Neoconservative Strategy In Iraq

Invading Iraq was—and remains—a highly debated and controversial decision within both world politics and the academic disciplines of politics and international relations. With a growing number of deaths, rising tensions in the Middle East, and a failure to find any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the voices condemning the Bush administration have been increasing ever since the decision to go to war was announced. While many scholars have traditionally argued against the war, this paper will argue that the Iraq War can be justified.

When the United States seized control over Iraq, many Iraqi citizens were left without a job. As a result of this widespread unemployment, recruitment for Muslim extremist groups thrived. Lt. General Michael Flynn, a key figure of the War, has admitted “As brutal as Saddam Hussein was, it was a mistake to just eliminate him.” Flynn went on to say. “The same is true for Moammar Gadhafi and for Libya, which is now a failed state. The historic lesson is that it was a strategic failure to go into Iraq. History will not be and should not be kind with that

The invasion and the war in Iraq remains a continuous topic of divisiveness and sensitivity in today’s America. One of the negative evaluation of the war is attributed to the false impression of the length of the war which lasted seven years, not six months as presumed in 2003. As the invasion initiated, the ideologies of American government then failed to perceive the large number of troops required, casualties and the financial toll in the interest of the preventive war doctrine. However, when weighing the failures of this war, there are successes brought home that relate mostly to the lessons the American military and the government learned with the use of counterinsurgency tactics after “winning the hearts and minds” of Iraqis (Young). Nevertheless, with evaluation through levels of analysis, the accomplished agenda of ending Saddam Hussein’s regime justifies success and failure, mutually.

Dictatorships are corrupt, but jihadist terrorist groups are far more destructive. Could it have been failed regime change which created a political vacuum that enabled ISIS to seize power? Critical mistakes made by America helped to construct the malicious growth of ISIS which in turn, suggests this was indeed the case. The theoretical idea that America has established international conflicts which sparked the rise of Isis is relevant to today’s world. Regardless of the fact that this is a controversial topic, it is hazardous to the numerous lives around the globe.

In the years leading up to and during the Iraq War, the United States pursued a neo-conservative agenda that aimed to dismantle Saddam Hussein’s regime, eliminate the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and install a democratic government in Iraq. To do so, U.S. policymakers deployed military forces and diplomatic ambassadors to intervene. This strategy, clearly seen during the early invasion in 2003 and the surge of 2007, produced mixed reactions. Indeed, more than a decade after the U.S. decision to mediate, the question remains: Can intervention actually work?

In March 2003, President George W. Bush announced that Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began: a mission to rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein, ensure that Hussein has no ability to develop weapons of mass destruction, and pledge to employ direct, pre-emptive strikes against Iraq to protect the United States. The United States government claimed they wanted the Iraqi people to achieve a united, stable and free country which would require our “sustained commitment” (History). After the United States’ Government deposed the Ba’athist government of Saddam Hussein, the divide between the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi’is deepened. As the government disappeared, so did the control between the Iraqi groups. Violent conflict ensued for years as the groups competed for power (Iraq Timeline). Despite Iraq’s recognized borders, exercised sovereignty, and international recognition, the people remained segregated, and even pitted against each other.

On March 19th, 2003 from the White House oval office President George W. Bush addressed the nation. "My fellow citizens. At this hour, American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger. On my orders, coalition forces have begun striking selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein 's ability to wage war. These are opening stages of what will be a broad and concerted campaign. More than 35 countries are giving crucial support from the use of naval and air bases to help with intelligence and logistics to deployment of combat units. Every nation in this coalition has chosen to bear the duty and share the honor of

Is war in Iraq really worth the risk? Should we continue to invade that Middle-Eastern Country or should we sit idly by waiting for an attack? One article says “There is no question that Iraq, as it stands today, has fallen short of American – and Iraqi – hopes and expectations. And there is no question that the costs of the war, for both sides, have been greater than anticipated. Even so, Iraq’s achievements – including the establishment of representative institutions against all odds – are hardly minor. The country could still become mired in a civil conflict that destabilizes the region. But it is equally or even more conceivable that, with relatively small amounts of continued U.S. support, the greatest strategic benefits of the Iraq intervention

