The Peloponnesian War Essay

The Peloponnesian War pitted the Athenians against the Spartans. The Peloponnesians’ were an alliance of city-states controlled by Sparta. These two powerful city-states became locked in a struggle for dominance of the eastern Mediterranean area. The roots of the conflict and in particular this expedition is highly complex. As Thucydides says in his history of the war, the underlying cause was Spartan fear of Athens' expansive power. But, the triggering event was Athens' aggressive behavior towards Corinth, an ally of Sparta.

The roots of the Peloponnesian war can be traced long before 431 BCE, when it officially started. It can be traced back to as early as the Persian Wars, where the Athenians had found their home burned by the hands of the Persians. That disaster left the Athenians with no home and no sanctuary. Even though that was a defeated battle

The Peloponnesian War between the city-states of Athens and Sparta (and their respective allies) lasted from 431-404 BC. Conflicts between the two cites dated back further, however, with

The Greeks closest to the Persian Empire after the war created the Delian League to protect them from the Persians. The Greeks chose the Athenians to lead them. The Spartans were originally asked to lead them, but the kind was very arrogant, so they retracted their offer. The Spartans then created the Peloponnesian League because they didn’t think the Athenians should lead the Delian League because they were getting too much credit for defeating the Persians in the war. The two leagues didn’t get along at all. This rivalry eventually turned into the Peloponnesian War. This war went on for about 30 years. After the war, the government changed in Athens.

The Athens leader at the time was Pericles, his strategy was to stay off land because Sparta had the better army whereas Athens had the better navy. Pericles died in 421, soon after Athens decided to sign the Peace of Nicias, a 50year truce with Sparta. This provided that each side restore captured places and prisoners and remain at peace with each other. This peace treaty was set in place to ensure that both sides could strengthen their power and gather their alliances without being attacked by the other (History of..). Athens and Sparta both caused great strife on people, many prisoners were killed or enslaved (Thomas R. Martin..).

The Peloponnesian War began in 431 BC between the Spartans and Athenians. The war was instigated by how Athens was gaining power, wealth, and prestige. The surrounding polishes became hostile and malicious towards Athens, Sparta included. Instead of pursuing an end to the hostility and conflict through diplomatic means, the leaders of Athens and Sparta both were for the beginning of a war. Each polis believed they had the upper hand and superior strategy and military. In time, war was declared between the two polises. The

The Peloponnesian War brought disease, destruction, famine, widespread civil wars, and a huge loss of life. The war was a complete catastrophe for Athens, who never fully regained their empire back. Sparta won the war, but they didn’t become a great city and a new empire was never built. Sparta attempted to lead the Greeks, but soon fell short and new leaders were called forth.

In 431 B.C., even before the Peloponnesian War, Athens’ strength compared to other Greek polises was evident. Athens had islands, a powerful, a well-trained navy, and one, if not the best, general at the time: Pericles. Pericles says in his speech that, “war is inevitable,” but in fact the war was preventable (72). Even with all of the military strengths and assets that Athenians had afforded to them, they chose to be merciful to the Peloponnesians who were in no shape to go to war. They did not have the experience, money, manpower, or means to participate in a lengthy war and Pericles makes the citizens aware of this (70). Pericles is both modest and humble for choosing to point out these facts which in turn helps the Athenians see the potential

The Spartans had very few ships to contribute, but they regarded themselves the natural leaders of any joint Greek military expedition, and always insisted that the Spartan general would be given command on such occasions. There were 180 ships from Athens, 40 from Corinth, 30 from Aegina, 20 from Chalcis, 20 from Megara, 16 from Sparta, 15 from Sicyon, 10 from Epidaurus, 7 from Eretria, 7 from Ambracia, 5 from Troizen, 4 from Naxos, 3 from Leucas, 3 from Hermione, 2 from Styra, 2 from Cythnus, 2 from Ceos, 2 from Melos, one from Siphnus, one from Seriphus, and one from

Herodotus recounts Themistocles’s plan in a conversation between Themistocles and Eurybiades, the Spartan commander of the allied fleet: “It is now within your power to save Greece, if you take my advice”. Themistocles strategy was to lure the Persians into the narrowest part of the straits where the Greeks’ intimate knowledge of the waterway and the Persian predisposition for maintaining formations would offset the numerical disparity between them. It also prevented the Persians from overwhelming the Greeks with their fleet numbering 500 ships against the Greek fleet numbering 378 ships. Most of the Greek vessels were equipped with rams and were faster and more agile in the confined waterway. Themistocles strategy was a complete success with the Persians losing 200 ships whilst the Greeks lost only 40.

