Tiller Construction Corp. vs. Nadler

Cross-Complainants are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that Cross-Defendants had no intention of completing the reconstruction improvements within four months because, among other thing, the first document, the Work Authorization, was signed on August 21, and the permit was not submitted until December 7, 2015.

this case could be an tricky in the court, because in the contract they only

On April 20, the District of Columbia Court of Appeal decided in the case “S. Brooke Purll Inc. v. Vailes” to reverse a trial court judgment and to remand it for further proceedings. The case was a dispute between a contractor - S. Brooke Purll, Inc.- and a house’s owner Patrick Darrell Vailes -. The latter sued in the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch for the return of a $5000 payment as an initial payment for the contract while the latter counterclaimed $36.102.04 for liquidated damages. The judge found that the owner failed to perform a demolition and to pay $ 7,031.71. It also determined that the liquidated damages clause was a penalty and, therefore, was not enforceable. It also found that the lost profits damages were not proven and

Josh was asked during his bankruptcy proceeding if he was ever sued. Josh lied and said no, when he in fact was sued many years ago and has no financial impact on Josh today. In regards to the matter of Josh's decision to not speak about was settled previously.

The plaintiff, First Colonial Bank for Savings entered into an interpleader action in the District court to determine who was entitled to the surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sale. The foreclosed property belonged to the defendants, Robert H. and Sherrell L. Bergeron, and the codefendants, Ford Motor Credit Company, the junior mortgagee of the foreclosed property as a result of corporate restructuring Ford Consumer Finance Company was substituted as the defendant for Ford Motor Credit Company. Both the Bergerons and Ford filed motions for summary judgement as they both felt entitled to the surplus. The district court ruled in favor of Ford Motor Credit Company and denied the Bergerons motion. The Bergerons appealed the decision of the District Court because they argued that they filed for and were discharged from bankruptcy prior to the foreclosure sale, therefore they believed that the security interest granted to Ford prior to their petition does not carry over to the surplus funds received after filing the petition.

Coppergate is not liable to pay the total due for the supply of windows because there was no contract between Coppergate and the plaintiff. They could have been involved with the Builders' Lien Act if the contract was made between Plaintiff and Coppergate. However, this contract was only made in between Houser Homes and the plaintiff not with the landowner. Consequently, resources were limited to the subcontractor and no claim as opposed to the owner, or the land that was enhanced. Therefore, it is clear that the claim against Coppergate was bound to fail.

Originally, Iva refused to pay the advertisement fee to Plaintiff claiming the contract was unintended, and Plaintiff entered into the lawsuit. After the trial judged in favor of Plaintiff, Iva appealed to the appellate court alleging the contract was made by misleading of Plaintiff 's sales representative.

To claim negligence, the Strums had to show that Harb had a duty, that he breached that duty, that the breach caused an injury, and that there was an actual injury. A duty may come from a contract or a state law such as a building code. However, the Strums failed to show that Harb was personally a party to the contract and failed to show any duty imposed by law. The Strums also failed to allege the manner in which Harb breached the duty, if there was a duty. Therefore, the Supreme Court found that the Strums had failed to state a case against Harb and dismissed this part of the case. Had the Strums(plaintiffs) asserted in their Complaint facts concerning Harb’s personal behavior and actions, the results of this case may well have been reversed. It is vitally important for a person who has a complaint against another person to allege facts that, if proven to be true, will cause a court to rule in favor of the person who has the

This appeal arises out of an order of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County granting appellee’s, Community Homes Housing, Inc.’s (“CHH’s”), motion for judgment against appellant, Wiencek + Associates Architects + Planners, P.C., (“Wiencek”) pursuant to Md. Rule 2-519. Specifically, Wiencek contends the circuit court erroneously concluded that CHH’s duty to pay had not arisen under the terms of the parties’ contract.

The error was obvious and can be proven as the owner forgot unintentionally to “insert the number of weeks specified by the tender in the appropriate blank.” The contractor asked to be given the opportunity to show to the court and to the owner his estimate.

Ms. Gershon testified that Mr. Welchel’s initial complaints were regarding the exterior and exposed walls. She testified that according to Mr. Welchel at the time those walls were not meant to be exposed and that they are interior walls. Ms. Gershon stated that the city looked into how to remedy the issues. One such remedy was a proposed application of a product to the exterior wall which would act as sealant. However, the city was uncertain as to the sealant’s reliability. The city ultimately decided to give and remunerate Mr. Welchel with the funds so that he could provide the repairs to the exterior walls himself. It was at that time they drafted the 1994 release agreement. Ms. Gershon stated that the walkway and the planters appeared to be in all at that period of time. Subsequent to entering the 1994 agreement, Ms. Gershon testified that she did not hear any complaints from Jim Welchel until around 2008 in which at that time he came into her office complaining of water damage to his building from the planters. Following that interaction, Ms. Gershon had the water irrigation system turned off. Ms. Gershon testified that the decision was not directly correlated to Jim Welchel’s complaints rather it was

On June 23, 2008, Formula One Racing Group (referred to herein as “FORG”) solicited bids for the building of a parts warehouse at its facility located at 1265 E. 20th Street in Chico, California. General Contracting Associates (referred to herein as “GCA”) entered into a contract with FORG to build the aforementioned warehouse. At the time of the signing of the contract, FORG and GCA were bound in privity. In this case GCA had asserted five claims for breaches of contract by the defendant FORG.

Numerous pieces of evidence led me to my conclusion about the contract in question. The first item of business a judge would attend to when making a decision is to decide whether a contract is present between any of the parties, and who those parties are. The contract under examination is between buyers Jon and Marsha and the seller Boren Deal. The documents pertaining to this case include the REPC as well as Addendum No. 1 which states the seller’s terms, and Addendum No. 2, the

The Parties involved: Peter O. Mattei (Appellant) vs. Amelia F. Hopper (Respondent) Counselors: Jay R. Martin and William F. Sharon (Counselors for Appellant.) Carlson, Collins, Gordon & Bold, George R. Gordon, John L. Garaventa and Dean Ormsby (Counselors for Respondent). Mattei is a real estate developer who was planning to build a shopping center on land that was owned by Hopper. Mattei approached Hopper, the owner of said property with an offer of $57,000, which both parties agreed on.

In the Final Paper (Case Study) it speaks to the following case and circumstances. Knarles and Barkley are father and son respectively. Barkley is seventeen years old. They operate a facilities maintenance company that regularly does business in the District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia. The company is based in Maryland. They have a number of contracts with building owners where they have agreed to provide building maintenance to both residential and commercial buildings within the three jurisdictions already mentioned. They receive a monthly payment of $2,000 to $4,000 depending upon the size of the building. They bill the owners for any equipment of a substantial nature that has to be replaced.