Mcclellan Battle

The American Civil War has become a point of controversy and argument when discussing key events in shaping America. The arguments that arise when discussing the war tend to focus on whether the Confederate was constitutionally justified in seceding, or whether the North had the right to prevent the secession. However, when discussing the America Civil War and the idea of separation, it is important to be mindful that separation did not simply end at the state level. Letters written by Jesse Rolston, Jr. and Jedediah Hotchkiss portray two significantly different attitudes toward the war, despite the fact that the writers both fought for the Confederate States and give accounts of the same battle, one of which ended in the Confederate’s favor. When examining the documents, both writers express different viewpoints on life on and off the battlefield. This significant difference represents a division amongst the Confederate army.

McClellan’s caution in waging war is evidenced clearly in the Army of the Potomac’s Peninsula Campaign. McClellan was charged with leading the assault on Richmond, delivering what could have been a fatal blow against the Confederacy. During the Army of the Potomac’s movements towards Richmond, McClellan repeatedly delayed, believing he had inferior numbers to his initial adversary, Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston. Johnston knew the caution McClellan was prone to, and slowly drew McClellan closer to Confederate forces defending Richmond. At the Battle of Seven Pines, Johnston reinforced the idea in McClellan’s mind that caution was necessary. (McPherson, 1988, p. 461) The surprise attach by Johnston’s forces, though ultimately defeated by the Army of the Potomac, delayed McClellan’s advance as he called for more reinforcements from Washington. Johnston was wounded in the battle, and replaced by General Robert E. Lee. Lee, whose prowess as a tactician bordered on legendary, led a series of surprise attacks against McClellan’s Army of the Potomac in the Seven Days’ Battle. McClellan’s forces were pushed back, and he was relieved of duty as commander of the Army of the Potomac, until later in 1862. (McPherson, 1988, pp. 462-470)

The Battle of Antietam began on September 17, 1862, in Sharpsburg, Washington County, Maryland. General George B. McClellan was the commander of the Union Army while General Robert E. Lee led the Confederate Army. General Robert E. Lee advanced into Maryland and planned to invade up into Pennsylvania. Lee planned a surprise attack against Union forces, but the battle plans were found wrapped around cigars by a Union soldier. On September 16, 1862, General George B. McClellan and the Confederate Army led by General Lee faced each other in Sharpsburg, Maryland along Antietam Creek. It was not until the next day that the battle officially began. General Joseph Hooker was the first to attack the Confederacy. Despite General Lee being outnumbered

McClellan was the one who organized the Army of the Potomac in 1861 and served as General-in-Chief of the Union Army. His men liked him as a leader, but George was defeated in the Battle of Antietam. Because of his loss, Lincoln took away his command of the Army of the Potomac in late 1862. He lost in a Presidential campaign against Lincoln in 1864 and later became Governor of New Jersey.

Ewell reached Heidlersburg at night on June 30 where he received a message from General Lee giving him orders to march his two divisions the next day either to Cashtown or Gettysburg, "as circumstances might dictate." A note from A.P. Hill stated that his troops were at Cashtown. With Lee not giving a clear command, Ewell decided to move westerly toward Hill at Cashtown, but by way that would allow him to turn south toward Gettysburg "as circumstances might dictate." Lee took it for granted that his orders were understood by his generals not to bring on a general battle and that those instructions were to followed on the next day, July 1 as well. Before looking for a fight, Lee wanted his entire army within easy reach.

Jackson: As you can see the north and the south were fighting across the Antietam creek and was pretty devastating to the south after the north eventually won the battle.

The Battle of Antietam could have been a devastating and fatal blow to the Confederate Army if Gen. McClellan acted decisively, took calculated risks, and veered away from his cautious approach to war. There are many instances leading up to the battle and during the battle in which he lacks the necessary offensive initiative to effectively cripple and ultimately win the war. This paper is intended to articulate the failure of Mission Command by GEN McClellan by pointing out how he failed to understand, visualize, describe and direct the battlefield to his benefit.

Maj. Gen. “Fighting Joe” Hooker demonstrated an excellent example of failed mission command during the Battle of Chancellorsville in April 1863. He had thought he would defeat General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia by maneuver beginning in Chancellorsville as he pushed Lee toward Richmond. His commitment toward his own plan for Lee’s response would overshadow his operational planning and ultimately lead to a mission command failure at Chancellorsville despite outnumbering Lee’s troops 128,000 to 60,000. Through decentralized execution, Hooker could have empowered agile and adaptive leadership to operate under uncertainty, exploit opportunities, and achieve unity of effort. Instead, he failed in exercising at least four principles of mission command. He did not provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, exercise disciplined initiative, or accept prudent risk.

