Modularity of Mind

In David M. Armstrong’s “The Nature of Mind”, Armstrong praises the field of science and seeks to put the concept of mind into terms that agree with science’s definition of minds. His interest is in the physico-chemical, materialist view of man. Armstrong considers science to be the authority over other disciplines because of its reliability and result in consensus over disputed questions.

What is the mind-body problem? The mind-body problem asks the question, are the mind and body separate substances of elements of the same substance? In this paper I wish to propose, and try to provide support for Descartes notion of the immaterial mind, by critically discussing the view of substance dualism, pertaining to the relationship between the mind and body. The two arguments of which I will provide in this paper to support this view are divisibility and disembodied existence. There are two fundamentally different substances in this universe, physical and mental properties, this paper will explore both of these substances (8).

The idea that mental states are non-reducible properties of brain states is the central tenant of a theory of mind called property dualism. However, before we can assess the theory we must be aware that the question assumes the existence of mental states and as such we cannot answer this question from some perspectives (e.g. eliminative materialism)

Jaegwon Kim thinks that multiple realizability of mental properties would bring about the conclusion that psychology is most likely not a science. Several functionalists, specially, Fodor, take up the opposing stance to Kim, supporting that the multiple realizability of mental states is one of the reasons why psychology is an autonomous and justifiable science. Essentially, Kim think that in order for mental states to be multiply realizable then psychology must be fundamentally broken; with human psychology encompassing properties realized for humans and alien psychology encompassing those mental states realized in the alien way etc. I will demonstrate that even if one supports and allows the principles behind Kim’s argument they do not result in his final conclusion of psychology failing to be a science. By attacking his principle of Casual Individuation of Kinds I will show that Kim has failed to find the correct conclusion. Furthermore, I will consider a possible objection that Kim might have to my stance and give a short rebuttle. I will conclude by explicating Jerry Fodor’s account of what is Kim’s essential problem is. By showing that Kim’s conclusion fails it will entail that Fodor’s conclusion is more viable in reality.

Functionalism, one of the most influential and widespread theories of mind of our day, proposes a model of human behaviour based on the way certain inputs are processed when the mind is in a given state, to yield certain outputs. This theory concerns itself only what mental states do, rather than the substance with which they are made, or whether they exist at all; this is called ‘multiple realizability’. In other words, the theory is ontologically modest, or flexible, and this enables functionalism to stay compatible with Cartesian dualism or monisms like materialism, an advantage when other theories lose followers due to their ontological preconceptions. The other notable strength functionalism claims is that it avoids some of the pitfalls of its counterpart theory, behaviourism. However each of these apparent strengths has flaws, both in and of themselves and in comparison to other theories of mind. These strengths and their flaws will be assessed in this essay, but allow me first to outline what the functionalist theory of mind proposes.

Psychology, due to its complexity can be approached in a variety of ways. To help us understand the human mind, behaviourist and psychodynamic approaches have helped us understand the alternative outlooks in the science of mind and behaviour. Both approaches can be examined by the means of theoretical assumptions and methodology.

Harris, P. L. (1991). The work of the imagination. In A. Whiten (Ed.), Natural theories of mind (pp. 283-304). Oxford, England: Blackwell.

The mind is perhaps the most fascinating part of the human body due to its complexity and ability to rationalize. In essence, the mind-body problem studies the relation of the mind to the body, and states that each human being seems to embody two unique and somewhat contradictory natures. Each human contains both a nature of matter and physicality, just like any other object that contains atoms in the universe. However, mankind also is constituted of something beyond materialism, which includes its ability to rationalize and be self-aware. This would imply that mankind is not simply another member of the world of matter because some of its most distinctive features cannot be accounted for in this manner. There are obvious differences between physical and mental properties. Physical properties are publically accessible, and have weight, texture, and are made of matter. Mental properties are not publically accessible, and have phenomenological texture and intentionality (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). This is challenging to philosophers, because man cannot be categorized as a material or immaterial object, but rather a combination of both mind and body (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). Man embodies mind-body dualism, meaning he is a blend of both mind and matter (Stewart, Blocker, Petrick, 2013). The mind-body problem creates conflict among philosophers, especially when analyzing physicalism in its defense. This paper outlines sound

