The probability of a conflict in our lifetime is high if you judge historical trends. We as an intelligence enterprise exercise a fairly new technique of no “cold starts”. We do not in the best of our ability enter a situation without historical, fused, and correlated information on the adversary. This information is introduced through technological based systems to allow for the intelligence analyst time to analyze and exploit. The U.S. Government one of the top users of big data spends on average $200 million just in research of how to manage data (Big Data in the Government Sector). The need for speed of collaboration on data is a necessity. We can longer execute collaboration via “flat products” but however we must …show more content…
The MIB (T) as an organizational solution to big data facilitates an increased capability for fused intelligence from BCT to Theater. In addition to the organizational solution the material solution in DCGS-A enabled systems streamlines near real time collaboration worldwide (Concept Development, Capabilities Determination, and Capabilities Integration). This collaboration on a Common Operating Picture sometimes exceeded a day when the interoperability was email and “flat products” ie Power Point. With “systems of systems” fielded within the DOD both structured and unstructured data may be fused into actionable intelligence or PIR’s answered for combatant commanders. With accurate intelligence this may influence commanders and policymakers to act or not. The technological help of the systems gives more credibility. An adversary may be more nefarious as originally thought or vice versa. It is without argument that technological advancement is increasing both within the U.S. and globally. With advancement analysts, commanders, and policymakers may come more reliant upon this technology to manipulate big data into streamlined answers. These systems will probably be replaced usually within every generation. With each replacement the process usually does not change but the technological advancement of the system
national information power, that is to say today’s strategic intelligence is the foundation for strategic
The objective is data predominance in this way expanding the velocity at which choices are made, while acquiring adversary decisions and approaches. The clash of Tannenberg WWI in the middle of Germany and Russia gives the same bits of knowledge the United States Military utilized against
In today’s modern world of security threats, intelligence and the ability to respond to incidents are the keys to survival. As technology continues to change and advance, we also must change our security procedure and techniques. Dina Evans from LookingGlass has a good definition of threat intelligence, “We define threat intelligence as the combination of technical and contextual information regarding existing or emerging threats from all available sources. It has been evaluated and analyzed for accuracy, timeliness, and relevancy, and implemented among an organization’s tactical, operational, and strategic stakeholders.” (Evans, 2016). The process of threat intelligence feeds into all
The strategic environment of the MRAP program spanned from 2003 through 2008. It began when General Abizaid, Commander of U.S. Central Command, declared that IEDs were the “No. 1 threat.” This declaration from one Combatant Commander (CCDR) was far short of the fundamentals required to develop a joint concept and its subsequent solutions. Although MRAPs seemingly provided a solution to an enemy capability, there was no joint concept that was idea-focused, collaboratively developed and assessed, or rigorously evaluated.
As we have seen throughout the entire history of warfare, ancient world terrorism, political intrigue and elitist terrorism of the middle ages, and into modern terrorism, intelligence is of vital importance on both sides. Armed forces have always used intelligence of some form be it sneaking up a hill and scouting what is on the other side to the use of modern platforms such as
The fusion centers and the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) are initiatives that were put forth and initiated by the Department of Homeland security in hopes of improving information sharing amongst both Federal, State, Local and tribal law enforcement agencies. The attacks of 9/11 proved that intelligence capabilities and willingness to share information lacked greatly. These programs were developed to hopefully counter that issue. The use of fusion cells started off with hesitation and complications initially. However, the use of fusion cells are absolutely critical to the sharing of information between agencies. “The goal is to fuse together lots of information into intelligence products that are useful to customer needs both at the federal and state/local levels. The Bush administration viewed the fusion centers as critical to information sharing, and they were a central component in the National Strategy for Information Sharing. The Strategy considers fusion centers to be “vital assets” that provide the federal government with critical information about state and local governments, while the state and local governments obtain information about terrorist-related threats” (Logan 2010). The ITACG along with the fusion cells started off with a few hiccups and has steadily improved overtime.
