet convoys were also vulnerable due to the surrounding terrain. The roads were very narrow and steep in Afghanistan. The limited road network, thin, icy air and insufficient armor on vehicles all slowly leaded to the Soviets demise. There were other reasons for rebel attacks on convoys. By disrupting convoys, the Soviet outposts were negatively affected, forcing them to increase their protection; Thereby reducing the number of troops ready to battle rebels elsewhere. After the Mujahideen cleared the convoy from the few surviving Russians, they would sweep the convoys of all weapons, food, clothing, money, and other useful items.( Tamarov, 59)
This wouldn't be a surprise then that the American forces personally trained these Islamic groups. However the Americans did not know that one day they would be fighting against them. Pakistani intelligence had established training camps all along the Northern Pakistani border with Afghanistan which acknowledged that the United States of America was in fact training the Mujahideens and supporting them with what they need, whether that would have been weapons, food etc. (To what extent is Al-Qaeda a creation of the
The Mujahideen would prove to be too powerful of a foe for the Afghan army to control so the Soviets took charge. More than 100,000 Soviet troops would control major cities and towns, making the Mujahideen move to the Afghanistan mountains and countryside. Most of the battles would occur in the mountains with the Soviet army with helicopter support trying to lure the Mujahideen out of the mountains. The mountains and countryside would provide the Mujahideen with the ultimate hiding spots and able to use guerilla tactics. The Soviets would bomb civilian locations near the mountains and countryside to cutoff support to the Mujahedeen but this failed with civilians fleeing from Afghanistan to nearby countries like Pakistan and Iran. The Soviet army was no match for the climate in Afghanistan and the religious determination of the Mujahideen. The Mujahideen was able to gain the upperhand when shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles were supplied to them by United States through Pakistan and other equipment by Muslim supporting groups. The Mujahideen was not organized into one big fighting force but comprised of different sects fighting to dispel Soviet forces. With now acquiring weapons from outside sources and being joined by Muslim volunteers from all over the world, the Mujahideen were able to defeat the mighty Soviet Union.
The Counter Insurgency operations in Vietnam have taught the U.S. a lot that can be applied to Afghanistan. According to Phillips (2015) “Although our understanding and steadfast support can make a significant difference, ultimate success depends on