Mind Body Dualism

In his writings, “A Contemporary Defense of Dualism,” J.P. Moreland argues the point that the mind and brain are separate from each other. It seems as a quick thought that both are the same. However, the mind deals with ideas, thoughts and hopes. The brain is made up of the neural process. Throughout the entire argument, Moreland tries to prove the theory of physicalism, which is the idea that only things that exist are composed of matter. His explanation is that the soul doesn’t exist and the brain controls everything.

In essence, Cartesian Dualism attempts to solve the mind-body problem – that is, what is the relationship between the mind and the body? The answer, according to this theory, is that the mind and the body are two distinctly different substances that constitute each person. Here, “mind” can be described as a nonphysical thing that thinks and “body” as a living physical thing that does not think. The mind can also exist independently of the body, and both can causally affect one another.

According to J.P. Moreland in his argument for dualism, he states that humans are composed of both an immaterial substance and a physical substance. Moreland notes that there are contrasting differences between the minds and the brains and that they are ultimately separate entities. By defending dualism, Moreland seeks to make nonbelievers believe in immaterial souls, while discrediting materialism. We can look at the arguments in which Moreland uses to support the argument of dualism and belief that the mind and brain are separate entities.

Thesis: The mind-body problem arises because of the lack of evidence when looking for a specific explanation of the interaction of mental and physical states, and the origin and even existence of them.

I am faced with the philosophical task of defending either dualism or materialism, depending on which one is most attractive to me. So either I support the theory of dualism, which is the belief that there is both a physical and a spiritual state, or I believe in materialism, which is the belief that everything that exists is material or physical. Although I believe materialism to be easier to prove, I find dualism more attractive to believe. Throughout the following, I will attempt to build a case for the theory of dualism giving insights both documented and personal. I will also shed light on the theory of materialism and the proofs that support this theory; showing that

The mind-body problem is an age-old topic in philosophy that questions the relationship between the mental aspect of life, such as the field of beliefs, pains, and emotions, and the physical side of life which deals with matter, atoms, and neurons. There are four concepts that each argue their respective sides. For example, Physicalism is the belief that humans only have a physical brain along with other physical structures, whereas Idealism argues that everything is mind-based. Furthermore, Materialism argues that the whole universe is purely physical. However, the strongest case that answers the commonly asked questions such as “Does the mind exist?” and “Is the mind your brain?” is Dualism.

Ryle is attempting here to undermine the Cartsian Dualism presnted by Descartes in the 17th Century, whcih has since become the accepted answer to the Mind/Body Promblem, which Ryle later refers to as ‘the Dogma of the Ghost Machine’. Ryle goes as far as to say that this dogma is entirely false, not in it’s details but in principle itself.

The mind is perhaps the most fascinating part of the human body due to its complexity and ability to rationalize. In essence, the mind-body problem studies the relation of the mind to the body, and states that each human being seems to embody two unique and somewhat contradictory natures. Each human contains both a nature of matter and physicality, just like any other object that contains atoms in the universe. However, mankind also is constituted of something beyond materialism, which includes its ability to rationalize and be self-aware. This would imply that mankind is not simply another member of the world of matter because some of its most distinctive features cannot be accounted for in this manner. There are obvious differences between physical and mental properties. Physical properties are publically accessible, and have weight, texture, and are made of matter. Mental properties are not publically accessible, and have phenomenological texture and intentionality (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). This is challenging to philosophers, because man cannot be categorized as a material or immaterial object, but rather a combination of both mind and body (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). Man embodies mind-body dualism, meaning he is a blend of both mind and matter (Stewart, Blocker, Petrick, 2013). The mind-body problem creates conflict among philosophers, especially when analyzing physicalism in its defense. This paper outlines sound

One of the most talked about concepts of philosophy is that of the mind-body problem. In short, the mind-body problem is the relationship between the mind and the body. Specifically, it’s the connection between our mental realm of thoughts, including beliefs, ideas, sensations, emotions, and our physical realm, the actual matter of which we are made up of the atoms, neurons. The problem comes when we put the emphasis on mind and body. Are the mind and body one physical thing, or two separate entities. Two arguments have stood amongst the rest, Interactionism and physicalism. Interactionism claims that mind and matter are two separate categories with a casual integration between the two. By contrast, physicalism draws from the idea that all aspects of the human body are under one physical being, there are no nonphysical connections that come into play. While both state a clear and arguable statement regarding mind-body problem, Interactionism gives a more plausible answer to the mind-body problem because although it may seem like we are tied as one, our minds have a subconscious that influence our thoughts, actions, ideas, and beliefs, which is completely independent from the realm of our physical matter.

