Synopsis In West Warwick Rhode Island, on February 20th, 2003, during the performance of the band Great White, a fire broke out that eventually claimed the lives of 100 people and injured an additional 200. The band’s tour manager arranged for, and ignited pyrotechnic props, large fireworks designed to display a shower of sparks. The sparks ignited foam soundproofing near stage. The fire spread quickly. Most were killed either in the crush to exit the building or overcome by fumes while trying to find an exit. The immediate cause was well documented due to witness reports and a videotape that was taken during the concert. In the period that followed the tragedy there were many attempts to fix blame. Following a Grand Jury …show more content…
Several handheld extinguishers are located at various points in the club. There was no fire suppression system. Sprinklers had never been installed. There is some debate over whether the Station was required to have a sprinkler installed. The Station had recently received an inspection by West Warwick Fire Marshal Dennis Laroque. The owners were cited for several violations including expired fire extinguishers and some that needed to be hung along with gasoline stored inside the building. In his statements to police, Laroque says that the critical violation that he was concerned about was the exit door near the stage. It had a second inner door that did not have panic hardware attached and opened into the showroom. They had been previously cited and had removed the door to pass follow-up inspections only to replace it shortly after. The occupancy capacity for the Station is also up for debate. There are notations in West Warwick permitting documents as low as 253 and as high as 404. The NIST estimates that 2003 model codes would place occupancy at about 430 people with no tables and chairs. Estimates of the crowd on the night of the fire range from 440 to 458. Attorney General, Patrick Lynch’s office puts the number at 458. Pyrotechnics and Foam The pyrotechnics that ignited the fire were designed to spray sparks 15 feet for 15 seconds. The two that were mounted at outward angles ignited foam that had
Facts: A fire was evolved on September 23, 1981 in a log cabin due to a hot plate. The hot plate was left on with an accelerant and kerosene near by. The owner of the cabin, Henry Xavier Kennedy was convicted of Arson as he obtained an insurance policy for $40K on the cabin five days prior to this fire and police found evidence that the construction business owned by Mr. Kennedy was losing money, and Mr. Kennedy's alibi was insufficient to eliminate him as a suspect.
The fire, he said, started when sparks from the cutting of metal on a van inside the business ignited fuel on the floor. The van was located in the bay closest the residence, which is attached.
The Local, State and Federal agencies were called to investigate the Station Nightclub fire incident and they found many issues. The polyurethane foam that was on the interior walls was the major factor in the Station Nightclub fire. It was easily ignited and also contributed to a faster fire spread within the building. According to NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, the interior finish is required to be Class A or B for general assembly areas with occupant loads of more than 300. It has been calculated that the number of occupants at the Station Nightclub was around 440-458 people, obviously well over this limit. The ignition of polyurethane foam gave out a magnitude of smoke and heat in such a short period of time and created mass chaos, thus resulting in a crowd-wide panic towards the initial entry point. Also NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, section 13.2.3.6.1 states that the main entrance/exit shall be of a width that accommodates one-half of the total occupant load and shall be at the level of exit discharge or shall connect to a stairway or ramp leading to a street. If the owner of The Station Nightclub would have
Nowadays, it is almost impossible to find a building that does not have exit signs or fire extinguishers in America. Whether in a university or at the work place, exit signs and fire safety instructions can easily be found by anybody. Fire drills are regularly practiced to ensure the least amount of casualty will occur if something goes wrong. However, a hundred years ago safety issues were barely taken into considerations and safety regulations were most of the time inexistent, as illustrates the terrible fire that happened a hundred years ago at the Triangle
In the days after the fire, there were considerable efforts to assign and avoid blame on the part of the band, the nightclub owners, the manufacturers and distributors of the foam material and pyrotechnics, and
In the year 2000, Michael and Jeffery Derderian bought the nightclub from Julian. Despite their lavish lifestyles, they were very frugal when it came to their business ventures. They were notorious for not being credible businessmen. It 's no surprise that they mishandled the structure that they bought. When they analyzed their investment, they noticed the foam on the walls. The Derderians decided to just place another layer of foam on the wall (Barylick 129). There were two different types of foam applied. One was polyethylene (PE) and the other was polyurethane (PU). They are both flammable and illegal on structure walls. The local fire marshal, Denis Larocque, would ignored this many times when he did inspections on the nightclub. He even increased the Station 's occupancy from 317 people to 404 people. The Derderian brothers were very happy about this because they could make more money. Larocque didn
The building was constructed in 1946, designed to be a nightclub. The same building had changed ownership and names numerous times, and had been incarnated as not just a nightclub but also a restaurant and pub. Exact numbers of occupants at the time of the fire is unknown, estimated to be between 440 to 458 persons. When the fire started at the Station Nightclub in West Warwick, Rhode Island, the venue was 100 people over capacity, but "even the legal number was based on a bogus standing-room formula," (Seligson, 2013). An estimated 450 people were inside when the fire occurred (FEMA, 2011).
