Subsequent to the British withdrawal “east of the Suez,” the United States (US) assumed the mantle of guarantor of Middle East stability. In furtherance of that stability, prior to the Islamic Revolution, Iran, along with Saudi Arabia, was considered one of the “Twin Pillars” of American support aimed at limiting Soviet access to Middle East Oil. As a result of the revolution in Iran, President Jimmy Carter, in his 1980 State of the Union Address, defined what came to be called The Carter Doctrine: “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” A new Iran, hostile to America, threatened American interests by potentially allying itself with the Soviet Union and placing the vital Strait of Hormuz at risk to commercial shipping carrying oil to the United States. Now, after nearly four decades of American provided security in the Arabian Gulf, the Soviet threat is gone and a highly integrated global oil market is swamped with excess supply. However, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Arabian Gulf, remains of vital interest to the US and events there continue to threaten global maritime security. The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway connecting the Gulf of Oman to the Arabian Gulf and is contained within the territorial waters of both Iran and Oman. This sea line of
For the United States, the Gulf region remains one of the most geo-strategically important locations in the world for diplomatic, intelligence cooperation, and business opportunities such as hydrocarbons and arms. This strategic cooperation has provided the region some stability, particularly with the rise of Iran and the Shi’a crescent and the chaotic outcome of the war in Iraq. The council members have also relied on the United State to fend off some of the domestic challenges to the existing regimes that are both internally and regionally rooted.
Ronald Reagan is now one of the most controversial presidents of the past fifty years. Although all have their defenders and detractors, Reagan, though not necessarily a polarizing figure, was engaged in some behavior that has caused questions as people examine his decisions. He is probably best known for his ability to communicate his conservative ideals to the public, and had an innate ability to get people to follow him. Some would say though that his strong arm tactics began the alienation of the United States from the rest of the world, and has led to this moment in time in which the US is reviled by many countries. His chief objective seemed to be to stop the Cold War and end communism as it had stood for the better seven decades, and he did accomplish his task. However, he lacked the delicate diplomatic touch that many wished he would have used. But, he was strong in his convictions ad was not afraid to voice them to any country or individual leader he believed needed to be told how to act properly. This paper looks at the situation with Libya in 1986, examines Reagan's diplomatic doctrine as it applies to this situation, and then determines the immediate and eventual impact of Reagan-led US actions.
In recent years, America has faced a major problem revolving around the transnational war in Syria. The conflict in Syria and turned into a major power contest in the post-Cold War history. In an article written by Dostal (2016), “the main factor in Syria that points back to the Eisenhower Doctrine, is the effort to defend the Country’s position as major, and ideally only, external balancer in the Middle East” (214). If there were ever a triple alliance between Syria, Iraq, and Iran, it would become very difficult to control the vacuum of power within the Middle East. This would overall make it very difficult to maintain the policies that were brought up in the Eisenhower Doctrine. The overall difference in the wars that take place in the Middle East are a bit different than they were back when Eisenhower was president. However, the fact that his doctrine is still used and cited today, proves how essential it was to his presidency and one of the reasons why his presidency was so important to the United States national security not only in his years but the years to
The Iranian hostage crisis was one of the most dramatic events in a series of problems that took place during President Jimmy Carter’s term. The crisis, beginning in November of 1979, received the most coverage of any major event since World War II. It was one of many problems faced in light of the United State’s complex relationship with Iran. The effects on both the US and Iran were astronomical, especially politically as well as economically and socially. It took a heavy toll on American relations with the Middle East and changed the way we engage in foreign affairs. In light of this crisis, Iran started an international war that we are still fighting thirty-two years later.
Background: In the midst of the Cold War and the Arab-Israeli conflict, conflict arose over Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. This was of particular concern due to Nasser’s increased connection with the Soviet Union, through the Czech Arms agreement and the Aswan Dam. Following Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, Great Britain, France, and Israel invaded Egypt. In facing this crisis, the U.S. had to consider Cold War politics with the Soviet Union, relations with Arab and Israeli nations, and relations with the invading powers
Background: On November 4, 1979, Iranian militants stormed the United States Embassy in Tehran and took 52 Americans captive. This terrorist act triggered the most profound crisis of the Carter presidency and began a personal ordeal for Jimmy Carter that lasted 444 days. President Carter committed himself to the safe return of the hostages while simultaneously protecting America’s interests and prestige. He pursued a policy of restraint that put a higher value on the lives of the hostages than on American retaliatory power or protecting his own political future.
The Importance of Oil in U.S. Foreign Policy During the oil and energy crisis of the mid-1970s Americans became painfully aware of the consequences of the United States dependence on foreign sources of oil. Unfortunately, research and exploration for alternative sources of oil in North America has not been pursued vigorously enough to cease such foreign dependence. As a result, in the mid-1990s Americans find themselves in the same precarious position as they were during the 1970s. The Persian-Gulf War in 1991 was all the proof needed to convince the United States of how strongly oil still influences our foreign policy and international relations in general. Oil and U.S. Foreign Policy: Historical Issues The United
Conflict over energy resources—and the wealth and power they create—has become an increasingly prominent feature for geopolitics particularly in the Middle East . The discovery of oil in the late nineteenth century added a dimension to the region as major outside states powers employed military force to protect their newly acquired interests in the Middle East. The U.S.’s efforts to secure the flow of oil have led to ever increasing involvement in the Middle East region’s political affairs and ongoing power struggles. By the end of the twentieth century, safeguarding the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf had become one of the most important functions of the U.S. military establishment. The close relationship between the United States and the Saudi royal family was formed in the final months of World War II, when U.S. leaders sought to ensure preferential access to Saudi petroleum. The U.S. link with Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region has demonstrated to be greatly beneficial to both parties, yet it has also led to ever deepening U.S. involvement in regional politics.