The decision to invade Iraq was perhaps the largest foreign policy blunder in modern Western history. Its immense cost—in the thousands of lives lost, trillions of dollars spent, and an unquantifiable amount of political capital squandered—represents an immense failure at many levels of government. Today, even though Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship and security state have been dismantled, Iraq remains ruined: its economy is in shambles, sectarian strife is rampant, and the Islamic State, a terrorist army, controls much of the northern and western parts of the nation. Iraq is a “state” in name only. In her memoir “The Unraveling” documenting her experiences in Iraq, Professor Emma Sky argues that to identify who is responsible for this failure, blame cannot be placed on just one actor. Both Western policymaking blunders—from the marginalization of experts to de-Baathification to the support of Nouri al-Maliki—and Iraqi politicians’ self-serving agendas acted in concert to exacerbate the sectarianism that ultimately tore the country apart.

Sending US troops to fight on the basis of information that proved false characterized Bush’s failure in the Iraq invasion, an invasion on which he bet his legacy on (Rothkopf, 21). Although the original policy failed, Bush and his administration came to terms with it and concluded that changes needed to be made. Bush made a final and confident decision to modify his team

In the months leading to March 2003 invasion of Iraq there was significant debate between actors, domestically and internationally, over if and how the US should overthrow Saddam Hussein and his oppressive regime. The two main camps on how to negotiate the issue were realist and liberal views on international policy making. For realists the view was held that decision making should be made in the interests of the nation with or without international consent. Contrary, for liberals the ideology was held that policy decisions should be made based on what will benefit the country while also working through and with international partners. The ideology of the two main groups, realists and liberals, focused on to what extent, if any, the US should seek international approval from the UN Security Council in its endeavors to invade Iraq.

After examining both Liberal Internationalist and Realist perspectives, the best interpretation is a combination of the two. The way in which Bush used weapons of mass destruction, as well as open critiques of Iraq’s non-democratic nature to justify the invasion exudes resemblances of Liberal Internationalism. Bush’s actions are similar to nineteen and twentieth century imperialism, as he forced a head of state out of office and dismantled the government using hard power. While Bush and several members of Congress believed America was invading for the right reasons, his justification as well as his execution of the mission lacked the depth of foreign policy knowledge to have positive outcomes for both parties involved. This can be seen in Iraq

In this paper, I intend to analyze Iraq war of 2003 from Realist and Marxist/ Critical perspectives. I intend to draw a conclusion as to which theoretical framework, in my opinion, is more suitable and provides for a rational understanding of the Iraq War. While drawing comparative analysis of two competing approaches, I do not intend to dismiss one theory in entirety in favour of another. However, I do intend to weigh on a golden balance, lacunas of both theories in order to conclude as to which theory in the end provides or intends to provide a watertight analysis of the Iraq war.

Neoconservatives have faith in the might of the American Army and its predominance at the level of labor, gear and advancement. They trust that the US has the military intends to reshape the world as per its own particular advantages, and thusly, they tend to benefit military control over tact. Like Jacksonians, Neocons hate multilateral organizations and have a tendency to see them as feeble and wasteful. They like to act singularly, regardless of the possibility that it implies violating global law. This carelessness comes from the Neocon adoration for the RMA, Revolution in the Military Affairs, which means a dependence on stealth innovation, air-conveyed accuracy guided weapons and versatile ground powers. Precisely what the Bush organization would convey in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Wilsonian side of Neoconservatism is clear in the development's advancement of the internationalization of law based govern to whatever number places as could reasonably be expected. The Neocon mind is Manichean and trusts that the world partitions into great states and awful states, and that majority rules systems have amiable expectations, notwithstanding the vote based peace hypothesis which asserts that "popular governments don't run at war with each other." Thus the more the U.S. democratizes the less danger of wars there is. This is the thing that Francis Fukuyama basically called the "finish of history". Obviously the occasions of 9-11 put

Most see Iraq coming out of the war as more powerful in absolute power terms but not in relation to the rising power of its neighbours (Parasiliti, 2003, p. 160). According to Parasilati (2003) Iraq's reliance on its economic "strategic rents" - the billions of loans and grants given by the West and other Arab Gulf states - undercut its power relative to its neighbours. Even though it may seem like Iraq hadn't lost territorially, its bid for power failed and dropped it deeper into debt. In addition, the only positive aspect of the war was the slight increase in the national pride amongst Iraqis but none of the important geopolitical issues were addressed.