Identified as first developed in 1996 in Los Angeles Fusion Centers did not become an expanded organization until after 9/11 (Monahan, 2013). Fusion Centers are evolving themselves and in this, are modifying their actions to address some concerns of their critics. In their post-9/11 inception, Fusion Centers were developed with little to no guidance, except to address the intelligence concerns of the modern day terrorism threat. With this broad mission, it should be expected that some issues regarding intelligence gathering would surface. Since that time, Fusion Centers have become an invaluable part of the law enforcement community, bridging a much needed gap in intelligence sharing. However critics exist and some issues are based out
The DNI has modestly more power than the old Directors of Central Intelligence (DCIs), but not enough to give the ODNI/AIS real clout. “Herding cats” remains a decent description of the ODNI’s basic role. The DNI has several duties and responsibilities, but for the subject of improving intelligence information sharing the focus will be directed towards: Improving Analytics, Improving Information Security, Improving Foreign Liaison Relationships, and the end state of Improving Information Sharing.
Intelligence in this day in age is a vital component of a countries security. The newest proposal increases intelligence spending between 2 and 3 billion dollars, a total adding to nearly $35 billion. In addition to military enhancement, the FBI and other law enforcement/intelligence agencies will also be included in this proposal. A new system has been proposed by President Bush that all information be shared among all agencies. DoD, FBI, and the Department of Counterterrorist Center have drawn closer together to create a Terrorist Threat Integration Center to evaluate information blended from all sources associated with terrorism and to act upon those findings accordingly.
In order to do this, the intelligence community has made it a priority to share intelligence amongst themselves in order to prevent attacks from occurring. Having access to a larger network, will allow them to understand and see the situation for what it is, and what it’ll become. A lot of the older analysis are retiring or changing careers. This means the new generation of analyst has a tough challenger of filling their shoes. Senior analyst should mentor these new analyst. As years of experience can be learn and new perspectives can be seen by these new analyst. At the senior ranks, intelligence needs to open up, to various scientists and other professions. This will allow for a new perspective, and maybe new ideas that will aid in national security
Consolidation of the intelligence community under the DNI increases collaboration by inculcating a culture of “jointness”, similar to collaborative efforts by the military services following the Goldwater-Nichols reform. Second, establishment of the National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C) provides DNI with a way to coordinate and focus collection efforts across the intelligence community. Lastly, The Library of National Intelligence provides a means for analysts across the intelligence community to gain access to additional sources.
The role of intelligence in the DHS has evolved. The original role was to understand and reduce threats to the nation. The current role of intelligence is to understand and reduce the vulnerability of the nation. The change in focus from reducing threats to reducing vulnerability marks the change in concept to an all-hazards approach. The initial implementation of the DHS’s intelligence mission faced many obstacles such as lack of access to resources and raw intelligence, and conflict with other intelligence agencies (Blum 2010, np). The DHS has largely overcome these barriers and evolved into a significant intelligence
According to a white paper conducted by the Intelligence Committee of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA), both law enforcement and intelligence organizations recognize the need to collaborate, share, and exchange information. However, the events leading up to 9/11 document how the legal and artificial boundaries between them created a serious impediment to protecting the country. First this paper will discuss some of the reasoning and initiatives behind the development of information sharing between the Intelligence Community (IC) and law enforcement agencies; and this paper will also discuss the similarities and difference between Title 50 United States Code (U.S.C.) intelligence activities to law enforcement information gathering/sharing. Apparently, the consensus is that, the IC and the law enforcement agencies need to share more information, that include operational strategies and tactics—especially those focused on transnational issues such as terrorism, drugs, counterintelligence, and weapons of mass destruction—needed to be better integrated.
Data can be collected through human sources, satellites, wiretapping, signals, and internet traffic. However, intelligence organizations must be in compliance with the law to ensure that they are not illegally collecting information (Chesney, 2012). Collection occurs because a threat is likely to occur or agencies are trying to find out what information our foreign adversaries possess about the nation’s assets. Intelligence collection occurs in both domestic and foreign territories. Intelligence agencies collect information about foreign adversaries in order to exploit their weaknesses or vulnerabilities (Gentry, 2008). Furthermore, government agencies and political leaders want to discover which of the nation’s assets are seen as vulnerable to the enemy (Gentry, 2008).
The promise of data-driven decision-making is now being recognized broadly, and there is growing enthusiasm for the notion of ``Big Data.’’ While the promise of Big Data is real -- for example, it is estimated that Google alone contributed 54 billion dollars to the US economy in 2009 -- there is currently a wide gap between its potential and its realization.