“The mind-body dualism, in philosophy, is the fact that any theory that the mind and body are distinct kinds of substances or natures. This position implies that mind and body not only differ in meaning, but refer to different kinds of entities (Britannica).” The most basic form of dualism is substance dualism. Substance dualism is the idea that he mind and body are composed of two ontologically distinct substances. According to one who believes and studies dualism, the mind is comprised of a non-physical substance, while the body is constituted of the physical substance, also known as matter. Dualism is closely related to the philosophy of Rene Descartes. Descartes identified the mind with consciousness and self-awareness and distinguished this from the brain. He believed that the brain was the seat of all intelligence. This lead to a great debate over the mind and body. So, ultimately, what is the nature of the mind and consciousness and its relationship to the body?

It can be very difficult to find a universal proposal that offers a solution to the mind body problem. While solutions to this problem differ greatly, all attempt to answer questions such as: What makes a mental state mental? What is the fundamental nature of the mental? Or more specifically speaking, what makes a thought a thought? Or what makes a pain a pain? In an attempt to answer these questions, many philosophers over the centuries have rejected, proposed, or altered preexisting theories in order to keep up with the thinking and science of their times. Entering the 21st century their still exit a plethora of theories, some stronger than others, which include Cartesian dualism, physicalism,

on despite the fact of not having any toes. If this notion of pain can still be remembered and even experienced within a person who no longer possesses feet with C-fibers, then the correlation must be incorrect. And, if “the damage to the toe is merely the ordinary cause of the sensation; the sensation itself is not spatially located in the toe” (Gertler 286). This means that the sensation of a stubbed toe can in fact be experienced within the brain or mind and does not have to be a result of C-fiber stimulation. This yields an entirely different concept of pain, one that Gertler focuses on and one that explains Mind-Body Dualism. To prove physicalism is false, Gertler moves to show that pain can occur in the absence of any physical state, and to help prove this, Gertler uses evidence from thought experiments to determine what is conceivably possible. The way in which thought experiments work is by the use of one’s own imagination; “one performs a thought experiment by attempting to imagine a given scenario, and then carefully reflecting on the outcome of this exercise” (287). Because everyone’s imagination is different,

In Brains and Behavior, Hilary Putnam puts forth an argument against strong and weak analytic behaviorism. According to Putnam, strong analytic behaviorism is the view that, “all talk about ‘mental events’ is translatable into talk about overt behavior” (Putnam, 25). This means that all of an individual’s observable behavior is a direct expression of that individual’s mental state. Moreover, this is the idea that when people are talking about one’s mental events, they are actually talking about one’s behavior. Furthermore, according to Putnam, weak analytic behaviorism is the view that “there exists entailments between mind-statements and behavior-statements; entailments that are not, perhaps, analytic in the way in which ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is analytic, but that nevertheless follow (in some sense) from the meanings of mind words. I shall call these analytic entailments” (Putnam, 25). On this view, behaviorism is no longer defined in the strict, analytical sense; rather, this is the view that one’s mental state is the logical antecedents for his or her behavior. Moreover, this view states that it logically follows that someone will behave in a certain way if he or

Many philosophers agree that consciousness provides a very difficult problem in understanding the mind-body concept; this is why from a materialist’s point of view, the problem is not sufficient enough for giving one’s attention. Thomas Negal on the other hand, finds the problem rather interesting. Negal’s “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” proposes a number of arguments, one of them which states that the subjective approach to the mind-body problem should be abandoned for a more objective approach (Nagel 1974, pp. 436). The purpose of this essay is to show that Negal’s arguments are sufficient in describing whether it is indeed possible to know what it is like to be a bat, portraying his arguments in an orderly fashion, and ultimately

Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949) is a critique of the notion that the mind is distinct from the body, and is a rejection of the philosophical theory that mental states are distinct from physical states. Ryle argues that the traditional approach to the relation of mind and body (i.e., the approach which is taken by the philosophy of Descartes) assumes that there is a basic distinction between Mind and Matter. According to Ryle, this assumption is a basic 'category-mistake,' because it attempts to analyze the relation betwen 'mind' and 'body' as if they were terms of the same logical category. Furthermore, Ryle argues that traditional Idealism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to