SSG Ross: The First Doctrine And Tactics Training

In 2011, the 45th Infantry Brigade Combat Team deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. LTC Ostervold was in charge of all CIED operations and his team worked and trained both the United States and Afghan National Army engineers how to properly find and clear IEDs in the 45th IBCT’s area of operation. LTC Ostervold was instrumental in taking the find/clear rate for improvised Explosive Devices (IED) from 30% at the beginning of mobilization to over 70% at the end.

Chief Warrant Officer Three Teddy Vanzant is an extraordinary instructor whose technical abilities and extensive combat systems experience make him uniquely suited to train United States Army, Ordnance Warrant Officers. Teddy has spent the last 13 months completely redesigning the Programs of Instruction for the M1A2SEPv2, Abrams Main Battle Tank and the M3, Bradley Fighting Vehicle. He provided sound guidance and assistance to the CASCOM, Training Development during the validation of not only these two critical combat systems, but for the M109A6, Paladin as well. Due to these qualities and his dedication to the instructional mission, I recommend CW3 Vanzant to compete for the Distinguished Instructor Award, and the Army Logistics University,

Develop and integrated a comprehensive 40-hour Integrated MTC Tool Suite training program that provided training to MTC and unit staffs to efficiently plan, design and executes exercises through the primary use of G27 Tool Suite; Exercise Support Application (ESA), Exercise Design Tool (EDT), Virtual OPFOR Academy (VOA), and Information Operation Network (ION). Validated the MTC Integrated Tool Suite training program and team certification to ensure a standardization of training and DATE compliancy. Provided briefings to the 84th Training Command and AVNCoE Commanding Generals, the United Kingdom ISR Bde Commander, NTC, JMRC senior leaders and individual staffs to continuously fostered enduring partnerships that resulted in a substantial growth in recognition and usage of G27’s web-enabled

2. The 101st Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Survey Section is a challenging, taxing and specialized section. SSG Clark has demonstrated exemplary work ethic by taking the initiative of the Survey Section’s Strike Team capabilities and dramatically strengthened the capabilities of the Survey Section by using first hand knowledge of procedures and regulations that are required to load and secure equipment in the Aviation assets that

I predict that Carter F. Smiths book, Gangs and the military Gangsters , Bikers and Terrorist with military Training will become the ‘Bible’ in the genre of understanding gang culture in America. Throughout he breaks down the theory, type, and definitions of gangs, bikers and terrorists and how they impact the community and workforce. What I found fascinating was his historical analysis of the gangs through the nation’s war year (Revolutionary First Gulf war 1990 – 94): it as illuminating to see that culture gang.

SPC Espinoza was part of four 25th Infantry Division's Lightning Forge exercise, where he was essential to the delivery of over 600 pallets of Class I, II, IV, V, and IX, completed it safely and without loss or damage to the equipment. This action heightened the BDE accumulative skills and ability to act swiftly. SPC Espinoza’s dedicated his personal time to share his technical skills and experience to help his NCO's train newly assigned Soldiers, improving their training on motor pool operations and unit

Effective training results in the measured potential of our Soldiers, which will be communicated directly to them through monthly and performance counseling. This counseling should not be limited to admonishment but instead present goals and challenges to help develop them for levels of greater responsibility, giving them a better understanding of themselves and what they are capable of. Effective training develops effective systems and processes which streamline mission success and develop greater synergy of a unit’s performance capability, while developing tactically and technically proficient

To answer this gap, the Office of Special Warfare (OSW) was developed to be the focal point for USASOC’s UW capability. With this change, each 4th Battalion across the regiment was redesigned to build a build a full spectrum UW capability in support of the Theatre Special Operations Command (TSOC) and Joint Force Commanders. It was during this re-design that the modern Jedburgh was re-born. Much like the World War II era Jedburghs, many skilled operators across the regiment jumped at the opportunity to enter a new phase of conflict and increase their skills in the application of unconventional warfare. With this personal commitment came the understanding that time would be allotted to build a small cohesive team with training and education needed to succeed in complex environment. This theory would soon be diminished because many of the newly selected Jedburghs, riding on the success of Jedburghs some seventy-two years ago, would be thrown straight into complex environment without the needed education and training. Premature operationalization of the Jedburghs has effected training, education, and organizational design needed to build a long lasting unconventional warfare