The horrific Chicago Fire devastated Chicago, Illinois on October 8, 1871, continuing until October 10, 1871. Hundreds of lives and thousands of homes were claimed by the fire (Duis 435). Many were left without a single possession, causing them to start over on their lives completely. Although for some this would have been bad, for others, it meant a new start for a better life. It gave criminals a chance to clean up their life and go back to their families. The cause of the Chicago Fire of 1871 is still unknown, although it left much devastation until Martial Law took over, resulting in the city patriotically rebounding back.
For years if not decades, firefighters have responded to a reported structure fire that turned out to be a fully involved single room. This fire scenario requires a core set of fire tactics and skills to control and extinguished the fire, but is it this simple? Perhaps twenty years it may have been, but new dangers are lurking in every scenario and may have detrimental outcomes for unsuspecting and unaware firefighters and victims. The National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) agency along with the Underwriters Laboratory (UL) have been conducting research to understand fire behavior and fire dynamics. This research is providing firefighters with new information about how and why
It was temporary as they were only there overnight and then left at morning. The concerns being certain guidelines that weren’t met such as not enough fire exits. However, being that it is not
The fire spread from the O’Learys’ barn to the yards nearby. Soon it was spreading throughout the neighborhood. William Lee, a neighbor a block away, saw the fire and ran to Bruno Goll’s drugstore to turn in the fire alarm. Bruno Goll refused to turn in the alarm because he said the fire truck had already gone past. So instead of arguing, Lee went home to his family. At the courthouse the lookout on duty saw smoke, but thought nothing of it, thinking it was just Saturday's fire and there was no reason to be alarmed. Then he looked up and noticed it was a different fire and had his assistant strike the Box 342 for the fire department. Soon fire trucks were at the scene and attempted to put out the fire. The fire department’s Chief Marshal, Robert A. Williams got the engines to circle the fire to contain it. They got as close to the fire as they could until their arm hair was being burned and their
There is some dispute to the cause of the fire, but most believe it was set by three inmates who intended to cause a distraction during dinner time, so as to make an escape in the commotion. Instead, they mistimed the ignition device which didn’t ignite until they were all locked up for the night (Latta). This idea was later cemented as the cause when two of the three men hung themselves from grief. There are still some, however, that believe the fire was a tragic accident and the prison officials used the three inmates as an excuse to avoid blame
Observation: Expired fire extinguisher was found in the backroom. (A ticket was open during the visit (C6054115)
Less than 5 minutes after that phrase being yelled , the whole amphitheater had caught on fire and was producing uncontrollable flames as high as the sky light. Metal rods, chunks of debris and pieces of glass were flying and dropping
With all of the different reasons for setting arson fires, as well as the large variance in profiles of arsonists, investigating them can be difficult. This difficulty is compounded by the amount of evidence than can be destroyed by the act of arson. Arson investigators must begin by trying to find the point of origin; a task that can be made very difficult by tossing aside the debris and damaged items while the fire is being fought (Swanson, et al. 2006). If arson is suspected, the point of origin can be a deciding factor in declaring a fire intentional, especially if the fire began in the center of the room