In this essay I will argue that moral obligation is like legal obligation to some extent, in that they share certain features, in particular notions of blame and responsibility. They also often overlap, though I shall argue that moral obligation is in some sense prior and superior, or more obliging than legal obligation . Before I begin, it would be worthwhile to try to pin down what ‘obligation’ in a general sense actually means. In simple terms, an obligation can be seen as a sort of binding reason directing one to act or not act in a certain way. When we say one is legally obligated to do pay their taxes, we mean that they must do so lest they incur some form of legal penalty, be it a criminal conviction or a hefty fine . Moral obligation however, while still directive, does not seem to incur such a result, unless of course it overlaps with a legal doctrine. In what sense are they similar then? Primarily, as I have just mentioned, both legal and moral obligations are directive in nature. They both prescribe certain courses of action, and place demands upon the individual. As Pink clarifies, ‘obligation…seems, like law, to be to do with direction – with getting people to do things or refrain from doing them or refrain from certain things’ . Often, legal and moral obligations overlap. A good example of this is ‘do not kill’, both a law of our society, and by almost all moral systems, an obligation (without bringing in special circumstances). Further, both contain a notion
Kennan breaks moral responsibility down to two entities: government and individual. He argues, “Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience” (Kennan, 34). Kennan also argues that morality is only conceptually possible
will and moral responsibility. I will argue, that Frankfurt makes an invalid implicit assumption that the
When thinking about morality, it is necessary to consider how aspects from both nature and nurture, along with free will, may form ones moral beliefs and dictate ones moral actions. To understand how moral beliefs as well as actions formulate and operate within individuals and societies, it is imperative that a general definition of morality is laid out. Morality, then, can be defined as ones principles regarding what is right and wrong, good or bad. Although an individual may hold moral beliefs, it is not always the case that moral actions follow. Therefore, in this essay I aim to provide an explanation that clarifies the two and in doing so I also hope to further the notion that one’s moral framework is a product of all three factors; nature, nurture, and free will. The first part of this essay will flush out what exactly morality it and how it manifests similarly across individuals and differently across individuals. Contrariwise, I will then explain how morality manifests similarly across societies and differently across societies. Alongside presenting the information in this order, I will trace morality back to primordial times to showcase how morality has evolved and developed since then, not only from a nature-based standpoint, but also from a
According to Michael Davis obligations and rights are mostly identified as rules. He explains how “I was just following the rules” is unjustified by arguing several points which are explained below.
An argument Rawls gives in favour of a moral obligation to support the law is that there is a moral duty to support and further just institutions'. What is meant is that if a government is generally just and democratic, its laws should be obeyed in order to support and further them. The origin of the moral obligation is thus that just institutions should be helped and supported.
The first are innate and arise naturally and are independent of obligation and opinions, whereas the latter are the result of obligation in order to support the necessities of a society. Hume further on explains that the inclinations of our natural duties are not enough to maintain peace and order in a society since everyone is directed by his/her passions, but that experience and observation have shown that an authoritative power is necessary in a society. Thus, the second type of moral duties that are based on obligation and power come into play with the establishment of the
Kant argues that mere conformity with the moral law is not sufficient for moral goodness. I will argue that Kant is right. In this essay I will explain why Kant distinguishes between conforming with the moral law and acting for the sake of the moral law, and what that distinction means to Kant, before arguing why Kant was right.
Ban animal cruelty! Give aid to the poor! Save the rainforests! Obey the law! As a human race we must strive to fulfill these commands, for they are our moral duties and obligations. Our obligation to morality sometimes leads to a dilemma. What happens when a law contradicts the morally right thing to do? Would it be moral to act illegally by breaking the law? No matter how drastic the measure, we are still required to act morally--even if one must break the law to do so. But why is it so important to be moral that one could justify something as serious as breaking the law?
In the last part of the course, we studied different forms of relativism and how they can be applied to morality. Relativism is in contrast to the universal laws that we studied when we were studying Kant’s Groundwork earlier in the semester. Instead, relativism makes the claim that there are no universal laws that can be applied to morality because every point of view is equally valid and therefore nothing can be said to be morally right or wrong. What we perceive to be right or wrong is based on our own perception and is shaped by our cultural upbringing (Drogalis, Lecture, March 31). In this paper I intend on describing the three kinds of relativism and demonstrating how they can be applied in a real world context. I will then focus on normative relativism in particular and describe two arguments in support of normative relativism as well as three arguments in opposition to normative relativism. I will wrap up the paper by summarizing why I believe normative relativism seems to be incorrect when applied to morally complex circumstances.
Kant had a different ethical system which was based on reason. According to Kant reason was the fundamental authority in determining morality. All humans possess the ability to reason, and out of this ability comes two basic commands: the hypothetical imperative and the categorical imperative. In focusing on the categorical imperative, in this essay I will reveal the underlying relationship between reason and duty.
Duty is what motivates the individual and guides them towards doing good acts. Lastly are the categorical imperatives, which are the rational and moral obligations that are universal and non-situational. They are to which duty is subservient.
The theory of moral responsibility by Aristotle will be used as a foundation to analysis the moral responsibility on dream. The theory is used because Aristotle is the earliest philosopher who discuss about moral responsibility in Nicomachean Ethic. Aristotle concept of moral responsibility is focus on “the role of knowledge in taking the proper course of action” (Hsieh). According to Aristotle, moral responsibility is the notion that “it is sometimes appropriate to respond to an agent with praise or blame on the basis of her actions and/or dispositional traits of character” (Eshleman). This concept similar to Plato’s ideas that “the issue of moral responsibility primarily arises as a result of the investigations into the connection between knowledge, desire, and right action; his discussions generally center around whether those who desire evil do so knowingly or due to ignorance or error” (Hsieh). However, the notion of moral responsibility by Aristotle is more complex and details.
When we think about moral obligations and their directional structure, this involves the obligations that we have to other people. “Obligations are owed to the benefactor” (Timmons, 2015). This means that a person is obligated to someone who tries to help another person in some way, shape or form. So, let’s say for example I promise you to walk your dog. Since I have promised you this I am not fulfilling my promise because I told you I’d walk your dog, or because I want to keep my promises to you, but I fulfill my promise of walking your dog because you have the right to me walking your dog. As we learned in our reading, you now own my action. You have the right to be angry or upset at me if I fail to perform the act of walking your dog. You are able to demand me to perform that action. I think the directionality has more to do with the relationship that is developed as a result of your promising rather than how good the person you promised feels after you have performed the action.
Wand(1979) expounds on Hume ethical theory in relation to moral obligation is a theory of good and evil rather than one of duty and obligation- , according to Wand (1956:55):”this statement is quite erroneous’ for Hume does not merely wish to discover the foundation of our moral actions”. Hume account of how motives prompt men to moral actions is quite complex, but Wand (1979) also asserts that Hume distinguishes between two basic type of action to make it more understandable. The first type are those action which men will perform without the aid or influence of reason or custom; the second are those action which it can be expected men will normally perform with the aid or influence of reason or custom.
The word ‘duties’ on prima facie duties are not the actual duties which are morally bound to be performed (Garrett, 2004). Prima facie duties relate to actual duties as reasons do