The Peloponnesian War was the turning point in Athenian hegemony in Ancient Greece. It was fought in 431 B.C. between the Delian League, led by Athens, and the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta. According to Thucydides, Athens’ imposing hegemonic status and its overwhelming quest for more power made the Peloponnesian War and Athens’s eventual fall from power inevitable. Despite the Athenians having a far more superior navy and being considerably wealthier, they were defeated and made subjects of Sparta. In this paper, I will discuss Thucydides’ and Socrates’ reasons for why

The Peloponnesian War was a series of battles that were fought between 431-401 B.C.E. Its two conflicting forces were the Peloponnesian League, which was headed by the city-state Sparta, and the Delian League, which was headed city-state of Athens. The war separated and disconnected the poleis of ancient Greece, and other negative aspects of war were highlighted by Thucydides, who writes of the war and states, “think, too, of the great part that is played by the unpredictable in war: think of it now, before you are actually committed to war. The longer a war lasts, the more things tend to depend on accidents. Neither you nor we can see into them: we have to abide their outcome in the dark.

According to Herodotus Histories book he states “Themistocles convinces the Athenian assembly to build a fleet of triremes”, which will be explained more as you read on. Both sides had very similar ships - the Triremes- which were 40-50 ton wooden warships up to 40 m long. Light, streamlined, and manoeuvrable, they were powered in battle by 170 oarsmen split in three ranks down each side of the ship. They were able to rapidly accelerate, break, zigzag, and turn 360 degrees in just two ships’ lengths, good seamanship could place the vessel to best advantage and employ the principal strategy of naval warfare at that time which was to ram the enemy. The way the Greeks prepared for the battle was, they had 371 triremes and pentekonters which were smaller fifty- oared ship, successfully under Themistocles, but officially led by the spartan Eurybiades. According to Herodotus he mentions that “The Athenians with 182 ships, half the whole fleet, - 40 from Corinth; 30 from Aegina; 20 from Megara; 20 from Chalcis; 16 from Lacedaemon (Sparta), 15 from Sicyon; 10 from Epidaurus; 7 from Ambracia; 7 from Eretria; 5 from Troezen; 4 from Naxos; 3 from Hermione; 3 from Leucas; 2 from Ceos; 2 from Styra; 1 from Croton; and 1 from Cynthus. The total number of warships was 368”. Herodotus also mentions the Persians fleet: “1,327 warships from the Persian allies and subjugated states present at Salamis. These included 300 from Phoenicia; 260 from the Greek cities in Asia Minor; 237 from the

Once against the expedition, Nicias now stood favor of showing no weakness to his home of Athens nor to the Syracusans and the Spartans. Nicias is seen time and time again as being extremely indecisive. One instance Nicias is against the siege and begging for retreat. The next he finds himself wanting to change tides and show no mercy. This leadership along with a series of other unfortunate events leads to Athenian decimation on the island. Nicias found himself in the trenches and wanting to leave once more when Peloponnesian reinforcements arrived to aid the Syracusans against the Athenians. After a lunar eclipse which the general saw as superstitious, Nicias decided to stay just an extra 27 days. This decision resulted in the annihilation of roughly 86 Athenian ships and the loss of many men. Syracusans were now able to recover from their last defeat. With Spartan aid, they blocked the borders which trapped the Athenians on land leaving no way off the Island. In the final battle, Nicias surrendered to Gylippus and was later executed under the Spartan generals name. It is said that on that day on the Assinarus river, Athenian forces were slaughtered and this is considered one of the greatest defeats in the Peloponnesian War due to lives lost. Thucydides claimed that a total of

Written by the Greek historian Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War is one that tells the story of the war (431-404 BC) which divided the Greek world between Athens and its allies and Lacedaemon. The Melian Dialogue presents two sides and two perspectives that of the Melians neutrality and that of the Athenians’ might. By Thucydides juxtaposing the Athenian’s position to that of the Melians, there is a clear conclusion of which side actions are tactically and morally acceptable. One would argue that the Athenians are immoral for violently plundering the Melian territory because they had the power to do so. However, given the circumstance of trying to defend their empire due to the imbalance of forces, the Athenian actions are not