The article that I read was Antietam in the Civil War and i got this information from from http://www.shmoop.com/civil-war/antietam-battle.html. General Mcclellan failed to take Richmond and confederate officials planned to recapture lost territory in the east. After Lee planned to seize railroads feeding into Washington.

Civil War historians view the Battle of Chancellorsville as General Robert E. Lee’s “greatest and most remarkable” victory (Sears 1). Lee, facing an army twice his size, defies all military doctrine and divides his army multiple times in order to out-maneuver and surprise the Union forces. The daring maneuver succeeds and ultimately forces the Union’s Army of the Potomac to retreat. The victory was another major blow to Union troops, but it came at a huge cost to the Confederacy: the loss of General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson. By evaluating the battle through the lens of the mission command activities, one can see how Lee’s daring maneuver was actually very calculated and his only option for victory. Throughout the rest of this paper, I will describe the timeline of the battle and how General Lee used the mission command activities of understand, visualize, assess, and lead to ultimately achieve victory at Chancellorsville.

Commanders at all levels face increasingly challenging scenarios as the operational environment changes. Some instinctively motivate and empower their subordinates to think and act independently, thereby influencing actions during combat. However, those who understand the commanders' activities of mission command will influence not only subordinates, but the outcome of the battle as well. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders.1 Commanders who understood the importance of mission command was Major General Horatio Gates. General Gates at the Battle of Saratoga successfully

One of McClellan goals was to have crushed Lee’s army. The 1st Texas army lost 82% of their own men during the Battle of Antietam, this battle was the highest casualty rate for any Confederate regiment out of any of the battles of the Civil War. George McClellan was slow, cautious and defensive. The battle ground Lee had was suited for his defense. Lee withdrew on September 18 in defeat. The battle of Antietam was the bloodiest day in American history.Alex Gardner took pictures of the battlefield and got pictures of the dead and wounded. It was on an early morning morning of September 17, 1862. It was called Antietam because the names, places after their

The Confederates in the middle of the battlefield, led by General D.H. Hill, were in a sunken road that they were told to hold at any price. Colonel John B. Gordon said to General Lee “these men are going to stay here, general, till the sun goes down or victory is won.” They shot from the sunken road at the approaching Northern generals French and Richardson’s soldiers of General Sumner’s corp. The union line retreated 5 times, but kept returning. For some unexplained reasoning, the right of the Confederate boundary ultimately stammered and subsided. Union General Richardson exploited this convenience and went in the Confederate right. He attacked through the sunken

The Battle of Fredericksburg falls in a long list of failures of the Army of the Potomac during the first year of the American Civil War. Following the Battle of Antietam the Northern Army had the opportunity to defeat Lee’s army. However, Northerners, were shocked by Lee’s escape following this battle on 17 September 1862, and were further upset by Major General George B. McClellan’s procrastination in pursuing Lee and allowing General J.E.B. Stuarts daring cavalry raid into Pennsylvania around Gettysburg (10-12 October 1862). McClellan’s failure to pursue Lee’s Army is mainly due to his own lack of confidence, believing that he doesn’t have enough men or material in order to defeat the Army of Virginia. President Lincoln had finally

Johnston originally planned to attack Grant on April 4, but delays postponed it until the 6th. Attacking the Union troops on the morning of the 6th, the Confederates surprised them, routing many. Some Federals made determined stands and by afternoon, they had established a battle line at the sunken road, known as the "Hornets Nest." Repeated Rebel attacks failed to carry the Hornets Nest, but massed artillery helped to turn the tide as Confederates surrounded the Union troops and captured, killed, or wounded most. Johnston had been mortally wounded earlier and his second in command, Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, took over. The Union troops established another line covering Pittsburgh Landing, anchored with artillery and augmented by Buell’s men who began to arrive and take up positions. Fighting continued until after dark, but the Federals held. By the next morning, the combined Federal forces numbered about 40,000, outnumbering Beauregard’s army of less than 30,000. Beauregard was unaware of the arrival of Buell’s army and launched a counterattack in response to a two-mile advance by William Nelson’s division of Buell’s army at 6:00 am, which was, at first, successful. Union troops stiffened and began forcing the Confederates back. Beauregard ordered a counterattack, which stopped the Union advance but did not break its battle line. At this point, Beauregard realized that he could not win and, having suffered too many