Mission Command Analysis Essay

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

Operation Al-Fajr in Arabic, Operation Phantom Fury was the code name given to the second battle of Fallujah, considered the hottest point of conflict of all the military campaign in Iraq. Led by the US Marine Corp against the Iraqi combatants, who had held the city under their control, some consider it was the most difficult battle marines have been involved since Vietnam in the 60s. The battle put end to the insurgent control over the city and constituted an important victory for the US troops, however such victory had a high painful price 1.

Using the damage and wreckage behind, they bolstered together a propaganda campaign to prove their cause to the world. In light of the tragic events, good came about. The failure of Operation Eagle Claw led to the creation of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). A review committee known as the Holloway Commission convened to improve U.S. special operations. (The Origins of Air Force Special Operations 2009) provided us with two major changes that came about to pave the road for future special operations. First, the DoD would establish a Counter Terrorism Joint Task Force. The CTJTF would consist of special operations members from all services. Here, they are to plan, train, and conduct operations together under joint doctrine. This change brought about the symmetry and cohesion between the services needed to conduct future high risk operations in denied territories. Secondly, a Special Operations Advisory Panel (SOAP) was established. This panel consists of high ranking officers and retired personnel well versed in special operations. They review and evaluate high risk missions and provide an independent assessment. If created, SOAP could’ve identified that the wrong helicopters were being used for the mission and chose the correct iron for the mission. To date, several operations have been successfully completed under extreme odds due to the lessons learned from Operation Eagle

During 2003, General Petraeus and his soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division had no clue of the astounding role they were about to embark on. General Petraeus found the city of Mosul in complete destruction, and knew it would take a cohesive effort through mutual trust and teamwork to restore the city. The city of Mosul did not only need a complete make over, but also a regime that shared a mutual understanding as Petraeus. Lastly, with the city rebuilding changes would bring hostility and risk to the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division. General David Petraeus was successful in Mosul, because he applied the mission command control principles of building cohesive teams, creating shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk.

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

After the First Battle of Fallujah in April of 2014 United States (US) Forces turned fighting over to Iraqi Fallujah Brigade general (General Muhammed Latif a former Baathist general. The Brigade later disbanded, in return opened the city up to insurgents. “Operation Phantom Fury” (Al-Fajr meaning Dawn) was the second Battle of Fallujah. Which consisted of United States (US), British, and Iraqi force (Multi National Forces). Operation were conducted from November

(FM3-0) Because of the minimal operational environment information, General Petraeus tasked Colonel Joe Anderson and the 2nd Brigade to do reconnaissance and report in detail. On Sunday, 20 April 2003, Colonel Anderson arrived at the Mosul airfield. There he found a small element of Marines from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit and some Special Forces. (ref book) Each group had vastly different views of the city. The people of Mosul were not pleased with the Marines: On Tuesday, 15 April 2003, a massive riot had broken out after Mishaan al Jabouri announced himself mayor of Mosul, and while conducting riot control, the Marines killed 17 Iraqis, making conditions unstable in Mosul and leaving the Marines on high alert.

The mission was to attack and clear al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), from Diyala Province in Baqubah The bad Intel was said that there were only 500 to 800 AQI combatants when we initiated operations in Buhriz. On the morning of 14 of March 2007, the Regulars would soon realize that we walked into a hornets nest. When the Regulars began clearing operations in Buhriz they did not know the exact number of AQI that would be in the city. Route (RTE) Gold was the only road into Buhriz this is where the Regulars would encounter their first improvised explosive device (IED), deep buried improvised explosive device (DBIED) and house borne improvised explosive device (HBIED). AQI had hundreds of mines and IED’s laid out in the roads or in manhole covers in sewer diches. (Cpt Chuck

His position taught him the crucial importance how excellent intelligence was to effective military operations and learned the mechanics of multinational operations. In 2002, General Petraeus assumed command for the U.S. Army’s 101st Airborne Division. In 2003, tasked with the mission to stage the division in

Operation HUSKY was a dismal display of mission command and integration at the operational level. GEN Eisenhower’s unwillingness to get involved in the planning and execution led to a lack of understanding and mistrust among subordinate leaders ultimately allowing German forces to evacuate to Italy. This essay will evaluate mission command by examining first Eisenhower’s leadership, or lack thereof, and the resultant lack of involvement by his ground commander, GEN Alexander. Resultantly, the two subordinate commanders, Patton and Montgomery, developed their own uncoordinated maneuvers. The essay will apply the joint attributes of commander’s intent, mutual trust and understanding as evaluation criteria to analyze the impacts of poor mission

Throughout history commanders and leaders at all echelons in armies across the globe have been required to make many decisions that affect operations both at home and abroad. These decisions were based on many different facts and assumptions available to the commander and his staff and then synthesized to produce orders for the various missions that were conducted across a myriad of operational environments. In today’s Army, commanders utilize the philosophy of mission command, which became prominent in the 1980’s. They do this through integration of the warfighting functions when conducting unified land operations (ADRP 6-0). The purpose of this paper is to explain mission command and how to integrate and apply this philosophy

The brand new mission that involved the 1-502nd Infantry regiment was not only a hostile, but a confusing one in the least. In 2005, the 502nd Infantry Regiment was flung out to the 330-square mile region in Southern Baghdad known as the “Triangle of Death,” homing one of the most dangerous insurgency in the country. This area was the focal battleground between the Sunnis and Shi’ites as well as the central grounds for terrorists to ferry men, weapons, and money into the capital (Frederickson 113). The 502nd Regiment was assigned to the task of root out insurgent strongholds, promote social and municipal revival, and to train the local Iraqi Army battalions into a competent fighting force,

The historical significance of the 2nd Battle of Fallujah immediately prompts us to look at the man behind it all, LTG Natonski. General Natonski ultimately retired from the Marine Corps in 2010, with his last assignment being commander of the Marine Corps Forces Command. Originally from Amsterdam, New York, Richard

Another major battle for the U.S. Marines during Operation Iraqi Freedom was the first battle of Fallujah is also known as “Operation Vigilant Resolve”. The killing of 4 Blackwater contractors on March 31st, 2004 sparked this operation by U.S. forces. The mission for the Marines during this battle was to set up a cordon just outside of the city to