The mind-body problem, which is still debated even today, raises the question about the relationship between the mind and the body. Theorists, such as René Descartes and Thomas Nagel, have written extensively on the problem but they have many dissenting beliefs. Descartes, a dualist, contends that the mind and body are two different substances that can exist separately. Conversely, Nagel, a dual aspect theorist, contends that the mind and body are not substances but different properties. However, although Nagel illustrates the problems with Descartes= theory, Nagel=s theory runs into the problem of panpsychism. In this paper, both arguments will be discussed to determine which, if either, side is stronger.

Many arguments in the philosophy of the mind have been made for and against, whether or not the mind and the brain are the same entity. The mind-brain identity theory is the view that the mind is the brain and that mental states are brain states (Mandik 77). Therefore, we can identify sensations and other mental processes with physical brain processes (Blutner 4). I argue, that the mind is not identical to the brain, and the conceivable idea of zombies, as well as the multiple realizability argument, can disprove this theory.

There are many philosophers throughout the existence of time. Two in particular are Jacques Maritain, and Peter Hacker. Both Maritain, and Hacker are philosophers who both specialize in Philosophy of the mind. Maritain was a french roman catholic philosopher born in Paris on November 18th, 1882. He attended Lycée Henri IV and Sorbonne where he studied philosophy, literature, biology, and social questions. Maritain went on to teach philosophy at The College Stanislas. As for Peter Hacker, he was born on July 15th, of 1939 and is still alive at the age of 78 years old. His expertise was not only in philosophy of the mind but also the philosophy of language. Hacker studied philosophy, politics, as well as economics at The Queen’s College of Oxford. Maritain & Hacker both have different arguments, and positions on why we should study philosophy,. In this paper, I will unpack, and contextualize those ideas, arguments, and positions from both Maritain, and Hacker along with explain my agreements/disagreements on the topic in regards to both of their articles.

     In 1988, Premack carried out a research study which would appear to support the notion of the ‘theory of mind’. In his study, which was centred on an adult chimpanzee called Sarah; he exposed her to videotapes of an actor with a problem, namely an inability to reach some bananas that were placed out of reach overhead. He then proceeded to show Sarah a number of photographed solutions to the problem, only one of which actually evidenced a successful solution to the problem, (in this situation, it was stepping on a

The Science of Mind philosophy is not an abstract spiritual theory, but rather, a study of Consciousness, and, specifically, our expression of It. Ernest Holmes considered this study of Mind to be a science, in that it correlates principles and practices that can be applied and proven to be effective. Even so, the correlation of principles and practices is not what makes the Science of Mind a practical philosophy to live by. Anyone can deduce principles and devise practices that enhance and advance their favorite theory of everything. Every religiously minded group has done just that. Science of Mind distinguishes itself as a practical philosophy because of its teachings on the nature of Law, and its emphasis on the application of the principles of this Law in our life.

The introduction of the modular model of thought, by Jerry Fodor, resulted in a restructuring of how scientists view the human mind; this idea also resulted in the re-examination of the differences between the brains of anatomically modern humans (AMH) and Neanderthals (N). The modular model of thought is primarily used to describe these differences in terms of evolution, or lack thereof, in the brains of AMH and N. The differences between the brains of AMH and N are generally shown through the differing size and shape relative to each other with distinctly different types of behavior shown by each group. These differences are highlighted no better than in the area of innovation, in which, N showed almost no progress after almost 150

Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949) is a critique of the notion that the mind is distinct from the body, and is a rejection of the philosophical theory that mental states are distinct from physical states. Ryle argues that the traditional approach to the relation of mind and body (i.e., the approach which is taken by the philosophy of Descartes) assumes that there is a basic distinction between Mind and Matter. According to Ryle, this assumption is a basic 'category-mistake,' because it attempts to analyze the relation betwen 'mind' and 'body' as if they were terms of the same logical category. Furthermore, Ryle argues that traditional Idealism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to