Dr. Williamson Murray once declared a want to develop his Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS) seminar students into hand grenades. His comments were, of course, figurative, but Murray communicated a vision: his company grade students would read more deeply, think more critically, write with greater effect, and ultimately be more willing to challenge conventional wisdom than their peers. Murray, with EWS, engineered the course, from initial selection through the final seminars, to meet his goal of a competent, well-armed officer prepared to make and recommend just decisions grounded in history.

The department’s leadership is responsible for providing appropriate manpower and resources to each mission using an increasingly tight budget, while also following strict laws for high priority missions, such as nuclear defense, which mandate both high levels of training and manpower (Air Education Training Command, 2015). Additionally, warfare technology has become incredibly advanced. Due to this complication, the educational and technical requirements for military service members and employees are steadily increasing.

SFC Boozer studied the CGS technical manual and was able to teach what he had learned to our section through hands on training, practical exercises, and homework, which was amazing considering that he just graduated from the school house two years before. He created an in-depth by the numbers Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the section in which new and seasoned Soldiers could understand. The SOP shows his expertise by showing written instructions on start-up, operating, and shut down procedure accompanied by pictures to ensure that anyone could get walk into the section and operate the system with minimal guidance. SFC Boozer took his personal time to create a digital component inventory book, identifying over three million dollars’ worth of equipment so that everyone in his section knew all the system components and the purpose of each. His system knowledge left me speechless as all I knew about infantry Soldiers at the time was that they were good at combat and not smart enough to score high enough on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery test to be Military Intelligence Soldiers. He shows mental agility because here was someone how had been an Infantry Soldier his whole military career and to no fault of his own had to learn an entirely new

The U.S. Navy’s Bomb Squad faced a very real problem: Its newest members were being selected for training upon merit alone, with no personality or physical screening process. This was a very real challenge, for the aforementioned reasons of required emotional intelligence and physical toughness. The screener had a very clear mission: “safely and effectively screen Midshipmen in their ability to lead small units under stress while introducing them to the NEOD training pipeline through evaluation by their peers, upper-class, and NEOD technicians”

When Halstead was given this mission in Iraq, she never anticipated the challenge she would soon face. She had one year to plan her operation, train and certify her units for deployments and after months of painstaking preparation and training, Halstead was confident her soldiers and unit were ready to be certified for deployment. However, certification had to be issued by her superior, a three-star general recently back from Iraq—and the most challenging boss Halstead had ever encountered in all of her years of services.

As stewards of our profession, commanders ensure that military expertise continues to develop and be passed on to aspiring professionals through operational development. It is during this developmental phase that Professional Soldiers put their knowledge and skills to the test. Operational Army units certify and recertify their Professional Soldiers through repetitive and realistic training events including the Combat Life Saver Course, platoon live fires, and exercises at the National Training Center. In the course of these challenging and realistic experiences, the Army’s operational units develop Soldiers and leaders prepared to maintain high standards, discipline, and operational readiness. Operational development and adaptability will continue to drive changes in Army doctrine, organization, leadership, and education as we enter the post-war era. Without this kind of development, the Army could not maintain a well-disciplined professional fighting force.

Training objectives must support the mission profile and meet the commanders desired end state. Prior to the 56TH train up at the National Training Center (NTC) the deployment location changed from Iraq to Afghanistan (case study). Changes to mission essential tasks were not identified prior to NTC, resulting in the BCT training on collective tasks and validated during MRE based on the Iraq mission profile. However, the shift to the Afghanistan mission profile created gaps in training not identified until units arrived at Bagram Air Field (BAF). i.e. the BCT had to establish an MRAP drivers training program at BAF extending the RSOI process. Training gaps were not limited to company level shortfalls as battalion and brigade staffs were not able to anticipate potential threats and capitalize on opportunities. (case study 2)