faced from the Soviets in the mid to late 1940’s as that logically drives the foreign policy process. This is best captured in American Orientalism by Douglas Little and the chapter on U.S. policy towards Egypt (1949-1956) by Peter Hahn in The Middle East and the United States. The U.S. was faced with the possibility of an expansionist and dangerous Soviet Russia that stood to challenge the West in the Middle East, a serious threat to the access to Persian Gulf oil, which among other things, would hurt the European and Japanese recovery efforts. This claim against the Soviets seemed reasonable enough through the eyes of U.S. policymakers since the Soviets were already in Iran and continually positioning for control of the Dardanelles from Turkey. Furthermore, any strategic thought experiment could easily conclude that the Soviets would gain a huge advantage in an actual war if they could gain control over the Persian Gulf area; therefor they would most likely try to attempt it militarily, diplomatically, or both. After adding in additional crisis going on such as the Greek civil war earlier and the Korean War later, it is clear to see the line of thought leading to Truman’s doctrine of U.S. national security relying on the containment of the Soviet Union in the Middle East.
Clearly, this period was marked by political instability of which the communists sought to take advantage of. In 1954, Khalid Bakdash won a seat in parliament as the first communist elected to an Arab parliament. The Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 strengthened the communist influence in Syria after signing a pack with the Soviet Union in exchange for military equipment. Soviet support to Syria was part of the greater strategic battle playing out in the Middle East between the Western and Eastern blocs. It was apparent that Syrian political power was likely to shift towards communism at this point. The Communist Party of Syria was becoming highly organized and the army’s chief of staff, Afif al-Bizri, was a Communist sympathizer (Irvine, 2013).
The Suez War or Crisis of 1956 was a geopolitical conflict between Egypt with Israel, Great Britain, and France. Just War theory will be used to assess the “just” qualities of the British’s involvement in the war. Great Britain’s role in the war does not fit within any of the categories of being a just war in either “jus ad bellum” or in “jus in bello.” A “just war” can be justified if it brings peace to a region however; in this case, the Suez War was fought to retain the British’s colonial powers among other reasons.
The relations between the United State’s and Iran were amicable throughout the post-World War II. In entering the Cold War, “the United States negotiated the Baghdad Pact in which an alliance between, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan was formed.” During this era, President Nixon encouraged the Shah of Iran to develop a nuclear program and provided the funding to Iran’s energy sector. The United States maintained a close partnership with Iran until, the Islamic Revolution in February of 1979. The revolution overthrew the Shah of Iran and Ruhollah Khomeini became the new supreme leader of Iran. Immediately following the revolution, Iran engaged in a war against Iraq in the early 1980s. “With a new balance of power, tensions grew between the U.S. and Iran. During this time, Iran held 52 Americans hostage in an attempt to negotiate with the United States; however, after the Iranian hostage crisis, the United States no longer saw Iran as an ally.”
In the Suez Crisis, not all other ways of resolving the problem should have been tried first because it was a surprise attack on Egypt. The British did not try other ways of solving the crisis and did not try diplomacy with Egypt. The British took “prompt action” against Nasser because they feared that their power in the Middle East would be compromised because of him.” (Dooley) They colluded with France and Israel so that they would all attack Egypt and forcefully recover the Suez Canal. Prime Minister Eden did not consider many options besides war because he saw a parallel between how “Hitler had begun by remilitarizing the Rhineland; Nasser had expropriated the Suez Canal.” (Kunz 97) Consequently, he did not want to try to appease Nasser because he feared that the Egyptians would influence the rest of the Middle East and cut off their oil supply. Although war should have been a last resort the British’s “immediate impulse was to hit Nasser hard and quickly” (Dooley). Clearly, diplomacy was not considered because the British hoped to seize the Suez Canal by force. This is why they secretly colluded in hopes of bombarding the Egyptians and forcing them to relinquish control of the canal. “Almost immediately, Britain with France started well-publicized military preparations in the Mediterranean” they hoped to force Egypt to agree to give the Suez Canal to the international community. (Epstein) When Egypt refused British, France and Israel retaliated against the Egyptians.
This essay is an analysis of the Suez crisis in 1956, its origins and its consequences. It gives background information of the political role of Britain and France during the crisis, especially of how they were an indication of military weakness and turmoil. The importance of the Suez Canal itself is introduced. To begin with a brief description, the Suez Canal is one of the greatest engineering achievements of modern civilization. More than 20,000 ships passed through it each year. Only one mile long is the most important Watergate in the world. Additionally, the British police-makers remained determined to maintain as many of their imperialist interest in the Middle East as possible and strongly defended these from any signs from the Unites
Thirty-four years ago, the Islamic Revolution changed not only the leadership of Iran but brought a complex and strained relationships with the United States. The focus of this paper is an analysis on an Iranian engagement policy option outlined in the CSIS Report “The Gulf Kaleidoscope: Reflections on the Iranian Challenge”. The international relations theory of liberalism is applied using the tenets of economic interdependence and democratic transparency.